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ABSTRACT

TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND THE PROMOTION OF
CONSERVATIONIST NORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
MAY 2011
KEMI GEORGE, B.A., OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas

The political economic pressures of development contribute to unsustainable
environmental practices in developing countries, and marginalize civil society
participation. This dissertation looks at the following countries where policymakers are
faced with strong incentives to foster rapid economic growth. In Jamaica, the bauxite
industry demands mining rights in sensitive mountainous ecosystems. In Mexico, the
tourist industry demands access to construct in vulnerable coastal environments in the
southeast. In inland Mexico, unregulated agriculture threatens ecosystems in the Yucatán
Peninsula. Finally, tourist and energy industries in Egypt demand access for
infrastructure in sensitive ecosystems in the Red Sea region. In all of the cases, the
preferences of these sectors threaten to displace local communities, while creating
unsustainable pressures on the environment. At the same time, the projected revenues
from these sectors justify continued environmental exploitation.
In response, transnational networks of environmental advocates and epistemic
communities mobilized throughout the 1990s, lobbying the Global Environment Facility
vi

for conservationist projects in each country, and then lobbying governments to effectively
implement the projects.
This research finds that three conditions were necessary for transnational
networks to influence policies associated with project implementation. First, networks
must generate an internal scientific agreement on the dimensions of the environmental
problem. By doing so, they can delegitimate competing arguments, strengthening their
own claims. Second, networks must build social ties with policymakers in powerful
agencies. Social ties increase the likelihood that policymakers will adopt the norms of
the network. Third, networks must reframe the discourse on environmental management.
At present, policymakers and industry argue that environmental management should be
assessed by its contribution to economic development, validating only those policies that
lead to sustained revenue generation. By reframing environmental management as an
issue impacting the wellbeing of domestic populations, networks can argue for the greater
participation of actors marginalized by the dominance of privileged productive sectors in
resource management. Moreover, by linking sustainable resource use to the interests of
domestic populations, networks can generate political capital to oppose the most
unsustainable environmental practices. This research thus builds on the epistemic
communities approach by highlighting the importance of democracy in knowledgebuilding and environmental governance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMY, BIODIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC
COMMUNITIES
Introduction
Global environmental governance is a product not only of representatives of
governments acting in what they perceive of as their national interest, but also of nonstate actors acting in the interest of what they consider to be globally applicable norms.
Scholars such as Khagram,1 Wapner,2 Keck and Sikkink,3 and Haas4 point out that nonstate actors can influence the conduct of international environmental treaties and global
management frameworks when they persuade policymakers and governmental
representatives that a particular course of action is appropriate in a given context.
Further, these scholars note that this persuasive capacity does not only depend on
marshaling material resources. Transnational corporations (TNCs) may have profit
margins that exceed the GDP of small states, but environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs) have to rely on carefully chosen arguments to convince

1

Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water
and Power (New York: Cornell University Press)
2

See Paul Wapner, 1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (New York:
SUNY Press)
3

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998 Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press)
4

Peter Haas 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy
coordination. International Organization 46: 1-35
1

policymakers to act in a certain manner.
Recognizing the potential impact of non-state actors on environmental
governance, institutions in the UN constellation have reiterated calls made in Agenda 21
that civil society actors be included in global governance efforts. For example, UNESCO
has called for the inclusion of the civil society in the management of Biosphere Reserves,
both on functional grounds, as civil society actors may serve as potential sources of
expertise, and normative grounds, to improve the democratic nature of policymaking.5
The Global Environment Facility (GEF),6 created to foster environmental capacity and
will in LDCs, likewise asserts that non-state actors should play a role in managing
biodiversity at the grassroots level.
Of course, that non-state actors advocate for their internally held ideas about
appropriate management does not mean that they will be successful. Formal inclusion in
stakeholder processes may obscure the fact that authority over environmental
policymaking remains concentrated in state hands. Government agencies are under no
obligation to listen to the recommendations of the civil society, and may jealously guard
their authority over policymaking. If non-state actors matter in global environmental
governance, under what conditions and when are they most likely to do so?
5

See, e.g., UNESCO, 2006, Biosphere Reserves: Biodiversity and Stakeholders.

Available online at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001465/146566e.pdf
6

The GEF was created between 1990 – 1992 as a funding mechanism to LDCs, to foster
compliance with several internationally important environmental goals, including
biodiversity conservation, ozone depletion, and land degradation. As a result, it was
made the official funding mechanism for several multilateral environmental agreement
(MEAs), including the CBD.
2

This research is particularly interested in the impact of non-state actors on
environmental policymaking and governance in less developed countries (LDCs) for two
related reasons. First, certain global environmental problems, such as deforestation,
biodiversity loss, water access issues and desertification are manifested almost
exclusively within the developing world.7 Moreover, these problem areas can generally
be managed unilaterally, distinguishing them from transboundary and global
environmental issues such as acid rain, ozone depletion and transnational waste
movement, which require that regulatory policies be coordinated internationally. As a
result, effective management of these problems will depend strongly on persuading LDC
governments to implement meaningful environmental reforms.
Second, it is suggested that the environmental problems faced by developing
countries, in conjunction with their position in the global production of capital, has led to
a situation in which LDC governments are only going to respond to very specific
arguments for environmental management. In particular, arguments that highlight the
potential for national economic development are likely to be more persuasive to LDC
policymakers. This research investigates the efforts of transnational activists in
developing countries to determine whether non-state actors are constrained by the need to

7

See inter alia, Marc Williams, 2005, The Third World and Global Environmental
Negotiations: Interests, Institutions and Ideas (Global Environmental Politics, 5: 48 –
69); Adil Najam, 2004, Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in
Desertification Negotiations (Global Environmental Politics, 4: 128 – 154); Susan Sell,
1996, North-South Environmental Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodiversity
(Global Governance, 2: 97 – 118) pp. 110. See in particular, Marian Miller, 1995, The
Third World in Global Environmental Politics, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner) for a
discussion of the Third World as a negotiating bloc in global biodiversity governance.
3

appeal to economics to promote better environmental behavior.

Less Developed Countries, the Environment, and Development
The idea that LDCs have a particular relationship to the environment and to
development was made internationally prominent in the early 1970s. In the lead up to the
1972 Stockholm Conference, Maurice Strong and 26 experts from developing countries
published the Founex Report, in which they argued that the environmental problems of
less developed countries (LDCs) were fundamentally different from those of highly
industrialized countries (HICs). In brief, LDCs face structural factors that differentiate
them from HICs.
First, the environmental problems of immediate consequence to LDCs are not
generally those receiving most attention in the international arena. Rather than
confronting global “green” environmental issues such as biodiversity loss, ozone
depletion and transboundary acid rain, the pressing environmental issues facing LDCs are
predominately those associated with local, “brown” developmental problems, such as
access to sanitary drinking water, communicable diseases and a chronic lack of adequate
housing,8 all of which are exacerbated or caused by poverty, technological disadvantages

8

Dana R. Fisher and Jessica F. Green, 2004, Understanding Disenfranchisement: Civil
Society and Developing Countries’ Influence and Participation in Global Governance for
Sustainable Development (Global Environmental Politics, 4: 65 – 84) pp. 68; Adil
Najam, 2004, Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in
Desertification Negotiations (Global Environmental Politics 4: 128 – 154); Jordi Diez
and O. P. Dwivedi, 2008, Global Environmental Challenges: Perspectives from the
Global South (Broadview Press); Roberts and Parks in 2007, A Climate of Injustice:
Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press)..
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and low capital development. Currently, the Millennium Development Goals, drafted in
2000 as a blueprint for eradicating global poverty, explicitly links underdevelopment to
environmental problems endemic to LDCs.
Second, global environmental problems such as climate change, transboundary
acidification and ozone depletion, are predominantly the result of action taken by HICs
during the era of industrialization.9 LDCs that do experience negative externalities of
these problems, for example the low-lying Maldives and poverty-stricken coastal
Bangladesh, both vulnerable to climatic disruptions and rising oceanic levels, are
suffering from the poor environmental behavior of other, richer states. Poor states are
also less likely to be able to mitigate environmental catastrophe. Global environmental
governance then takes on strong undertones of injustice, as LDCs bear a disproportionate
burden of the costs of management.10
Third, in the practice of international politics, LDCs tend to be disenfranchised.
Environmental governance is generally dominated by HICs, either because international
institutions, such as the World Bank, are dominated by HICs, or because negotiations
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atmosphere, NASA, Major and Minor Sources of Stratospheric Chlorine, 2001, retrieved
April 2006 from http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/depletion.html
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require a level of expertise and technical knowledge beyond the reach of most LDCs.11
Fourth, many of the environmental problems associated with LDCs are ostensibly
solvable by industrial development. As countries become richer and more industrialized,
they will better be able to reduce domestic environmental vulnerability, and respond to
pressing issues such as water access and housing problems. Therefore, LDC
governments would arguably be better served by focusing on domestic economic
development to address the “poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and sheer misery”12
characterizing domestic natural resource use, rather than spending scarce resources on
assisting the international society to address ‘global’ environmental problems.
Fifth, LDCs are highly indebted. The pressure of debt-servicing in the global
South, as well as the dependence of these countries on the export of agricultural
commodities means that LDCs are stuck in a perpetual game of ‘catch-up’ to the model
of development exemplified by the developed world. This contributes to further
subordination of the environment to development, as LDCS attempt to solve their
economic problems and address chronic underdevelopment by increasing the stress on
their production of primary goods and agriculture.13
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Margaret Biswas and Asit K. Biswas, 1982, Environment and Sustained Development
in the Third World: A Review of the Past Decade (Third World Quarterly 4 (3): 479 –
491) pp. 484.
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Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global
Agreements (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 19. This situation is neither
ecologically nor politically sustainable in the long term. The 1987 WCED Report noted
the interplay of global markets and the comparative disadvantage of LDCs in the
international capital markets by observing that “economic policies of some major
6

The combination of these factors means that environmental management in LDCs
poses significant opportunity costs to governments. Curbing deforestation or addressing
biodiversity loss might be environmentally friendly at the global level, but at a domestic
cost for LDCs, which have to limit, inter alia, road construction, agricultural expansion
and the construction of living areas for a growing population.14 Given these economic
and environmental pressures, one concern is that attempts to promote environmentally
friendly ideas and behavior will be constrained by the overwhelming concern of LDC
governments to promote short-term growth, almost always by exploiting natural
resources. Can transnational civil society networks persuade policymakers in LDCs to
adopt environmentally friendly ideas, particularly when the benefits of managing goods
like biodiversity are diffused globally and the costs concentrated domestically? Can
ideas about environmentalism prevail over the economic developmental concerns of
LDCs?
The Role of Ideas in International Relations
By focusing on the use of ideas and persuasion to shape state behavior and
governance, this research takes a constructivist approach to explaining international
relations. In short, constructivism asserts that ideas deployed by non-state actors can

industrial countries had depressed and destabilized the international economy, which
aggravated these pressures on developing countries,” cited in Steven Bernstein 2001,
The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism pp. 65
14

See Steven Bernstein, 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmetnalism; Marian
Miller, 1995. The Third World in Global Environmental Politics. Colorado: Lynne Reiner
Publishers; Phillip Fearnside, 1986; Human Capacity of the Brazilian Rainforest;
Columbia University Press, New York
7

shape behavior by precluding or endorsing certain policy options. This diverges from
much of traditional IR which limits the study of causal variables to the distribution of
military capabilities and other material resources among unitary actors (almost always
states) with fixed, definable interests.
The kinds of ideas deemed consequential in constructivism may vary. Causal
arguments may clarify that certain actions will result in outcomes that are harmful to
existing interests. Norms, or ideas about appropriate behavior by a specific group of
actors in a given context, may indicate that certain actions are simply inappropriate.
In political science, the power of ideas has been used to explain several prominent
international outcomes. The downfall of the Soviet Union; international support for
sanctions against apartheid South Africa; the stability of the international currency
regime; the tendency of states to create meaningless but costly institutions for
environmental governance; and global reluctance to use nuclear weapons have all been
attributed to the responses of states to internationally held norms, rather than to changes
in material conditions. The Soviet Empire was brought down by internal conflicts
between the ideas of democratic capitalism and Soviet statism, not by changes in the
distribution of military power between the two poles.15 The international society,
including the US and the UK, both of which had economic ties to South Africa, imposed
crippling sanctions against the apartheid regime to protest the idea of institutionalized
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Explanation of the INF Treaty (Ashgate)
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racial hierarchy.16 Despite the decline of US hegemony and the loss of the gold standard,
the international system of states maintained internationally stable trade through the
principle of competitive currency devaluation.17 States have adopted a norm of
environmental multilateralism, and thus create treaties and institutions to address
problems such as global deforestation, even when there is no additional problem-solving
capacity gained by doing so.18 Although contemporary conventional weapons may
exceed the destructive power of nuclear weapons, international revulsion against using
nukes has meant a de facto 65-year ban on their use, despite the eruption of several
military conflicts in that time-span.19 In all of these examples, norms affected how states
behaved.

Constructivism, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance
This research continues in the tradition of constructivism by attempting to explain
when norms matter, what kinds of norms matter, and identify which actors deploy norms
16
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Security. New York: Columbia University Press
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to constrain behavior. To be sure, some constructivist approaches restrict the study of
relevant actors to focus on the state.20 However, this research is developed from existing
approaches that focus on the role of non-state actors known as transnational advocacy
networks (TANs), loosely-organized coalitions of “actors working internationally on an
issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense
exchange of information and services.”21
TANs have been instrumental in several instances of global environmental
governance. Existing studies point out that TANs have: persuaded Brazilian
policymakers and the World Bank to endorse environmental impact assessments of
Amazonian development on indigenous communities;22 lobbied states to push for the
adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling in the International Whaling
Convention (IWC);23 convinced the World Bank to allow independent review of the

20

See Alexander Wendt, 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of it. International
Organization 46, 2; Alexander Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics.
New York Cambridge University Press.
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Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998 Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press) pp. 2. As networks oriented around a shared purpose,
one not based on national loyalties, TANs challenge the primacy of the sovereign
nation-state as the primary organizing principle of relevant action in international
politics. Some scholars however, such as Lucy Ford, are critical of the idea that the
global civil society represents a fundamental change in the ordering of power and
preferences in global governance. Rather, they argue, the global civil society reproduces
the same divisions of labor and international hierarchy (2003, Challenging Global
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Environmental Politics 3 (2): 120 – 134).
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environmental and social impact of dams in India;24 assisted states to negotiate the UN
Convention on the Law of the Seas;25 and persuaded consumers in Western Europe to
boycott Shell in protest against deep sea disposal of oil storage structures.26
These cases demonstrate the dynamic, multilevel activity of TANs. They may
shape international outcomes by constraining the language and negotiation of
international treaties, influencing the mandates of international organizations, or by
influencing the behavior of other politically significant transnational non-state actors,
who then shape state behavior from the ground up by domestic, grassroots activism.27

Epistemic Communities
In explaining how TANs generate norms and persuade target audiences to change
behavior, this research relies strongly on the epistemic communities approach. Epistemic
communities are knowledge-based networks of individuals who are recognized as experts
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24
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in one field of research, and who share a consensus on: causal beliefs; normative
concerns; appropriate policy recommendations; and scientific validity claims.28 Keck
and Sikkink indicate that epistemic communities are different from TANs by
distinguishing the principled ideas held by TANs from the shared causal ideas driving
epistemic community action, and by arguing that TANs rely on interpretation and
meaning, whereas epistemic communities do not.29 However, it is not clear that there is a
decisive difference between the two categories of networks. Both Haas30 and Litfin31
point out that epistemic communities deliberately selected certain cognitive models to
interpret data, understand problems and explain complex processes to policymakers
negotiating a treaty to curb ozone depletion. Further, Litfin, Haas and Karvonen and
Brand32 assert that epistemic communities are also motivated by principled beliefs and

28
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York: Routledge).
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Khagram, Riker and Sikkink indicate that epistemic communities may constitute
important actors in broader transnational networks.33 Finally, principled networks often
use scientific knowledge to buttress their policy claims.34 This dissertation will treat
epistemic communities as a particular subset of transnational networks by virtue of the
fact that, while consensually held scientific knowledge is an important constitutive
element in epistemic communities, they nevertheless share features with TANs, including
shared principles that transcend national identity.
The use of consensually validated scientific knowledge distinguishes epistemic
community action from other kinds of TANs, as moral claims, unlike scientific
reasoning, do not rely on hypothesis testing and the validation of causal relationships
pertinent to an emerging problem.35 The fields of expertise of epistemic communities
include natural science, but these networks may be comprised of social scientists,
including economists and legal scholars.36
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Scientific reasoning and shared causal beliefs not only distinguish epistemic
communities from other kinds of advocacy networks, but also are the causal mechanisms
by which epistemic communities shape environmental governance. Scientific knowledge
claims are commonly seen as ‘objective,’ ‘competent,’ and ‘valid,’ and science portrayed
as derived from a “permanent, ahistorical” truth.37 It should be noted, however, that the
perceived objective, impartial nature of science, while generally accepted by the lay
public, is often contested by academics, analysts and advocates.38 Nevertheless, the
perception of scientific consensus reduces uncertainty, de-legitimates competing claims,
and clarifies appropriate courses of action.39 When science-based communities generate
a consensus about causal relationships in a problem area, they have a powerful cognitive
tool to convince target audiences, including state policymakers, corporations, and
epistemic community. John Ruggie,1998. Constructing World Polity. Routledge
37
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secretariats of international institutions to adopt a certain understanding of the world and
act appropriately.
At the same time, networks motivated by principled beliefs may yet play an
important role in the advocacy efforts of epistemic communities. Principled networks
can provide financial, political and intellectual support to emerging epistemic
communities, all of which may improve the ability of these knowledge-based networks to
generate credible, up-to-date information.
The epistemic communities approach has been applied to explain several
instances of global environmental governance. The development of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe’s convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP),40 the creation of a Mediterranean Action Plan to manage oil pollution,41 and
the negotiation of the regulatory Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer42 have been attributed to efforts networks of scientific
researchers to persuade target audiences of the need to modify behavior to an emerging
problem. Though the particulars differed, the causal explanation in each case was that a
40
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Wettestad, 1997, Acid Lessons? LRTAP Implementation and Effectiveness (Global
Environmental Change 7(3): 235–249).
41

Peter Haas, 1990, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press);
Peter Haas, 1989, Do Regimes Matter: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control. (International Organization 43: 377-403).
42

Peter Haas, 1992, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to
protect stratospheric ozone, in Peter Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power and International
Policy Coordination (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 187 - 224)
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scientific consensus among a network of publicly recognized experts was used to
persuade policymakers to implement policy in accordance with the conclusions derived
from the arguments of the experts.43

Issue-framing and the Socio-Political Context of Knowledge
At the same time, the success of epistemic communities depends on more than
getting the science right. While scientific authority is an important cognitive tool
available to epistemic communities, civil society networks nevertheless have to persuade
target audiences, whether policymakers or CEOs, that their claims are salient, and that
their interests are congruent with the pre-existing interests of managers.44 This requires
that epistemic communities and TANs negotiate the social and political norms in which
they operate, as causal arguments that violate institutionalized norms will be dismissed
by target audiences, even if the underlying science is valid.45 It is this need to appeal to
domestic norms that suggests that epistemic communities will have to frame their
arguments in language that is likely to appeal to the worldview of managers.
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In discussing the success of a transnational epistemic community in persuading
policymakers to adopt international regulations on ozone management, Karen Litfin
points out that skillful issue-framing, as much as scientific credibility played a significant
role. Prior to 1986, there was no international support for a strong regulatory regime to
curb the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODSs).46
Uncertainty over the rates of increased ozone loss from additional emissions of ODSs,
and an approach that discussed ecological and human effects of ozone depletion led to
little agreement among experts on what the significance of ozone loss was.
However, between 1986 and 1987, scientists linked the discovery of an anomaly
in the ozone layer over the Antarctic with a change in the perception of the problem to
focus on stratospheric chlorine loading and increased skin cancer rates. With this model
of the problem, scientists then suggested that “…something unprecedented and
potentially catastrophic was happening in the stratosphere.”47 This normative
interpretation of the problem led to greater support from US Congressmen for a stronger
international approach to ozone governance, and eventual adoption of the regulatory
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et al, 2001, Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion and Climate Change, p. 38. Haas et al,
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Montreal Protocol.
The strategic change in the description of the problem of ozone depletion suggests
that the ability to choose appropriate frames (or the set of metaphors, symbolic
representations, and cognitive cues used to interpret an issue, provide a rationale for
action, and mobilize support)48 is an additional important cognitive tool increasing the
success of scientific arguments. By extension, when emerging problem areas are framed
in such a way as to resonate with the predetermined interests and institutionalized norms
of target audiences, managers are more likely to self-identify as potential stakeholders,
and internalize the arguments presented.49

Economics, Politics, and Management in Developing Countries

If frames and institutionalized norms affect how knowledge is propagated by nonstate norm entrepreneurs, then one concern about environmental management in LDCs is
that institutionalized economic norms will constrain the propagation of environmental
arguments. In other words, environmental management in LDCs may be limited by the
norms and historical development particular to the developing world. This dissertation
investigates this concern by testing the hypothesis: H1: transnational advocacy networks
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Ronald B. Mitchell, William C. Clark, and David Cash, 2006, Information and
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must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order
to influence LDC governments. Focusing on national economic development encourages
advocacy networks and other norm entrepreneurs to link environmental management to
prominent, economic productive sectors. These vary across cases, and are described in
more detail throughout.

Influence, Knowledge and Power
Influence is a function of power; networks exercise influence when they convince
policymakers to take action that they ordinarily would not have. However, this
knowledge-based view of power is not materialistic, nor is it manipulative in the sense
that it is a product of networks convincing policymakers to act against their objectively
determined interests.50 From a constructivist perspective, interests are not fixed, but are
constituted by norms, and hence subject to change in ways not entirely dependent on
material realities. Thus, by exercising knowledge-based power, networks do more than
bring problems to light. They attempt to negotiate meanings and shape the discourse
around an emerging issue-area.51
As discussed in this research, the successful exercise of influence by networks
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means that policymakers will look to epistemic communities for information and
theories, accept the conclusions drawn by scientists, and adopt the policy implications
therein.52 Further, the frameworks used by policymakers to understand an emerging
problem may also change, indicating a deeper level of influence. In practice, this means
a concordance between the proposals made by networks and the policies and
management approaches adopted by policymakers, provided that these represent a change
from the previous manner of doing things. If the first hypothesis is correct, the influence
of knowledge networks in LDCs will be sharply constrained by the need to appeal to
national economic development norms, even if scientific consensus is present.
Consequently, transnational activism in LDCs will be affected by different factors than
activism in the industrialized world.
This hypothesis is tested in conjunction with additional tests of hypotheses drawn
from the epistemic communities literature. As suggested above, the epistemic
communities approach asserts that knowledge consensus is the causal variable through
which networks generate influence. However, if issue-framing is sufficient to cause
influence, then consensus may be unnecessary, a proposition which may undermine the
epistemic communities approach. To determine whether consensus matters, this
dissertation will also test the following hypothesis. H2: scientific consensus increases the
influence of transnational advocacy networks.
Finally, tests of these hypotheses are carried out simultaneously with tests of the
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influence of socialization on learning. Socialization is the regular exchange of
information and ideas between actors. It contributes to the development of shared
perceptions among connected actors, and improves the chance that knowledge produced
among interacting agents will be mutually accepted and legitimated.53 Finally,
socialization can promote framing alignment,54 or the development of shared interests,
values and beliefs between various groups.55 Consequently, the literature on social
processes and knowledge generation suggests the following hypothesis: H3: socialization
increases the influence of transnational advocacy networks.

A Heuristic Approach to Hypothesis Testing
These hypotheses indicate that there are three independent variables that can
53
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explain the success or failure of transnational network advocacy: issue-framing,
knowledge consensus, and socialization. What will be investigated here is how these
variables interact in the propagation of knowledge from advocacy networks to
policymakers. Understanding how transnational networks function in LDCs will require
multiple tests of these variables in order to determine which are sufficient and/or
necessary. For example, if knowledge consensus is the only variable that corresponds
with network influence in LDCs, then a narrowly-focused epistemic communities
approach would suffice. This would undermine the argument that environmental
advocacy in the developing world is subject to a particular economic logic. However, if
variation in knowledge consensus does not correspond with influence, and the primary
variable predicting influence is economic issue-framing, then this research would suggest
that the primary factor increasing network influence in LDCs is not scientific coherence,
but carefully chosen symbols and metaphors.
Of course, there are other possibilities, including the chance that the three
independent variables: framing; consensus; and socialization, all interact together to lead
to the dependent variable: network influence. Parsing the impact of these variables is
best carried out by a heuristic investigation of network advocacy.
A heuristic approach is also sought in this case as the relationship in the literature
between socialization, political openness and influence is ambiguous. In short, it is not
clear if more or less political openness is conducive to socialization. This has
implications for the study of activism in the developing world, since LDCs tend to be
more politically closed systems.
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On one hand, science should be credible. For science to be considered credible,
the conclusions drawn should not be derived from an already-established political
agenda, but rather based on a neutral (as far as possible) assessment of the facts at hand,
as knowledge that is produced with a visible political bias is easier to delegitimate.56
Scientific credibility is more likely to emerge in politically open states, where ENGOs
and academic research institutions are free to formulate ideas and research programs,
communicate with policymakers and establish relationships with transnational
researchers.57
On the other hand, socialization between expert networks and policymakers may
paradoxically be stronger in closed political systems. There, the production of policyrelevant knowledge is more likely to be controlled by policymakers concerned about the
implications of allocating scarce benefits to political constituencies.58 Political elites are
more likely to be invested in the pronouncements of research programs.59 Scientific
community members may also be drawn from government bureaucrats or state agencies,
reinforcing the states’ involvement in the production of knowledge. As a result, scientists
conducting policy-relevant research in autocratic countries may be more likely to
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socialize with policymakers.

The Interplay Between Comparative Politics and IR
Thus, domestic politics affect the use of transnationally held knowledge that is
generated in response to global problems. As such, this research includes a necessary
comparative element to the study of the influence of knowledge networks. As illustrated
in the figure below, knowledge is shaped at multiple levels, and is affected by
relationships between states, between non-state actors within a network, and between
governments and their citizens.
Consequently, investigating the influence of advocacy networks on policymaking
in developing countries depends on several tests of combinations of the three identified
independent variables: framing, consensus and socialization. In addition, for a heuristic
investigation into the impact of political openness on influence, this research depends on
taking a comparative study of transnational activism in countries under varying stages of
political liberalization. By doing so, this research will investigate whether and how
developmental concerns particular to developing countries constrain the advocacy efforts
of transnational environmental networks.

Biodiversity Management in Developing Countries
As indicated above, one prominent global environmental issue that is associated
with the developing world is biodiversity management. Restricting the study of
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environmental advocacy to cases focused on carrying out biodiversity management
confers certain advantages. First, focusing on one environmental issue area allows
comparability across cases. Second, global biodiversity management, as currently
conceptualized, has significant scope for actors to proffer their own interpretations of
social reality and problem dimensions.
The cases studied here center on the domestic implementation of the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) but involve other biodiversity-oriented
MEAs, such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Convention on Migratory
Species (CMS).60 As a framework convention, the CBD leaves substantial room for
implementing states to interpret treaty obligations. For example, Article 8 of the CBD
recommends that Parties create and manage protected areas for in situ conservation,
while the IUCN has also recommended an international standardization of protected areas
management pursuant to the CBD. However, states complying with the CBD are free to
manage protected areas to the extent that policymakers see fit.61

Protected areas can

range from zones restricted only to scientific researchers for the purpose of knowledge
and data gathering, to “cultural landscapes,” with human populations daily utilizing the
natural resources within, to sites of tourism, to ‘paper parks,’ legally created areas that
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have no management practices in place.62 Technically, states may therefore be in
compliance with biodiversity treaties if they create additional protected areas, regardless
of whether these additional areas signify an improvement in management or not. As a
result, transnational networks may significantly impact biodiversity management, by
proposing which geographic areas are relevant to biodiversity management, how to
evaluate appropriate management policies in protected areas, and how to measure
biodiversity.

Case Selection
A short description of the research methodology follows. Cases were selected by
searching for GEF-funded projects carried out in developing countries to implement the
CBD. Projects were identified by examining the online GEF database, which maintains a
list of funded efforts in LDCs pursuant to various MEAs. In addition, screens were
applied to the universe of LDCs carrying out GEF-funded biodiversity management
projects in order to narrow case selection by removing those cases which were less likely
to have the material conditions to support epistemic community emergence.
Among the universe of LDCs, cases had to demonstrate a base level of an
institutional capacity for science and technology, conditions identified as conducive to
the emergence of epistemic communities in countries.63 This consists of governmental
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11578–11586. Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: transnational
26

support for research, level of scientific development, and capacity of the state to generate
scientific knowledge and investigate environmental issues. A rough measure of this
characteristic was taken by comparing several existing indicators.
First, countries with minimal resources, in particular those which have to spend a
great deal of their income on debt-servicing, are unlikely to be able to support a
substantial science community.64 Using the World Bank classifications of indebtedness,
which calculates debt service to gross national income for 2005, and the ratio of debt
service to exports from 2001 – 2005, low-income countries that were highly indebted
were eliminated from the sample as unlikely to have the necessary resources to support
scientific research.
Second, this rough measure was refined by comparing the 2005 Environmental
Sustainability Index (ESI) measure of social and institutional capacity65 and the World
Bank Governance Research Indicators Database (GRID), for the years 1996 – 2004.66
The ESI score is an aggregate measure of four components: environmental governance;

coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war
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eco-efficiency; private sector responsiveness; and science and technology, each of which
are aggregates of several other indicators “evaluating the institutions and underlying
social patterns of skills, attitudes, and networks that foster effective responses to
environmental challenges.”67 The GRID comprises 6 indicators of governance that affect
the capacity of governments to implement policies in response to new information: voice
and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness;
regulatory burden; rule of law; and control of corruption.68 Governments that score
comparatively low on measures of governance could confound research, as poor
governance could inhibit the effective implementation of environmental policy, even if
epistemic communities are successful in transmitting claims to policy makers. Cases that
scored below the median on these indicators were considered less useful tests, and
excluded from consideration, as they are unlikely to have the necessary structures for
effective biodiversity management.
Further, the research question requires investigating the relationship between
67
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political openness and socialization, and so case selection had to include variation for the
sake of comparison. To order the remaining cases, I compiled a series of measures of
political democratization, namely: Freedom House ratings from 1975 – 2005; the
Reporters sans Frontiers Press Freedom Index of 2005; the 2002 and 2003 Polity IV
indicators of Democracy, Polity and Autocracy; and the Polity IV 2003 measures of
Levels of Authority from 1970 – 2003. By investigating GEF biodiversity projects in
developing countries, screening countries to ensure they had an institutional base for
science, and choosing countries that varied according to their levels of political
development, the following four projects were selected.

Jamaica
The first project studied was carried out in Jamaica. Jamaica is currently
classified as a parliamentary democracy, even though the country has had longstanding
problems with political patron-clientelism. Under this system, political decision-makers
have historically formed tacit alliances with economic elites, using political power to
create favorable environments for capitalist growth, even where such policies may
conflict with the interests of the mass public. Nevertheless, the measures of political
openness indicate that Jamaica is institutionally and in practice a fairly robust democracy.
For example, the country has never scored below a 3 on any Freedom House indicator
since 1973. Similarly, the Polity IV measures score Jamaica as receiving a 10 (highly
democratic) continuously since 1962, only falling to an eight in the early 1990s. The
project studied in this case is the Project on Sustainable Conservation of Globally
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Important Caribbean Bird Habitats, intended to manage biodiversity in the Cockpit
Country, an area of roughly 450km² located between the western and northwestern
parishes of Trelawny, St. Elizabeth and St. James (see Figure 1.1).

Mexico
In comparison to Jamaica, Mexico is relatively autocratic. Despite the history of
regular presidential and parliamentary elections, culminating in the first transition
between parties in 2000, the country has long been described as corporatist. Power has
historically been centralized and concentrated in the executive branch of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, which has traditionally managed to avoid ceding accountability to
the mass public through a combination of electioneering, and practices such as the de
facto appointment of presidential successors by party elites. Nevertheless, the above
measures of political organization indicate that the country has, since 2000, become
markedly more democratic, though still falling short of Jamaica in terms of length of
experience with democracy. Again, using Freedom House data for comparison, Mexico
has historically scored fours and fives on measures of Political Rights and Civil Liberties
prior to the 2000 transition. Polity IV data also show a transition to democracy (scored as
a six) in 2000, only after decades of autocracy.
Two projects are studied in this country. The first, the Proyecto para la
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM) is carried
out along the eastern coast of the state of Quintana Roo to manage the reef ecosystem
(see Figure 1.2). The second Mexican project studied is the Proyecto del Corredor
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Biológico Mesoamericano (CBMMx) carried out in the states of Quintana Roo, Yucatán,
Campeche and Chiapas (see Figure 1.3). These projects are formally related in that the
SAM was conceived of as a component of the CBMMx, and initially designed as an
extension of the CBMMx project to the marine and coastal ecosystems along the eastern
part of the Yucatan peninsula.69 However, administration of the two is being carried out
by different state agencies, and separate agencies were created in Mexico to monitor and
administer the project. Further, the ENGOs, scientific community members and some of
the political institutions involved in managing the two projects differ.

Egypt
The final case is a project being carried out in Egypt. Egypt is the most autocratic
of the three, with only minimal concessions to democratic institutions. Freedom House
scores over time are universally measured as unfree since data was recorded in 1973.
The Polity IV index similarly ranks Egypt as continually autocratic since the 1950s.
Elections are held regularly, but party lists and eligibility are tightly controlled, and again
power is concentrated in the executive branch. Moreso than Mexico, the executive
branch is closely identified with the current president, Hosni Mubarak, giving a
comparatively personalist dimension to Egyptian political organization than is the case in
the other two countries. In this case, the project studied is the development of the Project
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for Sustainable Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, to be carried out in Egypt
along the coast of the Red Sea and the Sinai peninsula (see Figure 1.4).

Operationalizing Concepts
TANs and Epistemic Communities
Having identified cases, it was then necessary to operationalize and construct
measures of epistemic communities and TANs in order to determine which kinds of
networks were involved in advocacy. Likely core groups of epistemic communities and
transnational networks were identified by reviewing documents associated with the GEFfunded projects, and determining which ENGOs were officially involved in project
implementation. Subsequently, snowball sampling was used to identify and bound the
population of networks to which these ENGOs may have been members. These measures
were then triangulated with analyses of archival materials, such as project documents,
workshop reports, meeting minutes, and jointly-produced studies to bound the
populations of the tentatively identified networks.
Population bounding is, at best, an approximate exercise. Network membership is
amorphous, as it depends on informal and perhaps tenuous connections between people,
not just on formalized relationships that can be discovered through investigating
participation in recording meetings, or through identifying authorship of jointly produced
documents. As a result, the chapters, in describing the size of the various networks, gives
a range of potential members based on analyses of organization size, the research focus
of identifiable members, which are triangulated as much as possible through archival
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analyses of meetings, committees, and other recorded data on network participation.
Nevertheless, the numbers throughout are not precise.
As described above, epistemic communities are networks of science-based
professionals with publicly recognized expertise in a particular domain, and holding an
intersubjective consensus about a problem in their area. Again, a scientific consensus
distinguishes epistemic communities from other kinds of TANs, and is considered one of
the primary independent variables being tested in this research. Using Dimitrov’s
understanding of consensus, I disaggregated the concept into 3 indicators: the presence of
agreement on 1) causes, 2) consequences and 3) extent of an environmental issue.70
Some level of disagreement on one or more of these indicators would weaken consensus,
but as long as a network held a core agreement, it would be coded as an epistemic
community.
There may be cases in which one network evinces more internal agreement than a
comparative network, which allows some determination to be made that one case may
depict greater consensus than another. However, in the absence of finely tuned measures
of cognitive perceptions, it is still useful to consider knowledge consensus as an ordinal
variable, that is, that a hierarchical ordering of cases is possible, but the degrees of
separation between their ranks is difficult to measure. To determine if a network held an
intersubjective consensus, I used multiple sources, including elite interviews and project
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documents to identify whether members of a network agreed on the causal relationships
relevant to an emerging issue area, whether they were aware that agreement within the
network was shared, and whether they were accurate in their assessment of the causal
relationships under study.
Of the four cases studied here, epistemic communities were active in only two of
them, in Jamaica and in the Mesoamerican reef system in Mexico. In the remaining two
cases, a transnational network emerged to advocate for improved environmental
management, but lacking an intersubjectively recognized agreement on the pertinent
causal relationships, was not measured as an epistemic community. Making a clear
distinction between network types was necessitated by virtue of the fact that in the first
two cases, TANs played an important supportive role in the advocacy efforts of the
epistemic communities. In these cases, the relationship between the TAN and the
epistemic community was described, as well as the reason for classifying the networks as
different actors.

Issue Framing
In addition, the frames used by networks had to be measured. The proposals
advanced by networks were analyzed to determine whether and how networks were using
a consistent set of metaphors, cognitive cues, and descriptive language to justify action.
This variable is a nominal variable, and described in more detail in the cases. If the
frames used to communicate with policymakers and managers differed from the internal
reasoning used by networks to justify action, they were described as engaging in external
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strategic framing based on their interpretation of the internalized value systems of their
external audience.71

Socialization
Finally, it was necessary to measure the extent of socialization between
policymakers and networks. In the generation of policy-relevant knowledge,
socialization may be manifested by such processes as jointly conducted reports between
norm entrepreneurs and target audiences, mutual participation in workshops, and
exchange of staff. In each of the cases, the kinds of relationships between networks and
audiences were qualitatively assessed. Socialization was considered strong if multiple
points of contact existed between audiences and networks, and the exchange or
recruitment of personnel between populations was considered a particularly strong
indicator of socialization. Since the precise measures of socialization will vary across
cases, it is again useful to consider socialization as an ordinal variable. The measures of
socialization varied, and are described in more detail in each chapter.

The Dependent Variable: Network Influence
Finally, the end result would be the existence of network influence on the actions
taken by managers to regulate biodiversity. Influence existed when policymakers and
managers looked to epistemic communities for information and theories, accepted the
71
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conclusions drawn by scientists, and adopted the policy implications of the advocacy
groups. Therefore, when networks had influence, target audiences would change their
behavior, whether as policies and practices, in such a way that they would converge on
the preferred practices of the advocacy networks. Since, as will be demonstrated in the
case studies, biodiversity management is a multisectoral issue, measuring influence
required evaluating the behavior of several actors in each case, including in the private
and public sectors.
Measuring influence required comparing the stated preferences of network
members, as discussed in internally generated project documents and interviews, with the
following behavioral outputs: First, influence occurs if the network exercises control
over project design, such that the essential components of biodiversity management as
preferred by the network are included. This includes determining the biodiversityrelevant area covered by the GEF funds; identifying which species are targeted for
protection; or specifying management tools (measurement criteria, for example) to be
adopted as a condition of the project.
Second, control over the terms of the project does not necessarily equate to
influence if the government is laggardly on carrying out substantive changes in policy.
Thus, another indicator of influence would be the adoption of policies by natural resource
management agencies such that new action corresponds with proposed policies suggested
by network members. I triangulate upon this measure by conducting interviews and
archival analyses to determine if newly adopted regulation was effectively implemented,
rather than existing as toothless formal declarations. For example, if the responses of
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policymakers and managers are limited to general exhortative statements extolling the
virtues of conservation, but without real efforts to regulate environmentally harmful
activity, or if policymakers create empty policy, such as ‘paper parks,’ protected areas
without a meaningful regulatory framework, no influence can be said to have occurred.
Third, influence occurs if the network’s recommendations lead to changes in the
practices of private sector actors, such as corporations, cooperatives, or other non-state
entities.
Unfortunately, network influence does not always mean that there will be
measurable improvements in environmental degradation. Natural disasters, time-lag
problems, external threats, and a lack of clear information may all prevent the
recommendations of epistemic community members from having a measurable impact on
biodiversity conservation, even if adopted by policymakers and private-sector managers.
This is of particular concern, given that the management efforts started in these projects
are still ongoing, and the projects that have formally concluded did so less than 3 years
ago. Thus, while desirable, recording changes in population of important species would
provide a measure of low discriminant and convergent validity.
Thus, to test the argument, the following steps were taken: in each case, the
transnational network was identified and measured, determining whether the network was
an epistemic community comprised of like-minded scientists, or a TAN. The advocacy
efforts of the network were process-traced, to discover whether individuals repurposed
arguments and justifications for action to persuade policymakers and managers of the
economic rationale for taking environmental action. The level of socialization between
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the network and target audiences was described by examining the strength of contact
between the two populations. The regulations and practices adopted by policymakers and
managers were compared with the recommendations of identified networks to verify
whether or not networks had any influence on biodiversity management. These steps
then led to conclusions about the effect of scientific consensus, strategic framing,
socialization, and domestic political organization on the efforts of transnational networks
to inform and influence the management of biodiversity in LDCs.

Outline of the Dissertation
In Chapters 2, I describe the case study of the Project on Sustainable
Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats carried out in the Cockpit
Country of Jamaica. In that case, a transnational epistemic community emerged during
the 1990s and early 2000s to advocate for the protection of sensitive ecosystems in an
area threatened by bauxite mining. The epistemic community, concerned about the
ecological integrity of the Cockpit Country, had to contend not only with various natural
resource policymaker agencies in the environmental and agricultural ministries, but also
managers in the powerful bauxite industry, and peasant and agricultural residents, all of
whom had sometimes incompatible preferences.
Chapter 3 presents the SAM project carried out in Mexico. Again, this case
involved an epistemic community engaging with competing interests of various actors.
Here, these consisted of policymakers in the environmental and agricultural ministries,
managers in the transnational hotel sector, and peasant and subsistence populations. An
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important theoretical distinction between this case and Jamaica, is that this biodiversity
project took place in a post-transitional autocratic country.
Chapter 4 investigates a case that takes place under the same level of political
openness, as the CBMMx was also carried out in Mexico. Moreover, this case study did
not involve an epistemic community, as the transnational network that emerged to
advocate for improved biodiversity management did not hold an intersubjective
consensus on the relevant causal relationships in the Yucatán peninsula. The advocacy
efforts of the TAN in this case focused on natural resource policymakers and
marginalized agricultural populations throughout the Yucatán. Nevertheless, the absence
of consensus in this case allowed for more robust tests of the importance of scientific
agreement on the influence exercised by transnational networks.
Chapter 5 presents the final empirical case study, illustrating the Project for
Sustainable Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds carried out in Egypt. As with the
CBMMx case study, this project involved a transnational network that did not generate an
intersubjective consensus. Further, by discussing a case study in an autocratic polity, this
dissertation further engages with questions about the effect of autocracy and centralized
decision making on the advocacy efforts of transnational networks.
In Chapter 6, I discuss alternative hypotheses to observed variation in the case
studies. In particular, I engage with the neoliberal institutionalist school of international
relations theory, which indicates that properly designed institutions can constrain state
behavior and lead to effective global management, in this case, of the environment.
Institutions allow states to generate predictable rules, and bargain for concessions to
39

promote desirable behavior. As indicated above, the countries involved are signatories,
not only to the CBD, but also to various other regional and international biodiversityoriented MEAs. Accordingly, the projects described may be embedded in different
institutions for each country. It is therefore possible that any variation observed in these
cases could be due, not to differences in the strength and cognitive skill of epistemic
communities, but rather to the strength of regimes of the relevant country. Variation in
observed implementation will therefore be tested against the institutionalist approach to
see whether the comparatively methodologically untidy and far less parsimonious
epistemic communities approach has more explanatory power.
In the conclusion, the summation of the causal relationships is given, clarifying
which independent variables are necessary and/or sufficient to lead to transnational
network influence on policymakers in developing countries. In addition, the impact of
political openness on socialization is discussed, as well as final statements on the chance
of improving project design and advocacy efforts for improved global biodiversity
management.
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Table 1.1: Multiple Levels of Knowledge

Impact on
Knowledge

International
International treaties and
obligations create the
impetus for gathering
knowledge on global
environmental problems
International
indebtedness limits the
appeal of environmental
norms to LDCs

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Transnational
Domestic
Political relationships between
Internal relationships in
knowledge networks affect the state and its citizens affect
the ability of transnational
the likelihood that
networks to socialize with
networks develop an
relevant policymakers
intersubjective consensus
Shared understandings
determine the frames
adopted by networks
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Figure 1.1: Map of the Jamaican Cockpit Country
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Figure 1.2: Map of The Mesoamerican Reef Region
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Figure 1.3: Map of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor – Mexico
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Figure 1.4: Map of the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway

45

CHAPTER 2
JAMAICA AND BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN THE COCKPIT
COUNTRY

Introduction
In the case study carried out in Jamaica, a transnational network of ecologists,
ornithologists and geologists developed an interest in biodiversity management in the
Cockpit Country, a roughly 450km² area of karst limestone located within the parishes of
Trelawny, St. Elizabeth and St. James (see Figure 1.1). As an epistemic community, this
network of scientists held a consensus about the causal processes of human activity in the
Cockpit Country, appropriate policy responses and a rationale for conserving the
biodiversity and endemism in the area. The advocacy efforts of the community centered
on carrying out the GEF-funded Project for Sustainable Conservation of Globally
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats, an effort to implement the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). As described in the introduction, this chapter investigates how
epistemic communities attempted to engage with policymakers, and whether the
developmental pressures and political systems of developing countries constrained the
arguments employed by epistemic communities.
To test this argument, as well as the corresponding hypotheses, I identified the
relevant actors: policy makers, an epistemic community, knowledge brokers, and a
transnational advocacy network (TAN). I process-traced how concern about biodiversity
management in the Cockpit Country led to the constitution of a transnational social
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network. I also tested whether policymakers in natural resource management agencies
learned from the epistemic community’s understanding of environmental processes, by
examining the output of state responses in terms of policy and management approaches to
the claims of the epistemic community.
A qualitative analysis of the data indicates that the epistemic community had
mixed success in promoting environmentally friendly policies in the Cockpit Country.
While there are overlapping policy jurisdictions, biodiversity management in the Cockpit
Country was subject to the management authority of two ministries, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Environment. Further, authority within these ministries
can be further disaggregated across subordinate agencies. Within the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Forestry Department, the Mines and Geology Division, and the Ministry
itself functioned as three distinct nodes of authority, while the Ministry of Environment
had a subordinate agency in the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). As
these five agencies were responsible for distinct aspects of biodiversity management, the
network’s advocacy efforts can be described as consisting of five different campaigns,
under the overall goal of improving the environment.
Of these agencies, the only policymaker institution whose subsequent
management approach demonstrated influence by the epistemic community network was
the Forestry Department. The Department adopted recommendations made by the
community, changed management procedures, and supported the epistemic community’s
biodiversity management framework. However, this was not matched by similar success
in the Mines and Geology Division, the Ministry of Agriculture, NEPA, or the Ministry
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of Environment.
Of the three variables discussed in the hypotheses: issue-framing, socialization,
and scientific consensus, the only variable positively associated with influence in this
case was socialization. As an epistemic community, the network used its scientific
consensus as a cognitive tool in all campaigns; consequently, it did not vary with
epistemic community influence. Further, the one area in which the community used
economic issue-framing, that is, to lobby the Ministry of Agriculture, there was no
measurable influence on policy. The only variable that distinguished the advocacy
campaign targeting the Forestry Department from the rest was the presence of a high
level of socialization between the Department and the network. This suggests that
socialization is a necessary variable, and that economic issue-framing is neither
necessary, nor sufficient. However, it is not clear from this data whether socialization is
sufficient to cause influence if consensus is absent. Nevertheless, this chapter
demonstrates that credible science is insufficient to lead to network influence in
developing countries. The following explains how the epistemic community emerged to
advocate for improved biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country, and details the
successes and failures of its advocacy efforts.

Overview of Threats to the Cockpit Country
The Cockpit Country is identified by the World Bank, the UN and Jamaican
policy makers and civil society as a site of high biodiversity, measured as a variation in
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the number of species and genetic variation within species.72 This wealth of biodiversity
is due to the unique geomorphological characteristics of the region. The isolated conical
hills and depressions characterizing the area have, in combination with poor species
dispersal capability, led to the creation of numerous microhabitats and specialized
evolution.73 Of 150 species of plants have been identified in the area, 101 are endemic.74
This highly sensitive biodiversity is subject to a range of human activity, both from
subsistence and small-scale activities from marginalized, agrarian populations, and from
large-scale extractive activities from powerful economic sectors.

Subsistence and Small-Scale Agriculture
The Cockpit Country is sparsely settled by various agrarian communities. These
communities, consisting of marginalized rural populations, engage in a variety of smallscale activities, such as: subsistence agriculture; logging; charcoal production; hunting
and collection of local species; and very occasionally, acting as ad hoc tour guides in for
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tourists.75
The impact of these communities on local biodiversity is exacerbated by
socioeconomic factors common to developing countries, such as high wealth
concentration and an inequitable distribution of resources. In the Cockpit Country, 3% of
landowners control 62% of the available farmland in the area, and as such, small farmers
have to rent or lease land from larger property owners or otherwise conduct incursions
into virgin forested areas. In turn, this contributes to migratory farming and fragmented
and dispersed agricultural plots.76 As agricultural productivity decreases, farmers turn to
logging for fuelwood and timber production to generate income.77
Yam production, one of the main agricultural practices, requires the harvesting of
yam sticks for crop cultivation, where saplings are cut and stripped to provide a support
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“Small scale” agriculture refers to farming carried out on agricultural plots of 10
hectares or less, and the majority of agriculture in the area is practiced on farms of 4
hectares or less. Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land
Management Report (prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) passim; ENACT
Programme, 2003, Policy on Strategic Environmental Assessment (draft) (Government
of Jamaica: Kingston, Jamaica) p. 15. Logging is not generally a result of industrial,
large-scale activity, but carried out on a small scale, with teams of 3-4 individuals
working with chainsaws, and transporting materials manually through the area. Balford
Spence, Land Management Report, pp. 17-18; Forestry Department, 2001, National
Forest Management and Conservation Plan (Forestry Department: Kingston, Jamaica)
pp. 40.
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Tony Weis, 2000, Beyond peasant deforestation: environment and development in
rural Jamaica (Global Environmental Change 10: 299 – 305), p. 302. David Barker and
David J. Miller, 1995, Farming on the Fringe, pp. 281. Several farmers owned more than
one plot, with a modal class of 3 plots per farmer, cited in this 1995 study.
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Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report pp. 40.
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for the biomass of the plant.78 The removal of saplings prevents the regeneration of the
forest, contributing to overall deforestation; in turn, this exacerbates forest degradation
caused by the conversion of forest cover to monoculture in agricultural production.79
Nationally, the parish of Trelawny is the primary yam and yam-stick producing parish.80
Other kinds of decentralized agriculture include marijuana, which creates inroads into
virgin territory as farmers seek hidden lands for cultivation.81
Clearing the forest for agriculture or logging creates ecological vulnerabilities and
gaps that may allow invasive species to gain access to vulnerable areas as well as
introduces crops as alien invasive species in sensitive habitats.82 Industrialized
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Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan.
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See inter alia, Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land
Management Report (prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) passim; ENACT
Programme, Policy on Strategic Environmental Assessment (draft) (Government of
Jamaica: Kingston, Jamaica, 2003) pp. 19; NRCA, 1999, Jamaica: Toward a Watershed
Policy, Green Paper no. 2/99 (Kingston, Jamaica: 1999) pp. 5 – 6.
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The eastern and southeastern buffer zones provide approximately 42% of Jamaica’s
national yam output, and of a total 15 million yam-sticks produced nationally per
annum, an estimated 6 million are produced in the Cockpit Country. See inter alia,
Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land Management Report
(prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) pp. 15
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Balfour Spence, 1999, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land
Management Report (Kingston: NRCA) pp. 17
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The Nature Conservancy, Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan: A Summary,
Appendix D; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment
Facility Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared
Resource (retrieved October 2005 from
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 55; also NEPA, National
Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity, passim; Forestry Department, 2001, Forestry
Policy 2001 (Kingston: the Forestry Department)
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commercial sugarcane production takes place in the southwestern and northeastern zones
of the Cockpit Country, and production of citrus takes place in the northwestern zone.83
In addition to contributing to monoculture and forest clearance on a larger scale than that
caused by peasant communities, industrial agriculture introduces chemicals from
pesticides and fertilizer, which may leach into soils and enter the hydrological regime as
biological toxins.84

Bauxite Mining in the Cockpit Country
Since the Cockpit Country contains bauxite deposits, bauxite mining is also a
potential and significant threat to biodiversity (see Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite Deposits
in the Cockpit Country).85 Further, bauxite mining, as shall be described below, is a
nationally prominent industry. Ore is extracted through the standard open-cast method,
which entails removing the entire layer of topsoil and vegetation covering a deposit.
Immediate impacts of this process include deforestation, forest degradation,86 and the
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Balfour Spence, 1999, GEF Cockpit Country Land Management Report pp. 18.
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See inter alia, Steve Bass and Tighe Geoghan, 2007, Incentives for Watershed
Management in Jamaica: Results of a Brief Diagnostic. CANARI Technical Reports 314
(CANARI: Kingston) pp. 7; NEPA, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity,
passim.
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See inter alia, Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report pp. 93; David Barker
and David J. Miller, 1995, Farming on the Fringe. In Barker, D. & D. F. M. McGregor
(eds) Environment and Development in the Caribbean: Geographical Perspectives,
(Kingston: The Press, UWI, pp. 271 – 292) pp. 282; Karyl Walker, “Cockpit Country
Worry.” (Sunday Observer, 19 November 2006); Kayenne Taylor. 1999, Report on the
Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit Country Conservation Project, pp. 93
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National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA), 2003, National Strategy and
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emission of potentially toxic fumes and dust.87 In addition, the use of heavy machinery
in mining areas requires the construction of access roads, which segment ecosystems,
allow further access into formerly pristine areas and contribute to deforestation.88
The interaction of these processes can cause widespread soil erosion, downstream
run-off and sedimentation, exacerbating the loss of forest cover, in turn causing
eutrophication in aquatic ecosystems.89 The relationship between human activity and
environmental degradation in Cockpit Country is thus quite complex, especially since the
environmental resources of this area are highly interdependent.

Tensions in National Economic Development
These processes complicate the idea that national development may conflict with
environmental management. As described in the Founex Report, national economic
development may be a way for developing countries to supersede their “poverty,
malnutrition, illiteracy and sheer misery.”90 Moreover, since poverty, malnutrition and

Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica. (National Environment and Planning Agency:
Kingston); NEPA, National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan Development Project:
Sector Assessment Reports – Mining, (prepared by Morrison, Dennis and Michael
Mitchell. National Environment and Planning Agency: Kingston, 1999b).
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NEPA, 2003, NBSAP pp. 27 – 28. Mick Day, 1993, Karst Terrains: Environmental
Changes and Human Impact (Catena Supplement 25: 109 – 125) pp. 121.
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UNEP, 2000, GEF Project Document, pp. 56.
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Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording
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Margaret Biswas and Asit K. Biswas, 1982, Environment and Sustained Development
in the Third World: A Review of the Past Decade (Third World Quarterly 4 (3): 479 –
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misery are exacerbated by environmental problems such as water scarcity and land
degradation, there is a sense that industrial development is the solution, not only to
economic woes, but also to environmental problems.
However, this should be problematized. In Jamaica, bauxite mining is seen as a
harbinger of economic growth and national development. While mining can attract a
substantial amount of foreign income and is a significant contributor to GDP, mining in
the Cockpit Country would directly harm the ability of rural communities in the Cockpit
Country to conduct subsistence activities, either from being directly physically displaced,
or because the removal of plant cover for ore extraction precludes agricultural activity.
In other words, national development, if conceptualized as an industrial process, could
conflict with the environmental and economic wellbeing of already marginalized
populations.

Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management
The policy makers responsible for managing natural resources within the Cockpit
Country are located in a variety of Ministries and Agencies (see Table 2.1: List of Policy
Makers). Despite reforms in the Jamaican environmental governance structure since
1991, authority over environmental management has remained dispersed across various
state actors, with 52 identifiable articles of legislation pertaining to environmental
management.91

491) pp. 484.
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NEPA, 2003, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biological Diversity in Jamaica.
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NRCA/NEPA and the Ministry of Environment
The National Resources Conservation Agency (NRCA) was created in 1991 as
the executive agency of the Ministry of Environment.92 In 2001, the NRCA was merged
with two urban planning agencies, the Town Planning Department and the Land
Development and Utilization Commission, to form the National Environmental Planning
Agency (NEPA). The agency regulates the use of fauna through the implementation of
hunting seasons, licenses for the removal of species for research purposes, and the
conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs).93 The Ministry of Environment,
lead agency of the NRCA/NEPA, can propose certain areas to be managed as National
Parks with the approval of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.

(Kingston, Jamaica: NEPA) pp. 13; see also Jamaica’s National Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan: National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston, Jamaica) pp.
3.
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The environmental portfolio has been transferred to various other ministries since its
inception. In 1992, the portfolio was created in the Ministry of Tourism and the
Environment. In 2000 the portfolio of Environment was shifted to the Ministry of Land
and Environment; in 2001, as the Ministry of Local Government and the Environment;
in 2007 as the Ministry of Health and the Environment. Throughout the dissertation, the
Ministry will be referred to as the Ministry of Environment for consistency. Information
taken from Author interviews with Jean Jo Bellamy, from notes taken from phone
interview. Author interview with Franklin McDonald, from notes taken from phone
interview. C. Easton and associates, 2004, ENACT Jamaica Case Study: A Governance
Model in Capacity Enhancement for Sustainable Development (Kingston: ENACT
Programme, 2004).
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Author interviews with Yolanda Mittoo. Taken from handwritten notes; NRCA Act,
retrieved October 2006 from http://www.nrca.org/legal/nrca_act_Ipart1.htm; Town,
Planning and Development Act, retrieved October 2006 from
http://www.nrca.org/legal/town_planning_act.htm; Land Development and Utilization
Act, retrieved October 2006 from http://www.nrca.org/legal/LDUC_ACT.htm
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The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Agriculture, which contains three relevant agencies in the
Forestry Department, the Mines and Geology Division, and the Jamaica Bauxite Institute
(JBI), is a key actor in biodiversity management.94 The Ministry of Agriculture can
declare areas as Forest Reserves, bestowing management authority to the Forestry
Department. In addition, the Ministry regulates the issuance of mining licenses over the
Cockpit Country to bauxite companies.

The Forestry Department
The Forestry Department, executive agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, gains
jurisdiction over resource management when the Ministry declares Forest Reserves. In
these reserves, the Department can regulate activities such as tree clearance, road
construction and the killing of wildlife, in particular avifauna.95 Since the 1950s, most of
the area known as the Cockpit Country has been declared a Forest Reserve (see Map 2.2:
Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country).
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Between 1994 and 2008, the Department of Mining was a part of the Ministry of
Agriculture (94 – 97), Ministry of Mining and Energy (97 – 02), Ministry of Land and
Environment (02 – 05), Ministry of Agriculture (06 – 07), Ministry of Agriculture and
Lands (07 – June ’08) and the Ministry of Mining and Telecommunications (’08 –
present). Mines and Geology Division, 2008, Background Information (retrieved
December 2007 from
http://www.mgd.gov.jm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=38
).
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See the 1996 version of the Forest Act in the Forestry Department, 1996, The Forest
Act 1996. See also later modifications to the Forest Act that expanded the role of the
Forestry Department to manage species and biodiversity in the Forestry Department,
2001, The Forest Regulations and in 2001, Forest Policy.
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The Department of Mining, the JBI and the Ministry of Agriculture
The Department of Mining, also known as the Division of Mines and Geology,
grants mining licenses and evaluates the environmental soundness of post-mining
activity.96 Its research division in the Jamaica Bauxite Institute (JBI), a quasi-state
organization established in 1974, acts as the Government’s technical adviser in mining
and regulates and monitors the activities of industrial bauxite companies.97 The JBI also
conducts EIAs on mining activities and, where necessary, develops planning strategies
for population relocation and post-mining land use and restoration.98

The Prime Minister’s Cabinet
The primary role of the Cabinet in managing the biodiversity in the Cockpit
Country is the regulation of land use policy. Cross-cutting agency jurisdictional claims
can become conflictual, as agencies with different mandates may seek to implement
incompatible management strategies in the same territorial area. For example, leases
established under the Mining Act allow bauxite companies to access subterranean
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Dennis Morrison & Michael Mitchell, Mining; National Environment and Planning
Agency, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica (National
Environment and Planning Agency: Kingston, 2003) pp. 14.
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Ivette Torres, The Mineral Industry of Jamaica, (Kingston, Jamaica 1998), pp. 1 – 3.
Also Shanti Persaud, author interviews conducted July 3, 2006. Taken from handwritten
notes.
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Shanti Persaud, author interviews conducted July 3, 2006. Taken from handwritten
notes. See also Dennis Morrison & Michael Mitchell, Mining, pp. 14.
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resources in Forest Reserves, even though standard open-cast mining would result in the
complete removal of all forest cover.99 Where necessary, the Cabinet may clarify
competing jurisdictional claims and acceptable land use policy under existing or modified
environmental regulations.

Transnational Mobilization around the Cockpit Country
The Emergence of the Cockpit Country Epistemic Community
As with the policy makers, the groups and individuals that comprise the epistemic
community relevant to policy management in the Cockpit Country come from a variety
of backgrounds and specializations (see Table 2.2: List of Epistemic Community
Members). Although scientists had been conducting research on the biodiversity in the
Cockpit Country for decades, the emergence of a social network sharing a rationale for
action, causal claims and beliefs in appropriate policy began in 1995, when a
transnational bird-watching ENGO called the Gosse Bird Club became an affiliate of
Birdlife International under the leadership of Catherine Levy, changing its name to
Birdlife Jamaica.100 In the mid to late-1990s, Birdlife Jamaica and Peter Vogel, a
herpetologist from the Department of Life Sciences at the University of the West Indies
99

The Forest, 1996, The Forest Act and 2001, Forest Regulations. Government of
Jamaica, 1947, The Mining Act (amended 1998).
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Mike Schwartz, Susan Koenig. Author interviews, conducted July 30, 2006,
transcript of audiocassette recording. Also, Catherine Levy. Author interview,
conducted June 30, 2006, handwritten notes of telephone interview; Catherine Levy,
2008, Tribute to Audrey Downer: 1918 – 2007 (retrieved December 2008 from
http://www.jamaicachm.org.jm/Article/PDF/August2008.pdf). John Fletcher, author
questionnaire, received December 9, 2008. Taken from transcript of typed responses.
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(UWI), became concerned about a global decline in populations of migratory Yellowand Black-billed parrots. Since 95% of the world’s population resides temporarily in the
Cockpit Country,101 this area became an important site for study.
The onset of interest in the mid-1990s grew, as other researchers joined the
network. Birdlife Jamaica hired Susan Koenig, an ornithologist from Arizona, to assist in
the Cockpit Country parrot study.102 In 1998, Koenig and British freelance researcher
Mike Schwartz, created the Windsor Research Centre (WRC), a decision motivated in
part to establish alliances with other organizations, in particular the transnational ENGO
the Nature Conservancy (TNC).103 In 1999, Birdlife Jamaica, WRC and TNC planned
the Cockpit Country Conservation Project, an NRCA implemented effort to conserve the
Cockpit Country as an area of bird habitats and sensitive biodiversity. Like the eventual
Project on Sustainable Conservation, this was to be funded by the GEF as relevant to the
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University of the West Indies, 2008, Amazona Parrots (retrieved December 2008
from http://www.mona.uwi.edu/lifesciences/parrot.htm). Susan Koenig. Author
interviews, conducted July 30, 2006, transcript of audiocassette recording. Birdlife
International, 2006, Bauxite Mining threatens unique Jamaican wildlife (Press release
available at http://www.birdlife.org/news/news/2006/10/cockpit_country.html).
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Mike Schwartz, Susan Koenig. Author interviews, conducted July 30, 2006,
transcript of audiocassette recording. At the time, Koenig was also planning to carry out
a project to study parrot populations in Dominica. John Fletcher, author questionnaire,
received December 9, 2008. Taken from written responses.
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TNC had considerable assets, claiming over US$4 billion in total assets for the fiscal
year ending in 2005. The Nature Conservancy, Consolidated Financial Statements,
retrieved December 2006 from
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/annualreport/files/arfinancials2005.pdf. The Nature
Conservancy, About Us, retrieved December 2006 from http://www.nature.org/aboutus/.
Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006; Ann Hayes-Sutton, author
questionnaire received September 27, 2006.
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CBD, especially Articles 7 and 8.104 However, the project was aborted in 1999 when the
government of Jamaica refused to use IUCN classification to create a protected area,
leading to the withdrawal of World Bank financing.105

The Emergence of a Core Pool of Knowledge
Although aborted, the generation of studies and inter-network links for this
project contributed to the emergence of a core pool of knowledge and transnational ties
among concerned actors on Cockpit Country biodiversity. In 1999, preparation for the
Cockpit Country Conservation Project led to the production of various reports, including
a Biodiversity Assessment of the Cockpit Country by Koenig, Ann Hayes-Sutton of
TNC, and George Proctor, a botanist from UWI and a Land Management Assessment
conducted by Balfour Spence, a geologist from UWI. These studies were then circulated
among research organizations in the network, including Birdlife Jamaica, TNC, the WRC
and STEA, a local ENGO created in 1996 to advocate for ecotourism in the region.106
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World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project (Project prepared for the
GEF) pp. 1 – 5. Susan Koenig et al, 2000, Cockpit Country Conservation Project:
Biodiversity Assessment (Kingston: prepared for NRCA, World Bank). Susan Koenig,
author interviews conducted August 3, 2007, taken from audiocassette recording. Adam
Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country (Farquharson Forum – A Guest
Column).
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Adam Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country (Farquharson Forum – A
Guest Column). Convention on Biological Diversity, Articles 7 and 8, available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.
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Windsor Research Centre, 2008, Cockpit Country Fact Sheet (retrieved December
2008 from http://www.cockpitcountry.org/factsheet.html). The findings of these reports
and the maps proposed by the community were cited in, inter alia: Susan Koenig and
Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted August 3, 2007, taken from audiocassette
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This growing set of information identified some of the major threats to biodiversity in the
Cockpit Country, focusing on agriculture, mining and the introduction of invasive
species.107 Moreover, the reports began outlining the policy preferences of the emerging
network, including the creation of a National Park in the Cockpit under IUCN guidelines,
and establishing a geographic outline of what the community felt was the Cockpit
Country ecosystem (see Figure 1.1).108
The Forestry Department of Jamaica also became part of the emerging epistemic
community in this time of emerging interest. In 1998, the Department concluded a
decade long LANDSAT study using satellite imaging to determine the net contribution of
certain types of human activity to deforestation. This report found that bauxite mining
was the greatest national contributor to deforestation, and also established the officially
accepted rate of deforestation nationwide as 0.1% loss in forest cover per annum.109 In

recording; TNC, Cockpit Country – Conservation Action Plan – A Summary (Kingston:
TNC); Adam Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country
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UNEP, 2003, Global Environment Facility Document Document for project titled
Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats:
Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource (retrieved October 2005 from
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 97. Balfour Spence, 2000,
Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land Management Report (Kingston: NRCA /
World Bank).
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Balfour Spence, 2000, Land Management Report pp. 3; Susan Koenig et al, 2000,
Biodiversity Assessment, Figure 3.1 on pp. 12. The map produced in the Biodiversity
Assessment was cited on the WRC website, and provided by the TNC to the author
during field research.
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Forestry Department, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan.
Retrieved June 2006 from http://www.forestry.gov.jm/PDF_files/ForestPlan.pdf, 2001b
pp. 19 – 20, pp. 66
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2000, the Forestry Department started a joint program with the WRC to receive birdbanding training in order to conduct species monitoring and population assessments of
birds in the Cockpit Country.110 The Department also created formal working
relationships with WRC and STEA through the creation of memoranda of understanding
(MOUs).111 In particular, one of the goals of the MOUs was the creation of Local Forest
Management Committees (LFMCs), joint training workshops conducted by the Forestry
Department, STEA and the WRC to share information on subsistence agriculture, and
promote environmentally friendly practices among residents of local communities.112
The Forestry Department also incorporated the 1999 studies into its own
management plans, using the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment to determine which areas
were of critical importance to management.113 In 2001, TNC began a Parks in Peril (PiP)
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Kevin Porter, author interviews conducted over several days in August, 2006. Taken
from handwritten notes. Respondent staff member in the Forestry Department, author
interviews conducted over several days in August 2006. Taken from handwritten notes.
Susan Koenig, author interviews between August 1 and August 6, 2006. Taken from
handwritten notes, and transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and Management Plan
(Kingston: the Forestry Department) pp. 45; Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted
July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording; Owen Evelyn, author interviews
conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and Management Plan
(Kingston: the Forestry Department) pg. 45; Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted
July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording; Owen Evelyn, author interviews
conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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In the terminology of the Forestry Department, these were referred to as Critical
Emphasis Areas. See Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and
Management Plan (Kingston: the Forestry Department) pp. 34. Susan Koenig, author
interviews conducted August 2005. Handwritten notes.
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project to set priorities for biodiversity management and recommend appropriate
management strategies.114 The Forestry Department also used this research to design
internal strategies for the conservation and management of forest resources and
biodiversity.115

Creation of the Project and Constitution of the Network
In 2001, Birdlife Jamaica and regional partner ENGOs in the Dominican Republic
and the Bahamas began to advocate for international funds to manage biodiversity in the
habitats of migratory birds. These organizations lobbied for GEF funds to create a
Project on Sustainable Conservation for Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats as
relevant to Party obligations under several Articles of the CBD, including Articles 7 and
8.116 With a total budget of almost US$2 million, the Project on Sustainable
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received September 27, 2006.
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See the text of the Forest Plan in the pp. 9, Section E.10. See also United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Facility Project Document for
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Conservation in Jamaica was slated to begin in October 2003 and was scheduled to run
for 42 months under the implementation of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and Birdlife Jamaica.117 In Jamaica, it was agreed that the project would take
place in the Cockpit Country. While the precise boundaries of the area covered by the
new GEF-funded project remained unclear, due to the fact that the Cockpit Country was
not a legally defined area, the Project for Sustainable Conservation did reference the
same area size – 450 km2 – as the area given in the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment
study.118
After 2001, the network continued to grow, as researchers from international
academic institutions and domestic organizations joined the advocacy efforts. These
included Mick Day, a University of Wisconsin specialist in karst geography, and Dayne
Buddo, the former director of the Jamaica Clearing House Mechanism (CHM).119
Precisely bounding the population is complicated by the fact that there are numerous
scientists who conduct work and contribute to knowledge on the Cockpit Country, yet
117
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See UNEP, Global Environment Facility Project Document, pp. 1.
UNEP, 2003, GEF Project Document, pp. 51 – 52.
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Mick Day and Susan Koenig, 2002, Cave Monitoring Practices in Central American
and the Caribbean (Acta Carsologica 30(1): 123 – 134); Dayne Buddo, author
interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording. The CHM is
a quasi-state organization in the National History Division of the Institute of Jamaica,
created in 2002 in order to fulfill Jamaica’s obligations as a signatory to the Convention
on Biological Diversity with a mandate to conduct sourcing and standardization of data
and methodology among researchers, and facilitate the exchange of information among
scientists. NEPA, The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, pp. 43. Forestry
Department, National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston, c. 2000) pp. 10;
Interviews with Dayne Buddo, Jamaica Clearing House Mechanism. Lacunae are often
identified when CHM staff members participate in ecological workshops
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should not be considered part of the epistemic community. In fact, in a database of
research relevant to Cockpit Country conservation maintained by the WRC, over 270
scientists have been identified as involved with knowledge production.120
However, the vast majority, although they do not challenge the core claims of the
epistemic community, do not self-identify, nor were they identified by the core members
as participating in the process of policy advocacy. Their contribution was ad hoc or and
motivated not by shared principled policy beliefs, but by opportunistic linkages between
their personal goals and the goals of the epistemic community, for example in attaining
funds for dissertation research.121
Nevertheless, some of this work has been significant to the core information of
the epistemic community. L. Alan Eyre, a geographer from UWI authored a series of
studies in the late 1980s calling attention to the high rate of deforestation in Jamaica and
Cockpit Country in particular, and was one of the most important contributors to the body
of early scientific knowledge on environmental degradation in the area.122 David Miller,
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Interviews with Kurt McLaren and Michaela D’Andrea. Most autonomous natural
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project reports or policy documents. The Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan
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Kimberly John of TNC).
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documents include: “Slow death of a tropical rainforest: the Cockpit Country of Jamaica,
West Indies”. In: Luria, M., Steinberger, Y. and Spanier, E. (eds.) Environmental quality
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Duncan McGregor and David Barker, geographers from UWI, have also conducted
policy relevant research on the economic catalysts for peasant agricultural expansion in
the area, and its impacts on environmental degradation.123 The core network of the
epistemic community consisted of a group of approximately twenty to thirty researchers,
fourteen of whom are listed by name, training and organizational affiliation in Table 2.2:
List of Epistemic Community Members.

Maintaining the Network
This network maintained cohesion through a variety of network-building linkages,
including physical meetings and electronic communication during the progress of the
project. In interviews with respondents from the WRC, STEA, TNC, UWI, the CHM and
the Forestry Department, these links were described as regular, yet generally informal or
semi-formal affairs, based around the principle of information exchange with identified
authorities on Cockpit Country biodiversity and management.
The physical meetings took place either in the Cockpit Country itself, or in
Kingston. In the Cockpit Country, the WRC maintained a high profile, due to its physical
location within the area. For example, the WRC continued the process of regular birdbanding training with Forestry Department rangers, including those listed below, from
and ecosystem stability – Vol IVA – Environmental quality. (ISEQS Publication:
Jerusalem, Israel, 1994) pg. 599–606; and “The tropical rainforests of Jamaica.” Jamaica
Journal, 26(1989):26–37.
123

For a good survey of their work, see the volume produced by D.F.M. McGregor, D.
Barker, and S. Lloyd (eds.) Resource Sustainability and Caribbean Development (The
Press: Mona, Jamaica, 1998) passim.
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2000 until the time of writing. The Forestry Department maintained its LFMCs in the
Cockpit Country region with periodic meetings between the Forestry Department, local
community residents, and the assistance of the region’s ENGOs, namely STEA and the
WRC, as well as with TNC. Finally, by virtue of establishing a research outpost within
the Cockpit Country, the WRC offered room and board, and hence face-to-face contact to
visiting researchers from UWI and foreign academic institutions, including researchers
such as Mick Day from the University of Wisconsin, who came to study the area.
The Kingston meetings had less direct involvement by the WRC. Dayne Buddo
from the CHM described an information exchange system maintained by a series of ad
hoc committee meetings covering the period of the project, ranging in frequency up to
three times a week, and attended primarily by members of UWI and TNC. At the same
time, the physical meetings were only a part of the information exchange and network
building process. In 2002, shortly after the TNC launched its PiP program, it held virtual
conferences with biodiversity experts, administered in part by Susan Koenig of WRC,
and WRC and CHM maintained online research databases stocked with submitted studies
conducted by researchers, including those within the network. Moreover, the process of
conducting joint studies on Cockpit Country biodiversity that began in the late 1990s
continued, as combinations of individuals from the WRC, STEA, UWI and TNC
composed shared reports and manuals on Cockpit Country conservation between 2000
and 2007.
A rough diagram of these links can be seen in Figure 2.4: Diagram of Epistemic
Community Links. This diagram also suggests that certain organizations, by virtue of
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the preponderance of connections they shared with other groups and actors, functioned as
the centrally important organizations of the network. This perspective was reinforced by
the fact that these organizations, namely WRC, the Forestry Department, TNC and UWI,
were also the institutions universally cited as key in environmental advocacy by
policymakers and researchers involved in Cockpit Country management.

The Cockpit Country Epistemic Community Develops a Managerial Approach
In interviews, epistemic community members indicated that they were primarily
concerned about the ecological impacts of biodiversity loss on the Cockpit Country.
Under this perspective, biodiversity was framed internally as a matter of ecological
importance, in that each living component of the Cockpit Country ecosystem was
considered integrally important in maintaining national ecological health and a
functioning biosphere. The following section summarizes the internal justification for
management as given in interviews and documents circulated within the network.

The Impact of Biodiversity Loss
One concern given about biodiversity management is that the impacts of loss of
key elements of biodiversity would not be restricted to their immediate area. In addition
to being a site of endemic flora, the limestone rainforest, provides a habitat for local and
migratory fauna. Arthropods, invertebrates and crustaceans as well as charismatic
species of Giant Swallowtail butterflies and Black and Yellow-billed parrots, all
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contribute to ecosystem stability by maintaining intricate trophic relationships.124 This
interconnectivity was described as a motivating factor in epistemic community interviews
and documents:
If you’re looking at it as a scientific point of view, if you lose elements of
biodiversity, a particular segment of biodiversity, it’s going to impact the
entire biodiversity. Whether it’s trophic levels, relationships, you’re going
to impact the entire thing.125
Selective removal of large timber species could cause unpredictable losses
of biodiversity, far greater than predicted by the proportion of forest
removed, because of the associated losses of host-specific parasites,
epiphytes or other symbiotic and commensal organisms.126
And sometimes, you know, you don’t lose something because of a direct
impact; you lose it because of an indirect impact, because you moved its
food source… So, sometimes it’s indirect, and you end up wiping out
these endemic species, these rare species.127
Endemism was also highlighted as an important dimension of concern, as it gives
an additional dimension of fragility and uniqueness to Cockpit Country ecosystems, as
described by epistemic community member Dayne Buddo:
There’s one section in Cockpit Country where there’s this particular road,
right? There’s this part, these plants are only found in that section, in that
place, and nowhere else in the world. I mean, that is remarkable! Only in
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STEA, Biodiversity Manual pp. 8. Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July
12, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
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Susan Koenig, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Report: Biodiversity Assessment
(Prepared for NRCA/NEPA: Kingston) pp. 30.
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Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
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that section, that one small section.128

Identifying the Primary Ecological Threats
Concerns about ecological integrity and the irreplaceable loss of endemic
biodiversity unified the epistemic community behind the perception that bauxite mining
was the primary threat to biodiversity in the Cockpit Country. In interviews and policy
documents, members emphasized the permanent transformation and disruption of
ecological relationships that would occur if open-cast mining took place in the area.
From this perspective, none of the available management strategies could cope with the
severity of biodiversity loss caused by bauxite mining. As Spence observed in 1999,
“[mining] should not be allowed in the Cockpit core because land reclamation will not
restore the original ecosystem to acceptable levels,”129 and it would become impossible to
manage the Cockpit Country for other resources, including forest conservation:
[Forest management] would be obsolete if bauxite mining takes place in
the Cockpit Country. There will be no trees to take anyway. That’s a
huge threat. Really above what an NGO can do, really above what
scientists at the University [of the West Indies] or Institute [of Jamaica]
can do. You’re talking about a Minister, almost, decision. You can’t have
bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country. It’s the last place that you want to
have that.130
The network also shared a concern about the expansion of agriculture and logging
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Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
recording. Emphasis based on author interpretation of phrasing of respondent.
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in the Cockpit Country. Yam harvesting in particular is problematic because of the
potential to clear vast tracts of land and contribute to deforestation by preventing the
regeneration of the forest.131 Other threats, such as commercial agriculture, were not
widely cited as of primary concern by epistemic community members.

Creating a Managerial Framework
Accordingly, the epistemic community developed an internal set of policy
preferences that emphasized the ecological importance of biodiversity in the Cockpit
Country. These preferred policies were based in part on the ecoregion mapping
conducted by the emerging epistemic community in 1999, including the Biodiversity
Assessment, which divided the Cockpit Country into a proposed core area of sensitive
biodiversity and a buffer zone.132 Throughout the entirety of the Cockpit Country, the
epistemic community sought a moratorium on mining and a fundamental change in the
harvesting of yam-sticks. In the area proposed as a buffer zone, the community sought
the promotion of sustainable agriculture and regulated timber extraction. In the core, the
community also sought a ban on agricultural incursions.
At the same time, there was some contention within the network about the
appropriate regulation of agricultural activity in the Cockpit Country. While all network
members were opposed to bauxite mining in the area, some members, mostly Jamaican131

The Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation
Plan (Kingston: Forestry Department) pp. 12.
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World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project, pp. 1; Susan Koenig et al,
1999, Biodiversity Assessment pp. 11
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born scientists, agreed that sustainable agriculture in the Cockpit Country buffer zone
was acceptable. Sustainable agriculture, if managed correctly, could incorporate local
communities into governance efforts, promoting biodiversity conservation while
simultaneously maintaining economic wellbeing for marginalized and rural populations,
as described by interview respondents such as Hugh Dixon of STEA, and Kimberly John
and Ann Hayes-Sutton of TNC:
[When] you get the little bits of research… you start to say, “Hey, I can
use the resource, because I know it’s renewable. And I can know what
levels I can use it, to make it renewable to sustain it over time,” as against
indiscriminate use of it.133
I think that all life is obviously, and not so obviously connected, and we
need to make sure that we keep it working if we want to survive. The fact
is that we wouldn’t, human beings or humanity wouldn’t be alive if we
didn’t maintain and manage biodiversity.134
I do not agree that there are species that should never be used for
economic purposes, nor do I agree that there are some uses (such as
hunting) that should never be considered, provided such use can be shown
to be consistent with the conservation of the species... I believe that
conservation of biodiversity is not just important but fundamental to the
maintenance of humanity.135
However, a small fraction of the community, three of the approximately two
dozen members, including both Schwartz and Koenig of the WRC, indicated greater
opposition to agricultural incursions into the Cockpit Country even from marginalized
133

Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
recording.
134

Kimberly John author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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and subsistence populations. In interviews, these respondents suggested that permitting
infrastructure development in the Cockpit Country, such as access to electricity and
maintained roads, would have a detrimental effect on biodiversity management, by
contributing to further access into ecologically sensitive zones. These three took a
preservationist approach not shared by most of the network, as suggested in the following
quotes from Schwartz and Koenig.
…I’m part of the human plague that has descended upon this planet... I
would be very happy if everyone on this planet voluntarily decided to go
extinct and leave it to the rest of the animals to have a chance to exist
[laughing].136
So, we need to set a good example to this future species that takes over the
world… [We] should voluntarily go extinct to protect the rest of
biodiversity.137
However, this internal tension was not fundamentally threatening to the coherence
of the network. First, these comments did not become a visible part of the internal policy
debate, and second, maintaining cohesion against the overarching threat of bauxite
mining remained the primary goal of the epistemic community.

Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN): A Wider Network of Policy Advocacy
As the epistemic community became constituted around the ecological
importance of Cockpit Country biodiversity, a larger transnational advocacy network
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Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006.
Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Susan Koenig, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006.
Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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(TAN) emerged to parallel the interest of the research network. This TAN consisted of a
range of organizations including: community based organizations (CBOs) of Accompong
Maroons, descendants of escaped slaves and indigenous Indians; Birdlife International;
the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ); the Jamaica Environmental Advocacy
Network (JEAN); the Jamaica Environmental Trust (JET); the Jamaica Caving
Organization (JCO); the Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust (JCDT).138
The membership of this network overlapped with that of the epistemic
community, insofar as Mike Schwartz from WRC and Diana McCauley of JET were
members of both networks. In addition, the information generated by the epistemic
community, highlighting the risk to Cockpit Country ecology posed by bauxite
expansion, was crucial in raising awareness about the potential encroachment of bauxite
companies on Cockpit Country biodiversity.
However, the TAN functioned as a different network, as the organizing principles
were different from those of the epistemic community. While TAN organizations
recognized the findings of the epistemic community, including the threat assessment and
the proposed boundaries of the ecoregion,139 the TAN was not motivated by scientific
reasoning, nor was the network solely concerned about the ecological ramifications of
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Cockpit Country biodiversity loss. For example, TAN organizations, such as the
aforementioned Accompong Maroons, value the Cockpit Country not only for its role in
providing economic opportunities, but also for its cultural importance as a historic site in
which rebel slave garrisons resisted British colonialism.140 Nevertheless, the TAN
assisted the advocacy efforts of the epistemic community by, among other things,
contributing funding to the Project on Sustainable Conservation and TNC’s PiP project,
aiding in the generation of scientific knowledge.141

Framing Alignment
The constitution of a shared ecological focus within the epistemic community
demonstrates the process of framing alignment, where actors in a network converge on a
set of norms, by exchanging information, ideas and building horizontal links.142 In
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particular, the effort towards creating mutually intelligible information required that
researchers conduct investigations and create relationships with specialists outside their
area of expertise. Besides building connections to other potential allies, this process led
to a shared understanding of the integrated ecological relationships in the Cockpit
Country, as described in the following quote by Susan Koenig.
…[When] you start doing one little bit of research, then the system has its
story to tell you, and you start seeing the interactions with the other
animals and the system… Also, I was kind of the resident biologist... So
everyone kind of directs the questions to me and so I started doing bat
monitoring for Windsor Great Caves, because “birds fly, bats fly, so
therefore Susan must know something about bats.”143
This also assisted the network in converging upon shared expectations and ideas
about the important environmental relationships in the Cockpit Country. The idea that
bauxite mining was the primary threat did not become a unifying idea until after 2000, as
ENGOs such as the WRC did not focus initially consider bauxite an imminent danger to
biodiversity:
[When] we did our analysis, we were supposed to be looking at the active
threats, not the potential threats. And there was no bauxite mining taking
explains the internal dynamics within networks converging on a shared set of norms.
See also Mario Diani, 1996, Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities:
Insights from Regional Populism in Italy (American Sociological Review, 61: 1053 –
1069), pp. 1058.
143

Susan Koenig, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006.
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Buddo, Mike Schwartz and Marilyn Headley. While conducting field research in the
Cockpit Country, the author engaged in trust building with the members of the WRC.
During this time, the WRC was engaged in collecting and categorizing species of snakes
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transmission.
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place. Therefore, it kind of dropped, might have been lower ranked than
otherwise...144
The diminution of bauxite mining as a major threat was also demonstrated in the
1999 Biodiversity Assessment, which, while recognizing bauxite mining as a potential
threat, focused on a management approach aimed at improving practices among local
subsistence and agrarian populations.145 This benign neglect of bauxite mining as a
policy concern was justified on the basis of the logistical difficulties of extending mining
into the difficult-to-access area.146 It was simply too cost-prohibitive for bauxite
companies to consider extractive efforts in the late 1990s.
However, after 2000, national policy developments and industrial practices in the
bauxite sector indicated mounting national interest in developing access infrastructure in
the Cockpit Country. First, the government of Jamaica began planning the construction of
Highway 2000, a major thoroughfare traversing the southern coast of the island, with a
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link between the north and south coast passing through the Cockpit Country.147 Although
the plan for this north-south link was abandoned due to the foreseen difficulties of
constructing the highway within Cockpit Country, the initial proposal indicated that the
government was considering the possibility of major and unprecedented infrastructure
development in the Cockpit.148 Second, as bauxite deposits were being depleted
nationwide, companies began increasing the scope of mining activities across the island,
and it increasingly seemed as if Cockpit Country with its projected reserves would be an
imminent target for mineral extraction.149 Consequently, by 2001, the network agreed
internally that mining was an imminent concern.
[Now, the TNC’s] analysis or our analysis gives bauxite mining as the
biggest threat. And we certainly agree with that.150

Measuring the Epistemic Community’s Knowledge Consensus
Along with adopting a framework that shared a focus on ecological relationships,
the network established an intersubjective consensus to explain the causal relationships
between human activity and environmental degradation. In interviews, respondents in
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the epistemic community and the broader scientific community indicated that there was
no contention, either within the network or externally, about the severity and extent of the
anthropogenic threats facing biodiversity management in the region. As a result, the
network in this case evinced the characteristics of an epistemic community, namely a
knowledge consensus and a rationale for action.

Measuring Consensus on Bauxite Mining
Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Causes
The idea that bauxite mining was an overwhelming threat to biodiversity in the
Cockpit Country after 2000 was universally shared within the epistemic community.
First, bauxite production has a privileged position in Jamaican national development.
Bauxite mining is a significant percentage of annual GDP, between 8.5% and 10% per
annum. In 1999 production stood at 13 million tonnes per annum, or 7% of the total
world supply.151 Second, governmental agencies also directly benefit from bauxite
production. Between 2004 and 2006, the JBI received J$5m in interest from bauxite
deposits and J$11.5m from commercial projects. The government has 50% ownership in
Clarendon Alumina Production, one of the bauxite companies possessing prospecting
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leases in the Cockpit Country.152 Bauxite interests have also been highly placed in other
agencies, with the appointment in the mid 2000s of Parris Lyew-Ayee, the director of the
JBI, to the directorship of NEPA.153 Third, there is wide recognition of which specific
companies are likely to conduct mining in the area. At the time of writing, the only
companies with Ministry of Agriculture-issued mining licenses for the bauxite in the
Cockpit Country were Alcoa and Clarendon Aluminium Production.

Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Consequences
Further, the common recognition of the ecological importance of Cockpit Country
biodiversity led to a shared understanding that the consequences of bauxite mining would
be the irrevocable loss of sensitive biodiversity. This was facilitated by the
standardization of industrial extraction practices in the bauxite sector, and awareness of
these practices within the network. Concern about the irreparable nature of bauxite
mining on biodiversity can be found in internally cited reports such as TNC’s Cockpit
Country Conservation Action Plan,154 STEA’s Biodiversity Manual,155 and in interview
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responses from network members Owen Evelyn from the Forestry Department, and other
respondents from UWI.
You will notice that in the [National Biodiversity Strategy and] Action
Plan, the primary threats, or potential threats, is bauxite mining. Okay?
We regard it as probably the most significant threat, because most of the
Cockpit is bauxite... Other threats are not that extensive. But the bauxite
is extensive, because if they go inside, it will affect all the biodiversity
planning that we have identified.156
[Any] kind of intrusive land cutting that the bauxite company would do
would just basically kill the area. There would be nothing left.157

Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Extent
During the period of transnational mobilization and network-building, there had
been no mining in the Cockpit Country. Nevertheless, there was a shared understanding
within the network about the likely extent of bauxite mining in the region due to the
recognition of certain details. The community shared maps illustrating the presence, size,
and location of bauxite reserves in the Cockpit Country (see Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite
Deposits in the Cockpit Country). These maps and figures were cited in reports such as
the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment conducted by Koenig of the WRC, Vogel of
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Birdlife/UWI, Hayes-Sutton of TNC and Proctor of UWI158 and the Land Management
Assessment conducted by Spence.159 Since the network was convinced by 2001 that
bauxite companies intended to mine the Cockpit, these maps contributed to a growing
alarm about the likely scope of bauxite extraction activities in the area:
…[Mining] is the biggest threat. It’s an inevitable threat, and it’s going to
be a significant impact on the Cockpit Country.160
…[The] whole issue that they will face in the near future, as you probably
would have heard, is that [the Cockpit Country is] supposed to be a huge
bauxite reserve. And so if we do run out of areas of bauxite outside the
Cockpit Country, they’re going to actually head in there.161
Consequently, the epistemic community demonstrated a shared agreement about
the scientific knowledge on every indicator of knowledge about bauxite mining and
environmental degradation. As described above, a qualitative assessment of the status of
scientific knowledge indicates that, for this process, scientific consensus within the
network is both present and strong.

Measuring Scientific Consensus on Agriculture and Logging
In comparison to the state of knowledge on the effect of bauxite mining on
environmental degradation, there was less agreement within the epistemic community on
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the causes, consequences and extent of agricultural environmental degradation. This was
due to a lack of clear information in some sectors, differences in methodology within the
network, and a qualitative difference between the network’s approach to understanding
the ecological impact of bauxite, and its approach to agriculture. Nevertheless, the
observed dissensus was not described by the network as a cause for undermining the core
knowledge consensus.

Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Causes
First, marijuana cultivation is illegal in Jamaica, though regularly carried out as
part of the informal economy. Similarly, unauthorized logging and unauthorized farming
of licit crops takes place in the Cockpit Country. In these cases, activities which are
hidden from the view of policymakers do not follow any formal reporting systems. Thus,
for some agricultural activities, it is difficult to isolate specific actors, practices and
conduct accurate models of the environmental impact of agricultural activity.162
As a proxy indicator for the lack of agreement on the causes of subsistence
agriculture, epistemic community members do not have a consistent ranking scheme of
the severity of the threat of agricultural activity. The terms used to classify and evaluate
the different activities, namely “agriculture,” “yam-stick cultivation,” and “forest
conversion” are not used in a consistent manner across policy documents. TNC’s threat
assessment for its PiP program lists the three as distinct, each with differing levels of
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importance, and separating the low-ranked yam-stick harvesting from broader
agricultural practices.163 The Forestry Department, while ranking yam-stick harvesting as
a prominent threat, also separated it from agriculture, while the 1999 Land Management
Assessment produced by Spence of UWI included yam production in agriculture, calling
it the “most significant immediate threat” to biodiversity management in the Cockpit
Country.164 Nevertheless, network members from the Forestry Department, WRC, STEA
and UWI all ranked yam-stick harvesting, whether included as an agricultural activity, or
counted separately, as the prominent agricultural threat in the region, with only TNC as
an outlier.

Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Consequences
A lack of clear information also inhibits collecting scientific information on the
consequences of subsistence agriculture and logging on biodiversity. For example, a
1995 study of subsistence agriculture in the Cockpit Country revealed samples of small
farmers who completely bulldozed forested areas for cattle, but also indicated that other
farmers painstakingly conserved the natural forest during crop cultivation.165 Although
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marijuana cultivation may contribute to further incursions into sensitive areas, it may
inadvertently lead to the conservation of certain broad-leafed tree species due to their
utility as aerial camouflage.166 As a result, precisely accounting for the impact of
agricultural activity on biodiversity in the Cockpit Country would require an extensive
qualitative survey of decentralized, under-reported activity; failing this, the current
models have some inescapable element of uncertainty.

Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Extent
Finally, the fact that agricultural activity was considered to be less severe of a
threat than bauxite mining contributed to another element of uncertainty. With bauxite
mining, it was assumed that any such activity would lead to complete destruction of
biodiversity. Since agricultural activity was less traumatic, the network relied on more
finely gradated assessments of environmental degradation, which led to some
disagreement when network members could not agree on a shared methodology for
measuring the extent of biodiversity loss.
The Forestry Department used its LANDSAT study to fix the rate at 0.1% loss of
forest cover per annum, a figure that is also recognized currently by TNC.167 At the
same time, UWI scientists have produced reports positing a range from a low of 0.03% to
a high of 11.3% loss per annum.168 Spence’s 1999 Land Management Assessment
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claimed the rate of deforestation in the Cockpit Country between 1961 and 1991 at
0.97%, and the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment cited studies by L. Alan Eyre fixing the
rate of loss at 2.8%.
One of the cited reasons for this recognized discrepancy is the presence of
methodological differences, particularly in distinguishing between native and non-native
species, and in projecting rates of change of foliage cover over time. Indeed, this was
one of the conclusions of the 1999 Cockpit Country Conservation Project reports by
TNC, WRC and UWI network members.169 However, there were no references to this
disagreement in the contemporary policy proposals and internal documents, even as there
was a verbal acknowledgement of this difference in interviews.
To reiterate, there was universal agreement on the dimensions of bauxite mining
and its causal impact on biodiversity loss. In contrast, there was some disagreement
between TNC and the rest of the network about the precise causes of agricultural
degradation, some diffuse uncertainty about the consequences of agricultural degradation,
and despite an official acceptance of the Forestry Department’s figure, acknowledgement
by all members of disagreement on the extent of agricultural degradation in the Cockpit
Country. Nevertheless, these disagreements did not surface in the network’s policy
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discussions, and although consensus was certainly higher in the case of bauxite mining, it
was nevertheless present throughout the network on the anthropogenic causes of
biodiversity loss in the Cockpit Country.

Measuring Network Socialization with Managers
While consensus was relatively uniform across the threats observed by the
network, there was substantial variation in the degree of socialization between the
epistemic community and targeted policymakers in natural resource management
agencies.

High Socialization with the Forestry Department
There were very robust ties between the Forestry Department and the network. In
fact, the Department functioned as part of the epistemic community. As indicated above,
this meant that researchers from the civil society and the governmental agency shared
information and knowledge about causal relationships and the importance of biodiversity
in the region through joint reports, training sessions, and information exchanges. Further,
the Department conducted LFMCs with STEA, TNC and WRC. However, the strength
of this relationship between policymaker and epistemic community distinguishes the
Forestry Department from other natural resource management agencies in Jamaica.
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Very Low Socialization between the Network and NEPA
In the case of the environmental management agency, NEPA, the relationship
between the network of scientists and the governmental agency was almost antagonistic.
This was not always the case. Prior to 2001, when the agency was still referred to as the
NRCA, members of the emerging epistemic community had established strong
relationships and created a pattern of information sharing with the environmental agency.
For example, the NRCA commissioned a series of Sector Assessment Reports in 1999 to
prepare for the construction of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
(NBSAP), one of the requirements of the CBD.170 Among some of the researchers
contacted by the NRCA to contribute information included epistemic community
members Peter Vogel from UWI and Ann Hayes-Sutton from TNC.
However, the 2001 restructuring of the agency led to a rupture in the relationship
between the network and the agency.171 First, epistemic community members were
concerned about the politics behind amalgamating the NRCA with the Town Planning
Department, given earlier tensions between those two bodies:
[The Town Planning Department] wanted to do [a housing scheme], and
suddenly they found to their surprise and amazement that they couldn’t do
it, because NEPA – NRCA – had refused permission, because of the
environmental impact. And the government took the shortcut route and
said, “Well, we’ll fix you. We’re going to amalgamate Planning and
NRCA into one, NEPA, so this doesn’t happen again.”172
170

See Article 6 of the Convention.
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Susan Koenig, author interviews conducted August 3, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
172

Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted August 3, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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Second, after restructuring, the organization had an almost entirely new staff, with
little institutional continuity from the previous agency. In interviews, former highranking NRCA staffers indicated that this weakened the regulatory authority of the
agency, as the loss of expertise severely hampered the credibility and capacity of the
organization to assess and evaluate environmental processes.173 The perceived decline of
the NRCA/NEPA as a regulatory power later contributed further to the rupture of
communication between the civil society and the agency.
The problem with NEPA from what I understand, is how the appointments
are made. The high echelon people are people who are appointed by the
government, and they might not have any interest in anything per se, other
than just doing their jobs. And they aren’t necessarily the best people for
this position.174
In 2005, tensions between the civil society and NEPA came to a head when
members of the epistemic community and the environmental TAN, such as the JET sued
the agency, alleging that NEPA conducted a compromised and flawed environmental
impact assessment (EIA) of a proposed hotel development on the north coast. From an
environmental perspective, the suit was successful, as Justice Brian Sykes barred
construction of the hotel, asserting that NEPA had failed its mandate. However, as
described in interviews with NEPA staff and epistemic community members, the public
173

These points made in interviews with the following: Franklin McDonald, author
interviews, conducted August 2007. Notes taken from telephone interview; Mike
Schwartz, author interviews conducted August 3, 2006. Taken from transcript of
audiocassette recording; Yolanda Mittoo, author interviews, conducted August 2005.
Taken from handwritten notes. Donna Blake, author interviews conducted June 28,
2006. Taken from audiocassette recording.
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Kurt McLaren, author interviews conducted. Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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confrontation between the civil society and the agency created irreconcilable tensions
between the ENGOs and the environmental ministry.

Low Socialization between the Network and Other Agencies
While less confrontational, the remainder of relationships between the civil
society epistemic community members and natural resource management agencies was
characterized by far less socialization than was the case with the Forestry Department.
Channels of communication between the various populations of social actors were not
institutionalized, but rather ad hoc and irregular. Most of the communication to
policymakers took place through letter-writing drives and media efforts by a few actors,
in particular Mike Schwartz of the WRC, Ann Hayes-Sutton of TNC and Diana
McCauley of the Jamaica Environment Trust (JET), who wrote letters to the Ministry of
Agriculture and issued press releases during 2005 – 2006. Occasionally, epistemic
community organizations would attempt to create more formal communication between
the populations of policymakers and civil society researchers. For example, in planning
for the Conservation Action Plan, TNC held a series of workshops with epistemic
community organizations from 2004 – 2006, and invited policy makers from the JBI, the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment, NEPA and the Forestry
Department to attend.175 However, only the Forestry Department participated while the
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Author questionnaire, Mike Schwartz, Jan 14, 2007, taken from typed responses;
Peter Vogel, 1999, NBSAP Sector Assessment Report – Terrestrial Fauna (Kingston:
NEPA); Ann Hayes-Sutton, 1999, NBSAP Sector Assessment Report – Terrestrial Flora
(Kingston: NEPA); Diana McCauley, author questionnaire received 18 January, 2007.
Taken from typed responses.
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JBI, NEPA and the remainder of the Ministry of Agriculture abstained, a pattern of
agency participation characterized as typical by epistemic community respondents.
Consequently, the only campaign in which socialization between the network and the
policymaker agencies existed, occurred in the case of the Forestry Department.

Measuring the Framing Strategies Used by the Network
Strategic Economic Frames: Persuading Managers
In assessing the advocacy efforts of the network, economic frames were used
extensively in communicating with the various managers associated with bauxite mining.
Between 2001 and 2006, the network deliberately adopted the language of economic
cost-benefit analysis to “translate” its claims by constructing models indicating that
biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country was intimately linked to economic
activity in other nationally important economic productive sectors, and that degradation
would lead to economic opportunity losses. Through interviews and policy documents,
epistemic community members stated that this was a necessary strategy of
communicating with policy makers that were primarily concerned with fostering national
development through prominent industrial sectors.
Since our decision makers, I don’t think they are really well educated
about ecology and so on… I think it’s best we, to frame the message of
biodiversity management in something that in a sense seems
[economically] conservative.176
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Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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Using Economics to Frame Environmental Impacts
The productive sector used to highlight the link between environmental
management and national economic development was the tourist industry. The choice of
tourism was considered appropriate, as tourism is a comparable contributor to national
development, bringing a similar amount of foreign revenue, and in 2003 contributing
10% of GDP and 50% of national foreign currency earnings. Including auxiliary
employment, tourism is credited with contributing to the creation of 1 in every 4 jobs in
Jamaica.177 According to interviews with the epistemic community network, this link
was deemed more convincing than appeals to environmentalism.
We’re trying to communicate to [policy makers] in dollars and cents.
Which is a language that they more understand than to say, “This is a
particular species that is only found in Jamaica.” They probably don’t
relate to it as much, as then saying, “If you lose this, you stand to lose
millions of dollars in tourism.”178
The link was made possible by the importance of the Cockpit Country to the
hydrological regime of the north coast. The Cockpit Country encompasses several
watersheds, or areas “drained by a single stream, river, or drainage network,” organized
since 1995 by the Water Resources Authority into two Watershed Management Units
(WMUs), the Martha Brae and Rio Bueno WMU.179 These WMUs supply municipal and
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JAMPRO, The Importance of the Tourism Mega-Cluster in the National Export
Strategy (from Conference on Global Tourism Growth: A Challenge for SMEs, 2005.
Retrieved October 2007 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/5/36886099.pdf) p. 2
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Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
recording.
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Definition taken from the Forestry Department’s Forest Regulations, pp. 1. See
Roland Camirand and Owen Evelyn, National Forestry Inventory Report, pp. 21. There
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drinking water to the northwestern section of the island, including to economically
important tourism centers in Montego Bay. In 2003, TNC began planning a water
valuation study of the hydrological resources of Cockpit Country, intending to
demonstrate the economic importance of the region, distributing these results to the
Forestry Department, the JBI, NEPA, the Ministry of Environment and the Water
Resources Authority.180
Water resources were regarded as a key starting point for the valuation of
the ecological services of Cockpit Country because of the very significant
municipal, agricultural and tourism interests downstream of the area and
because it would provide a compelling cost-benefit analysis when
compared with high-value activities such as bauxite mining.181
What we were going to do is attach a cost, that there’s a price associated
with the clean water that’s supplied by the Cockpit Country… If you
compare water with bauxite mining… [compare] the benefits to the
society and the economy of maintaining the resources.182
[Bauxite] brings revenue into a weak economy, so, you let the land, and
mine the bauxite, and get out as much as possible, and let’s rake in the
money… [The] only thing that is going to stem that exploit,
indiscriminate exploit, is the ability of the communities to put forward a
case on the value of the water.183
are a total of 26 WMUs in Jamaica and a total of 33 watersheds.
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For this study, TNC received a grant of $13,000 of technical support from USAID
and Development Alternatives Inc. The Nature Conservancy, 2005, Cockpit Country
Parks in Peril: Water Valuation Study Update (The Nature Conservancy: Kingston,
Jamaica) p. 1
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The Nature Conservancy, Cockpit Country Parks in Peril: Water Valuation Study
Update (The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, Jamaica, 2005) pp. 2.
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Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette
recording.
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At the same time, community members themselves continued to believe that the
real goal of environmental management was the maintenance of ecological integrity. The
same documents and reports that advocated using economic arguments to communicate
with policy makers observed that the primary goal of these arguments was to “conserve
the biodiversity of the area in perpetuity,” noting that the water resources were chosen as
the main focus of the conservation efforts, as “the karstic freshwater ecosystems [are] a
major component of Cockpit Country’s biodiversity.”184 Further, epistemic community
members asserted through interviews that economic valuation was an incomplete metric
in understanding the fundamental value of biodiversity.
So, to some extent, we have to find, we have to – to make a rational
decision, you should know what’s the value of the biodiversity, of the geodiversity, and compare it with the value of the bauxite. That’s one
approach, the economic approach… [But] we have 67 or something
different species of mosquito in Jamaica, and they’re all valuable, and
some are endemic, and we love them too. I mean, how do you value
them? So it is, there is a problem.185
How do you put a value on some of these things? …We’re talking about
plant material, you know? I mean, apart from actually timber, you know?
How do you value these other, other targets that we have identified?
We’re talking about the yellow Boa, and the butterfly. How do you put a
value to these?186
Consequently, the epistemic community did use economic framing although, as
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The Nature Conservancy, Cockpit Country Parks in Peril: Water Valuation Study
Update (The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, Jamaica, 2005) pp. 1.
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Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted August 3, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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Owen Evelyn, author interviews conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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will be seen later, not in every campaign attempt. As an epistemic community, this
network also generated an intersubjective consensus on the primary causal relationships
in the environmental threats studied. Finally, the network generated socialization
processes, although limited to the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.
The following section discusses the epistemic community advocacy, illustrating when the
network made use of economic frames to communicate its arguments.

Environmental Policy Advocacy
Ministry of Agriculture: Establish a Moratorium on Bauxite Mining
Having established an economic argument to curb mining, the epistemic
community first sought the declaration, by the Ministry of Agriculture, of an official
moratorium on bauxite mining in the area. Throughout the period of epistemic
community advocacy, knowledge brokers conducted a letter-writing drive to Minister
Roger Clarke, as well as conducting a media drive to convince the government of its
position.187 Existing environmental regulations were simply ineffective, and the threat of
bauxite mining was too great to environmental, cultural, and social concerns in the
Cockpit Country.
Under Jamaican law, the primary environmental regulatory policy over mining is
the requirement that companies restore mined land, governed by certification processes
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Mike Schwartz, author questionnaire received January 7, 2007. Taken from
handwritten notes. Diana McCauley, author questionnaire, received 18 January, 2007;
Jamaica Environmental Trust, 2006, Cockpit Country Press Release (Press release
2006).
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from the Department of Mining.188 However, mined lands do not have to be restored to
their previous ecological relationships, but can be converted to commercial agriculture, or
simply to grasslands. In fact, between 1995 and 2000, the bauxite companies Kaiser and
Alcan planted a total of 3 million trees in restoration efforts, with the vast majority of
these as commercial fruit trees, grass or fast-growing species,189 a process which
nevertheless was certified as adequate restoration by the Department of Mining.190 Citing
uncertainty, the epistemic community argued for the precautionary approach:
[Mining restoration] is complicated, because once the soil is removed, the
hydrology of the area is altered, and we don't really understand the
relationship among soil dwelling microbes, fungi and all other plant and
animal species, such as pollinating roles, seed dispersal and chemical
relationships.191
As a result, epistemic community members rejected the idea that mining
restoration would be an adequate environmental management strategy in the Cockpit
Country, pointing out: “You cannot restore forest which has been completely cleared.”192
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Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan pp.
95. The Mining Act of Jamaica, 1947, amended 1988 requires that mining companies
“…restore all mined lands to at least the level of agricultural or pastoral productivity or
of suitability for afforestation, which existed before mining.” Cited in NEPA, The
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan pp. 16.
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Dennis Morrison and Michael Mitchell, 1999, Mining pp. 20.
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Susan Koenig, Cockpit Country Conservation Report pp. 52. In the Forestry
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STEA, Biodiversity Manual pp. 15.
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George Proctor. Quoted at the 2005 Strategies Workshop on the Cockpit Country
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To be sure, there was some disunity in the community’s campaign with the
Ministry of Agriculture in this regard. Instead of supporting the network’s hardline
stance against mining, the Forestry Department recommended new regulations on postmining activity, advocating that companies reforest mined areas, or an equivalent area
elsewhere with comparable species. This proposal, referred to as the “no net-loss”193
strategy, contrasted with the preferences of the civil society members of the epistemic
community.
However, in interviews, Forestry Department personnel admitted that the removal
of forest cover would permanently change the biodiversity composition of the area.
Staffers admitted that the compromise position was a second-best preference, chosen only
in assumption of the fact that bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country was inevitable:
Well, what we are trying to get across to the bauxite companies is that… if
you’re taking out forest land, you should really start thinking that you
need to replace some forest somewhere... Purists don’t agree because they
say that you’ve lost the forest. Well, we’ve lost the forest. So our next
step now is to get them to put a forest somewhere else.
But you know, you can’t really replace the Cockpit Country. You can put
a forest somewhere else, you can pay for a forest to be planted somewhere
else, but you can’t replant the Cockpit Country.194

Parks-in-Peril Project, in Bridgette B. Barrett, Strategies Workshop Report, prepared for
The Nature Conservancy (Kingston: TNC, 2005) pp. 5
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Forestry Department, 2001, Forest Policy 2001: Appendix II (Kingston, Jamaica: The
Forestry Department) pp. II-2. Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest
Conservation and Management Plan, pp. 66
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Marilyn Headley, author interviews, conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
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Ministry of Environment: Establish a National Park under IUCN Guidelines
One of the longstanding policy recommendations held by the epistemic
community, was the creation by the Ministry of Environment of an IUCN classified
National Park to define the borders and management strategy of the Cockpit Country.
This was one of the core recommendations in the 1999 studies, and the associated
Cockpit Country Conservation Project.195 Like the proposed moratorium, this suggestion
rested on the network’s attempt to use economic arguments to highlight the benefits of
environmental management, by stating that IUCN classification would raise the
international profile of the Cockpit Country, encouraging international donors to
contribute funds for domestic biodiversity management.196
If adopted, this policy would legally establish the buffer zone and core areas of
the Cockpit Country under Jamaican law. While much of the area known as the Cockpit
Country is classified as a Forest Reserve, and while the area is generally recognized in
common language in Jamaica, and although the GEF-funded project references “the
Cockpit Country,” the area was not, at the launch of the project, a legally defined
195

Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, 2004, Categorization of Protected Areas in
Jamaica (The Nature Conservancy: Kingston), p. 3. Sacha-Renée Todd, A Framework
to Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas pp. 3-4. World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country
Conservation Project (Project prepared for the GEF) pp. 1 - 5
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Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, Categorization of Protected Areas in Jamaica
(The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, 2004) passim; Sacha-Renée Todd, A Framework to
Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas, passim. By one study, tourists visiting the
BJCMNP spend US$2.5 million in the area per year. According to one study, if the Park
were to implement access fees, there would be a further gain of US$420,000 per annum,
making it a model for developing ecotourism as a means for environmental protection
and sustainable development (see ENACT, Policy on Strategic Environmental
Assessment, pp. 20).
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geographical area. If the IUCN National Park used the boundaries suggested by the
community, this would increase the size of the area currently protected under Forest
Reserve status (see Figure 2.2: Map of Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country).197
Moreover, the adoption of IUCN classification was considered instrumental in
properly implementing the CBD. In 1997, the NRCA recommended the adoption of
IUCN standards in Jamaican protected areas management. In 2004, Ann Hayes-Sutton,
citing the Programme of Work on protected areas adopted at the 7th Conference of Parties
(COP-7) of the CBD, called for the adoption by the Forestry Department and NEPA of
IUCN classification to create an internationally standardized, protected area in the
Cockpit Country.198
Besides complying with the CBD recommendations and the COP-7
pronouncements, IUCN status was considered a more permanent form of protection than
are Forest Reserves. While Forest Reserve status is considered by the government of
Jamaica to be in technical compliance with Article 8 of the CBD, the legislative structure
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allows mining leases to be issued in Forest Reserves and National Parks.199 In other
words, National Parks and Forest Reserves can be overruled by bauxite companies
interested in extracting resources in the Cockpit Country.200

Ministry of Environment and NEPA: Implement Ecotourism as a
Management Strategy
In a related issue, the epistemic community recommended the promotion of
ecotourism in the Cockpit Country, both as a biodiversity management plan, and as a
revenue generating activity. Ecotourism proposals date back to the 1999 campaign, when
Spence’s Land Management Assessment requested $561,000 Jamaican from the
government of Jamaica to develop infrastructure for ecotourism in the proposed buffer
zones and core of the Cockpit Country.201 In 2001, the Project for Sustainable
Conservation continued the call for ecotourism as a viable means of promoting greater
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Plan: National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston: NRCA) pp. 12. Forest
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state interest in conservation, as well as changing domestic practices of subsistence and
agricultural communities.202
In part, the administration of the IUCN defined Park could be funded by
promoting ecotourism and low-impact recreational activities in protected areas of the
Cockpit, and charging user access fees to foreign and domestic visitors.203 An ancillary
benefit gained by promoting ecotourism in the Cockpit Country would be the alleviation
of pressure caused by the concentration of the tourist market on large-scale development
in high-traffic coastal areas, which have been showing signs of degradation, beach
erosion and shallow water pollution.204
As described above, these policy recommendations were organized in such a
manner as to highlight the economic merit of biodiversity conservation in the Cockpit
Country. In contrast, recommendations to the Forestry Department to regulate
agricultural and subsistence activities did not rely on linking biodiversity management to
prominent economic sectors important to national development. When economic
arguments were used, they referenced the economic livelihood of marginalized, agrarian
populations.
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Forestry Department: Implement Sustainable Agriculture
One of the concerns about implementing protected area status in the Cockpit
Country was the potential for prohibiting agricultural and subsistence activities in the
region.205 On one hand, this would create additional economic stress for lower-income
populations who would no longer be able to legally carry out their livelihood. On the
other hand, this could create additional environmental pressure, if farmers took
agricultural activity into secluded and virgin territory, in order to escape governmental
scrutiny.
For these reasons, the epistemic community recommended that the Forestry
Department foster sustainable agriculture as a matter of policy among marginalized
populations.206 By creating alternative wealth generation opportunities among lowerincome communities, sustainable agriculture could function as an incentive package to
persuade subsistence populations to eschew the most harmful agricultural practices,
particularly the use of tree saplings as yam-sticks.
Again, these policy preferences have been a longstanding goal of epistemic
community organizations. The 1999 studies contained recommendations that the

205

David Barker, 1998, Yam Farmers on the Forest Edge of Cockpit Country: Aspects
of Resource Use and Sustainability in McGregor, D.F.M., Barker, D. & S. Lloyd Evans
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Forestry Department fund the cultivation of fast-growth trees as yam-stick material, by
distributing free seedlings to local communities.207 Similarly, STEA had developed in
1999 a program to promote hedgerows in the Cockpit Country, where fast-growth trees
used for yam-sticks are planted in rows with cash crops cultivated in the “alleys” between
the rows. Besides functioning as renewable sources of yam-sticks, hedgerows can
minimize surface runoff and erosion.208
Therefore, as described above, the epistemic community developed a set of policy
recommendations between 1999 and 2001 about appropriate biodiversity management in
the Cockpit Country, particularly in regards to in situ conservation. The community,
which had generated a knowledge consensus on the relevant dimensions of human
activity sought the following: the creation of an ICUN National Park by the Ministry of
Environment and NEPA; a moratorium on bauxite mining by the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Mines and Geology Division, and the promotion of sustainable agriculture by the
Forestry Department.

Evaluating Epistemic Community Influence
Laggardly Behavior from NEPA and the Ministry of Environment
Despite holding an intersubjective consensus on dimensions such as the
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boundaries and importance of the Cockpit Country ecoregion, the epistemic community
did not influence the management of protected areas under the Ministry of Environment.
The government failed to implement the IUCN Park recommendations, despite their
occurrence in the 1997 NRCA recommendation, the 1999 Cockpit Country Conservation
Project proposals, and the PAMP conducted by Hayes-Sutton in 2004.209

Implementing Sustainable Agricultural Reforms by the Forestry Department
The community did register influence on the policies of the Forestry Department.
The Department’s 2001 Management Plan incorporated recommendations by the
epistemic community to produce and distribute seedlings for quick-growth trees. These
seedlings, provided for free to subsistence and agricultural communities, were intended to
be used as yam-sticks, replacing the unsustainable practice of cutting saplings.210
Further, the Forestry Department actively engaged in promoting sustainable agriculture in
local communities through the LFMCs, conducted with assistance from epistemic
community ENGOs.
More than demonstrating a willingness to adopt policies suggested by civil
society researchers, the Forestry Department demonstrated a similar adoption of
ecological arguments for environmental management. Prior to the emergence of
209
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epistemic community advocacy, the Forestry Department was criticized by civil society
researchers as uninterested in the ecological relationships of the Cockpit Country, and
focused on the commercial development of timber:
I mean, most of the, especially like in the John Crow Mountains, most of
the deforestation that was created in John Crow was by the Forestry
Department. You have this little stupid man basically going in and
clearing an area of forest, of natural forest, to plant up pine and all kinds
of crap.211
By the time the project concluded in 2007, the Forestry Department had changed
its environmental approach. Of the Jamaican natural resource management agencies, the
Forestry Department’s regulatory articles and the Forest Act of 1996 and 2001 are the
only specific references to biodiversity management as an environmental goal.212
Moreover, at the time of field research, the Department had adopted an approach that,
like the civil society epistemic community after the period of framing alignment, linked
forestry management with the wellbeing of fauna, other flora, and ecosystem integrity.
[Biodiversity] is a new discussion, and I suppose what has changed [are]
the views of managing forest for different, different reasons… So
everybody is talking about the ecosystem, and the habitat, and we even
talk about birds and bats, which we didn’t do, in the Forestry Department
before. When we started as the Forestry Department, it was just the trees,
we just never overlapped.213
As described in interviews with civil society epistemic community members, this
211

Kurt McLaren, author interviews. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording.

212
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not only marks a difference between earlier management approaches of the Forestry
Department, but also distinguishes the current approach of the Department from that of
the Ministry of Agriculture:
So the one good thing about the Forestry Department is that the Forestry
Department have changed their mandates, and they have a new outlook on
how to go about doing things… I worked there in ’97 briefly, and it’s just,
they just realized that forestry was not just about planting trees to cut them
down, you know?214
Forestry Department’s willingness is not reflected within other branches
of the Ministry [of Agriculture].215

Governmental Retrenchment in Mining Exploration
However, the success of the epistemic community in promoting ecological
management practices in the Forestry Department marked the only instance of network
direct influence on natural resource management. While the environmental ministry
seemed either unwilling or unable to incorporate the claims of the epistemic community,
the Ministry of Agriculture and the mining regulatory agencies were antipathetic to the
preferences of the transnational civil society network.
Despite the letter-writing and media drive, these agencies continued to support
bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country as critical to national development. In 2004, the
Ministry of Agriculture granted Alcoa and the Clarendon Alumina Production exclusive

214

Kurt McLaren, author interviews conducted. Transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Mike Schwartz, author questionnaire received January 17, 2007. Taken from typed
responses.
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licenses to prospect for bauxite deposits.216 In 2006, after Catherine Levy left Birdlife
Jamaica, the organization lost its Birdlife International affiliate status and left the Project
on Sustainable Conservation over a year before its completion.217 The WRC and JET
then became the primary knowledge brokers, maintaining the advocacy efforts to prevent
mining, but with no measurable success.
In 2006, the mining licenses, scheduled to expire at the end of the year, were
being considered for renewal by the Ministry of Agriculture. In September, communities
in the Cockpit Country reported that bauxite companies had already begun prospecting
mining in the area and relocating residents from lands with mining deposits.218 After the
epistemic community requested information to investigate these reports, the JBI and the
Ministry of Agriculture insisted that extractive mining was not planned for the Cockpit
Country, that the licenses would not be renewed, and claimed confidentiality to avoid
discussing mining plans.219
In October, concerned about what seemed like stonewalling, the TAN organized
around epistemic community and organizations associated with the Cockpit Country
TAN formally organized to create the Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s Group (CCSG).
216

Jamaica Observer, Sunday November 19, 2006.
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Mike Schwartz, Susan Koenig. Author interviews, conducted July 30, 2006,
transcript of audiocassette recording. Also, Catherine Levy. Author interview,
conducted June 30, 2006, handwritten notes of telephone interview.
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Jamaica Observer, Sunday November 19, 2006.
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Jamaica Observer, Friday December 15, 2006; Jamaica Gleaner, December 20,
2006; Parris Lyew-Ayee, 2006, No Plans to Mine in the Cockpit Country (Press release
for Jamaica Bauxite Institute).
107

The CCSG began a public campaign to mobilize local and transnational grassroots
political pressure through petitions, letter writing and by threatening public
demonstrations in order to pressure the government.220
From October to November, domestic members of the CCSG continued
requesting information on mining plans and license renewal from the Ministry of
Agriculture, in conjunction with press releases highlighting the severe environmental
harm to the Cockpit Country posed by bauxite mining. In December, the government
seemed to respond favorably, inviting TAN and epistemic community members Schwartz
of the WRC, Dixon of STEA and Diana McCauley of JET to participate with Minister
Clarke and the JBI in a Mining Policy Consultation, intended to be a multisectoral
planning workshop to analyze the environmental impact of mining in the Cockpit
Country. However, at the Consultation, the Minister revealed that the licenses had been
granted a week earlier, causing the members of the civil society ENGOs to “storm out”221
of the meeting and issue a public repudiation of the decision making process two hours
later.222 From the end of 2006 to 2007, public pressure mounted, as the CCSG TAN
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Jamaica Environmental Trust, 2006, Bauxite mining poses major threat to Cockpit
Country wildlife and watershed (Press release for Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s
Group); Jamaica Environment Advocacy Network, 2006, Petition to Save Cockpit
Country (Petition created for Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s Group); Wendy Lee, author
questionnaire, received February 13, 2007.
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Mike Schwartz, author questionnaire received January 2007. Taken from typed
responses.
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Jamaica Observer, Friday December 15, 2006. Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s
Group, 2006, Statement for a Meeting to be Held with the Minister of Agriculture and
Lands Hon. Roger Clarke (Press release created by CCSG).
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continued its public campaign to ban mining in the Cockpit Country. In 2007, Minister
Clarke issued a hold on mining and prospecting leases, citing in part, a need to establish
the legal borders of the Cockpit Country.
However, tensions between the mining regulatory agencies and the civil society
continued, as both sides failed to agree on the dimensions of the area. The epistemic
community reiterated its call for the borders to comprise the area defined in the 1999
studies, but now claimed an additional portion of the Cockpit Country region, increasing
the size of the proposed area from 450km2 to 1,142 km2, while UWI geologist Parris
Lyew-Ayee Jr., the son of JBI Director Lyew-Ayee, indicated in a study commissioned
by the JBI that the Cockpit Country ecosystem should only comprise 288 km2 (see
Figure 2.3: Revised Epistemic Community Cockpit Country Map).223
The conflict seemed to abate after the 2007 parliamentary elections, when Bruce
Golding’s government appointed Christopher Tufton as the new Minister of Agriculture,
who then asserted that the Cockpit Country would be permanently off-limits to mining.
This development, while positive, emerged less from the persuasive knowledge claims of
the epistemic community, than from the public mobilization engendered by the TAN.
However, at the time of writing, the issue of the legal cartographic definition of the
Cockpit Country had not yet been definitively established.
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Jamaica Gleaner, December 27, 2006. Dr. Lyew-Ayee is the son of Parris LyewAyee of the JBI.
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Conclusion
The results support one hypothesis, undermine another, and are inconclusive in
the third. The following table summarizes the predicted and observed relationships
between the independent variables: economic framing, consensus and socialization, and
the dependent variable: influence (see Table 2.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted
Outcomes).
As the data show, the independent variable that was only present in the campaign
that evinced network influence, that is, the campaign to persuade the Forestry Department
to change management practices, was socialization. This finding supports the hypothesis
H3: Socialization improves the influence of epistemic communities, and indicates that
socialization is a necessary, if not sufficient, causal variable.
As described above, the network socialized extensively with the Forestry
Department, which had by the late 1990s become highly integrated into the production of
knowledge with the epistemic community. As a result, the Forestry Department
demonstrated a singular interest in learning from the transnational network, promoted
sustainable practices by issuing seedlings for hedgerows and fast-growth trees to
minimize yam-stick harvesting and adopted an ecological approach to biodiversity
management emphasizing the forest’s function as a habitat and food source for local and
migratory fauna. This contrasted with their previous management approach, which
emphasized the production and rapid turnover of commercial timber. Further, other
agencies that did not socialize with the epistemic community, namely the rest of the
Ministry of Agriculture, its mining agencies, and NEPA were either environmental
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laggards or actively opposed to implementing policy recommendations.
Second, the data undermine the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks
must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order
to influence LDC governments. The JBI and the Ministry of Agriculture were
uninterested in arguments that ecological relationships in the Cockpit Country were
important to national economic developmental interests in the tourist market. The water
valuation study was unpersuasive, and the projected national revenues promised from
ecotourism were found to be unreliable without additional and significant investment
from the state.224
The water is critical to tourism, to the people that live in here, so that’s the
approach we hope to use if and when mining decides they’re ready. Right
now we don’t have enough data to substantiate any case.225
What’s the value of a tourism, what’s the value to the tourism industry to
have a particular forest? We don’t have those figures. And we’ve been
told number and number of times that because we don’t have those
figures, we really don’t have that sort of a balance to push into the
economic model that says bauxite will earn so many billion US dollars.226
Throughout the end of 2006, policy makers in the JBI and the Ministry of
Agriculture indicated privately in interviews and publicly in media statements that the
economic valuations conducted by the epistemic community were unconvincing. In
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World Bank, 1999, Jamaica Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Preparation
Report (World Bank) pp. 11.
225

Donna Blake, author interviews conducted June 28, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
226

Marilyn Headley, author interviews conducted July 6, 2006. Transcript of
audiocassette recording.
111

public challenges to the epistemic community’s scientific knowledge between October
and December of 2006, these policy makers also asserted that the impacts of prospecting
mining on the hydrological regime were overstated:
What is the value of the butterfly? What is the value of the trees? Who
cares if there’s one butterfly, or two butterflies, or no butterflies in the
Cockpit Country? …Who is the Cockpit Country going to appeal to?
Not the kids playing video games.227
[Prospecting] will not affect the water or damage the environment. If you
follow the environmentalists, you would never mine anything.228
Although the end of 2006 saw the cessation of mining leases, this occurred only
after public opposition to mining raised the political cost of permitting leases in the area.
In other words, the Ministry of Agriculture did halt the issuance of mining leases, not
because it learned from the arguments presented by the epistemic community, but rather
due to concerted public pressure. Moreover, the fact that communication with the
Forestry Department did not rely on economic arguments undermines the argument that
LDC policymakers are most likely to be persuaded by developmental arguments.
Third, the data are unclear about the hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases
the influence of transnational advocacy networks. Consensus was present in all
campaigns, both the failures and the successes. This indicates that consensus is
insufficient to lead to influence, even if recognized, and deployed in a concerted effort by
publicly recognized experts. However, the lack of variation on this variable in this case
does not allow for conclusions as to the necessity of consensus for influence.
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Shanti Persaud, author interviews July 3, 2006. Taken from handwritten notes.
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Minister Roger Clarke, quoted in Jamaica Observer, December 15, 2006.
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As a result, this case study gives an incomplete picture in understanding how
epistemic communities function in LDCs. While the actions of the epistemic community
confirm that policy advocates believe that developmental pressures matter in how
arguments are deployed, it is not clear that this is the case. Rather, socialization seems to
have a greater effect in explaining influence than other factors, including the presence of
knowledge consensus. Further understanding the effect of economic and political factors
on epistemic community advocacy requires additional analyses of case studies, which are
addressed in the following chapters.
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Table 2.1: List of Policy Makers in Jamaica

AGENCY

JURISDICTION
EST. THROUGH

The Ministry of Agriculture

Mining Act/ Forest
Reserve Act

The Forestry Department

Forest Reserve Act

REGULATES
Issuance of mining permits to bauxite
companies. Parent institution to the
Forestry Department, JBI and Mining
Department
Regulates (monitors and enforces)
logging and clearing for agriculture

Jamaica Bauxite Institute
Mining Department

Mining Act
Mining Act

Conducts environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) on proposed
bauxite mining on behalf of NEPA
Certifies restoration in mined areas.

The Ministry of Environment

National Resources
and Conservation
Act

Parent institution to National
Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA)

NEPA

National Resources
and Conservation
Act

Regulates (monitors and enforces)
human activity affecting fauna
species
Evaluates jurisdictional conflicts
between agencies and ministries.

Prime Minister's Cabinet
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Table 2.2: List of Jamaican Epistemic Community Members

ORGANIZATION

Windsor Research
Centre

INDIVIDUALS

FUNCTIONS

SCIENCE
TRAINING

Mike Schwartz

Population monitoring (fauna).
Conducts training of Forestry
Department personel. Habitat
health evaluation.

Biology

Susan Koenig
St. Thomas
Environmental Agency
The Nature Conservancy

The Forestry
Department

University of Manitoba /
University of the West
Indies
Clearing House
Mechanism
University of Wisconsin
University of the West
Indies

Birdlife Jamaica

Hugh Dixon
Kimberly
Johns
Ann HayesSutton

Population monitoring (fauna).
Conducts training of Forestry
Department personel. Habitat
health evaluation.
Population monitoring (fauna).
Socioeconomic surveys
Population monitoring (fauna).
Underwater ecology.
Population monitoring (fauna)

Kevin Porter

Population monitoring. Flora
taxonomy. Habitat health
evaluation.
Population monitoring (fauna).
Flora taxonomy

Respondent

Population monitoring (fauna).
Flora taxonomy. Habitat health
evaluation.

Balfour
Spence

Habitat health evaluation.

Owen Evelyn

Dayne Buddo
Mick Day
Peter Vogel
George Proctor
(retired)
Catherine
Levy

Population monitoring (fauna)
Karst limestone ecology.
Habitat health evaluation
Population monitoring (flora,
fauna)
Habitat health evaluation.
Population monitoring (fauna)
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Ornitholog
y
Ecology
Freshwater
ecology
Conservati
on ecology

Botany
Botany

Botany
Geology /
geography
Marine
ecology
Geomorph
ology
Conservati
on ecology
Botany
Ornitholog
y

Table 2.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in Cockpit Country
Advocacy
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Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite Deposits in the Cockpit Country
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Figure 2.2: Map of Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country
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‘

Figure 2.3: Revised Epistemic Community Cockpit Country Map
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Figure 2.4: Diagram of Epistemic Community Links in Jamaica
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CHAPTER 3
MEXICO AND BIODIVERSITY MANGEMENT IN THE MESOAMERICAN
BARRIER REEF SYSTEM

Introduction
In Mexico, as in Jamaica, a transnational coalition of researchers mobilized to
advocate for biodiversity management in a sensitive area in the 1990s. Again, this
culminated in the effort of an epistemic community to influence the implementation of a
GEF-funded project pursuant to the CBD. This GEF-funded project, the Proyecto de la
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano, (SAM Project),
was a regional effort by Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras to implement their
obligations under Article 8 and 10 requirements of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), for in situ conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity
respectively.229
In this case, however, the area under consideration was not a limestone forest, but
a reef ecosystem off the eastern coast of the Yucatán peninsula (see Figure 1.2).
Nevertheless, this case study demonstrates some of the same processes as did epistemic
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The reef system within the Mesoamerican basin measures 1,000km in length,
making it the second largest continuous reef system in the world, second to the
Australian Great Barrier Reef. Gabriela G. Nava Martinez et al, 2006, Reporte del
Programa de Monitoreo Arrecifal: Parque Nacional Arrecifes de Cozumel 2004 – 2005
(Cozumel: CONANP) pg. 2; Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP), 2004, Políticas
de Desarrollo Sustentable de los Recursos Pesqueros, Turismo y Áreas Marinas
Protegidas Transfronterizas en el Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (Belize City:
SAM) pg. 1.
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community advocacy in Jamaica. Again, there were a series of policymaker agencies and
managers targeted by the epistemic community. These consisted of the federal
environmental secretariat, SEMARNAT, and its subsidiary agency in protected areas
management, CONANP; the federal agricultural secretariat, SAGARPA, and its fishing
commission, CONAPESCA; the government of Quintana Roo, its environmental
management agency, SEDUMA, and its tourism secretariat, SEDETUR; and private
sector managers in fishing cooperatives and the hotel industry. In all, these comprised
nine overlapping campaigns for improved biodiversity management in the reef region.
As occurred in Jamaica, the epistemic community did not have universal success,
although comparatively more goals were met. The network demonstrated influence in
the management practices and approach of: the federal environmental secretariat, the
agricultural secretariat, the federal protected areas commission, the fishing commission,
and the private sector fishing cooperatives. Again, the impact of consensus is not clear
from this case: it occurred in all campaigns including those that failed, suggesting that
consensus is insufficient to lead to influence, even when used in a concerted campaign by
experts. Economic framing also does not seem to have an independent impact on the
chance for network influence, as it was neither necessary for success nor failure. Finally,
this case underlined the importance of socialization, as socialization, with one exception,
corresponded with a successful campaign. The remainder of the chapter explains how
issue-framing, socialization and knowledge consensus affected the ability of epistemic
communities to influence policymaking and biodiversity management in Mexico. Where

122

documents and interviews were originally in Spanish, I have provided my own translation
of the material throughout.

Overview of Threats to the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef
In a reminder of the transnational nature of biodiversity, the area of concern in the
Mesoamerican basin comprises the territorial waters of the four countries signatories to
the SAM Project: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize. Mexican management
jurisdiction extends across approximately 400 km of coastline, from Yum Balám in the
northern part of the Yucatán peninsula to Banco Chinchorro, in the southern coast of the
state of Quintana Roo (see Figure 1.2).
Like the Cockpit Country, the Mesoamerican basin is a site of internationally
recognized high biodiversity. The coral reef, formed by the deposits of calcium by
polyps presents one of the most visibly striking components of the system, with
substantial variation in the resident populations of fish, crustaceans and zooplankton, as
well as within the corals themselves.230 A sample of biodiversity at Mexican sites at Sian
Ka’an, Xcalak, Banco Chinchorro and Majahual (see Figure 1.2), yields over 90 species
of coral and 1,000 species of flora and fauna, including endemic and IUCN Red List
registered species.231 In all, reefs may house up to 3,000 species of marine life.
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M. García-Salgado, T. Camarena L., G. Gold B., M. Vazquez, G. Galland, G. Nava
M., G. Alarcón D. and V. Ceja M., 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrefical
Mesoamericano (Belize City: SAM), pg. 6
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Hernández, A., F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. Castro y J. MedinaFlores, 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros de Banco
Chinchorro. (Cancún: WWF-México) pg. 5; Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP),
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Biodiversity relevant to the ecosystem is also measured by genetic variation in
pastures of seagrasses closer to the shore and in coastal mangrove zones. Mangrove
zones and seagrass provide shelter to reef-dwelling populations of scaled fish and
crustaceans in juvenile and larval stages and thus may be considered part of the reef
ecosystem.232 They also act as filters, removing sediment and organic matter from river
outlets and coastal runoff, and preventing sedimentation in the reef.233 Because the
ecosystem comprises terrestrial, reef, and coastal environments, potentially harmful
human activity consists of both marine and terrestrial activity, including: coastal tourism
and urban development; inland industrial development; overfishing; and port practices.234

2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de Estudios de Impacto Ambiental de
Proyectos Turísticos en la Zona Comprendida por el SAM (Belize City: SAM) pg. 69.
Mar Caribe roundtable, Ficha Técnica para la Evaluación de los Sitios Prioritarios
para la Conservación de los Ambientes Costeros y Oceánicos del SAM (available
online at:
http://www.conabio.gob.mx/gap/images/2/29/78_Humedales_Costeros_Arrecife_Xcala
k_Majahual.pdf)., pg. 1 – 5.
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WWF, 2007, How to Profit by Practicing Sustainable Fishing: Lobster Fishing
Practice Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef (WWF), pg. 5
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M. García-Salgado, T. Camarena L., G. Gold B., M. Vazquez, G. Galland, G. Nava
M., G. Alarcón D. and V. Ceja M., 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrefical
Mesoamericano (Belize City: SAM) pg. 100.
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Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis (Draft)
(Presented for Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef
System) pg. 5; Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD), 2001,
Documento de Evaluación de Proyecto sobre el Proyecto Propuesto por EU$ 15.2
Millones, Incluyendo una Donación del Fondo Fiduciario del Fondo Mundial para el
Medio Ambiente por la Cantidad de EU$ 11.0 Millones Equivalentes a la Comisión
Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo para un Proyecto Regional para la
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (CCAD) Anexo
4, pg. 1 – 5.
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Coastal Tourism and Hotel Development
Coastal tourism in the Mesoamerican basin is concentrated primarily in the
northern third of the state, manifested in the development of large-scale and all-inclusive
hotel resorts in the popular Riviera Maya and the Cancún metropolitan resort area.
Tourism can also cause direct impacts on reef health when recreational users exceed the
loading capacity of the area. Motorized access boats and swimmers can agitate the ocean
floor, scattering sand on the reef polyps. Even when snorkelers or divers do not
intentionally or accidentally touch the highly sensitive polyps, chemicals present in
sunscreen may be highly toxic to the biota.235
Indirect impacts stem from the construction of hotels and urban centers on the
coast. Hoteliers developing beachfront property have to drain, cut and fill mangrove
zones with concrete, which contributes to sedimentation, run-off and nitrification in
marine environments.236 Multiple story buildings erected too close to the coast interrupt
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P. C. Almada-Villela, P. F. Sale, G. Gold Bouchot and B. Kjerfve, 2003, Manual de
Métodos para el Programa de Monitoreo Sinóptoco del SAM (Belize City: SAM) pg.
136 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 8; UCP
2003, Diseño e Implementación del Foro de Turismo Sustenible del SAM (SAM: Belize
City) pg. 3; UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de
Proyectos Turísticos pg. 63 – 64; M. García Salgado et al, 2006, Línea Base del Estado
del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano pg. 6. Also based on conversations with park
managers at Puerto Morelos National Park.
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Amigos de Sian Ka’an. 1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México. (Coastal Resources Center: University of
Rhode Island, Narragansett) passim. M. García Salgado et al, 2006, Línea Base del
Estado del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano pg. 109 – 110; World Wildlife Fund
México (WWF-México), 2008, Draft WWF MAR Strategic Action Plan (Cancún:
WWF-México) pg. 70. Juan José Dominguez Calderón, author interviews conducted
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the rate of replenishment of beach sand and contribute to a loss of coastline and increased
beach erosion, which may depress the rate of regeneration and growth within corals.
Current regulations on water treatment and disposal are insufficient in preventing
groundwater contamination, as pipelines constructed for waste water disposal are
ineffectively monitored and designed, and often transmit waste water directly to the water
table.237

Inland and Riparian Pollution
Marine pollution may also arise from inland industrial and agricultural
development, often considerably geographically removed from the reef region. For
example, riparian agriculture on the Rio Hondo separating Belize and Mexico contributes
to marine contamination by the runoff of agricultural pesticides and fertilizer, while
inland groundwater contamination can flow to the coastal region by the underground
complex of rivers and limestone caves of the Yucatán peninsula.238

Port and Docking Practices

January 24, 2008. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording.
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Amigos de Sian Ka’an. 1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México. (Coastal Resources Center: University of
Rhode Island, Narragansett) passim.
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Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 6 – 7;
CCAD, 2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 3
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In addition, inappropriate port practices can harm reef ecosystems. Improperly
monitored docking of cruise ships can lead to collisions with reefs, and poorly regulated
waste disposal practices can result in offshore sewage contamination of marine
environments.239 The construction of docks and ports for cruise ships also contributes to
sedimentation and erosion by disrupting the flow of marine currents, often causing
shorelines to recede.240

Overfishing
Fishing practices in the region are another source of environmental stress on the
basin. Certain species of scaled fish and shell-fish that are targeted for commercial use
have, since the late 1980s, experienced precipitous declines in population due to
overexploitation of these resources (see Figure 3.1: Graph of Declining
Populations).241 Fishermen target the largest species of fish in commercial stocks,
leading to a gradual diminution of the average size of adult fish in these populations.242
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Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 10; CCAD,
2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 4 – 5.
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See Los Amigos documents; CCAD, 2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg.
4 – 5.; UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos
Turísticos, pg. 62, 70
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Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal:
Programa de Acuacultura y Pesca (Quintana Roo: SAGARPA) pg. 56; CCAD, 2001,
Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 4
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Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal, pg. 56;
WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in Coral Reefs: Methods for Collecting
Ecological Data that Support the Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (Cancún:
WWF-México) pg. 20
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The impact of overfishing on fish populations and marine ecology is exacerbated when
population collapses in overexploited species causes fishermen to target populations at
lower trophic levels.243 Overfishing can negatively affect the viability of the coral reef,
as herbivorous populations of Parrotfish and other species both depend on coral reefs for
shelter and curb the growth of algae that may compete with coral species for nutrients
and living space.244

Tensions in National Economic Development
This case also demonstrates some tensions between national development and the
economic wellbeing of marginalized populations. Tourism is of considerable importance
to economic growth, both at a national level, and to the state of Quintana Roo. Thus,
there is an argument that tourism is a massively important productive sector, as it brings
substantial amounts of foreign revenue to the nation and the state. At the same time,
tourism may contribute to increased short-term revenue among fishing populations. High
tourist traffic contributes to demand for seafood, and increased scarcity in the supply of
commercial populations tends to drive up the final sale price of these fish.245
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WWF-México, 2004, MAR Strategic Plan: 2004 – 2009 (Cancún: WWF-México)
pg. 24; WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices pg. 20
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WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in Coral Reefs: Methods for Collecting
Ecological Data that Support the Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (Cancún:
WWF-México) pg. 20
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WWF-México, 2006. How to Profit by Practicing Sustainable Fishing: Lobster
Fishing Practices for the Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN/WWF-México) pg. 3.
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In the long run, however, increased demand for fish may be unsustainable.
However, since tourist development, by contributing to coral reef loss, can deplete fish
populations, unregulated tourism can create opportunity losses for low-income
communities who depend on fishing for their livelihood. As in Jamaica, ‘national
development’ may directly conflict with the economic interests of marginalized actors.
In addition, tourist development creates indirect hardships for low-income
populations. Inland migrants attracted by the possibility of gainful employment establish
shantytowns as “support communities” around hotel sites, providing cheap labor
generally in the form of custodial services or construction to hoteliers. Because these
shantytowns develop spontaneously, they are not covered by municipal planning and
services, nor are they incorporated into the water and sewage treatment plans of the
hotels. A lack of oversight in combination with absent treatment facilities means
residents have incentives to dump refuse directly into the ocean, or in hastily dug pits
which in turn leach materials into the water table.246

Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management
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Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 6; CCAD,
2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 2. According to interviews with Los
Amigos staffers, sewage treatment in Quintana Roo is poorly administered, and in
Cancún, approximately half of the volume of liquid waste is not treated prior to
disposal. Author interviews with Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, conducted February 2008.
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Federal Policy Makers
Technically, policy management of the problems described above falls under the
jurisdiction of various governmental agencies in Mexico, both within the federal
government, and in state agencies. The federal branch has supremacy in implementing
multilateral agreements (such as the CBD and the SAM Project) relevant to reef
management; national policies including the Constitution, the General Law of Wildlife
(LGVS) and the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and the Environment (LGEEPA)
locate authority over relevant environmental processes, such as biodiversity, coastal
management and natural resource management, in the federal government.247 The most
relevant federal agencies are located in the environmental ministry, SEMARNAT and the
agricultural ministry, SAGARPA (see Table 3.1: List of Reef Policy Makers).

SEMARNAP/SEMARNAT and CONANP
The environmental and fisheries secretariat, La Secretaría de Manejo Ambiental,
Recursos Naturales y Pesquería (SEMARNAP) was created in 1996 in the federal
executive branch. In 2002, under a series of bureaucratic reforms carried out by Vicente
Fox’s newly elected Partido Acción Nacional, control over fisheries was transferred to
the agricultural secretariat, La Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Alimentación y
Desarrollo Rural,(SAGAR); this turned SEMARNAP into SEMARNAT and the
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See CONABIO, 2000, Apéndice: Proceso de Formulación de la Estrategia.
Estrategia Nacional para la Biodiversidad (Mexico, DF: CONABIO) pg. 79;
Federation of Mexican States, 2003, Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública
Federal, Art. 32.
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Agricultural Secretariat into SAGARPA.248 Currently, SEMARNAT’s environmental
management responsibilities include: proposing the creation of federal Natural Protected
Areas (ANPs) and Marine Protected Areas (AMPs) to the executive branch, and
establishing appropriate land use policies and management plans for these areas. Further,
SEMARNAT can pass regulatory declarations called Normas Oficiales Mexicanas
(NOMs) that restrict or authorize appropriate environmental activity within ANPs,
AMPs. The NOM-059 series, for example, establishes management authority in
SEMARNAT to issue protection to species identified as nationally important and/or
under threatened.249
SEMARNAT has additional subordinate agencies relevant to reef management.
The National Commission for Natural Protected Areas (La Comisión Nacional de Áreas
Naturales Protegidas or CONANP), created in 2000 at the end of the Zedillo
administration as a specialized and autonomous agency of SEMARNAP, shares
responsibility with SEMARNAT for the creation and management of federal protected
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Prior to SEMARNAP’s creation, environmental management was scattered across
various specialized agencies. Interview, SEMARNAT official, not for attribution;
SEMARNAT, 2008, Programa Regional de Educación para la Sustentabilidad en
Áreas Naturales Protegidas (SEMARNAT), pg. 24.
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NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and NOM-059-ECOL-2001 indicate that SEMARNAT has
the authority to protect species recognized as integral to Mexico’s ecology, as well as
species under threat, in the interest of maintaining national biodiversity. These
regulations available in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 6 March, 2002.
SEMARNAT, 2009, ¿Qué hacemos? Retrieved January 2009 from
http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/queessemarnat/Pages/quehacemos.aspx. SEMARNAT,
2003, Reglamento de la Ley General de Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente
(Mexico: Diario Oficial de la Federación). CONABIO, 2000, Apéndice: Proceso de
Formulación, pg. 77 – 78.
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areas.250 CONANP may also conduct EIAs, and conduct monitoring of activities carried
out in protected areas.251

SAGARPA and CONAPESCA
SAGARPA and the national fisheries commission (La Comisión Nacional de la
Pesca, CONAPESCA), its executive agency, are responsible for designating appropriate
areas for commercial and sustainable fishing and evaluating appropriate fishing
techniques.252 CONAPESCA has a mandate to record catch sizes and set harvest quotas
with assistance in determining officially sanctioned rates of capture from the National
Fisheries Institute.253 CONAPESCA authorizes the creation of fishing cooperatives, or
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Taken from ICRI National Committee Progress Report – Mexico, available at
www.icriforum.org/secretariat/word/CebuCPC_13.doc
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Interviews with Alfredo Arellano, March 2008. Taken from transcript of
audiocassette recording. José Juan Dominguez Calderón, author interviews conducted
Jan 24, 2008. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording. CONANP, 2006, Qué
es la CONANP? Retrieved January 2009 from http://www.conanp.gob.mx/qienes.html.
The abbreviation CONANP comes from the Spanish name of the agency, which is la
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas. Unidad Coordinadora del
Proyecto, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos
Turísticos (Belize City: SAM) pg. 32.
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José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, autor interviews conducted between 12 and 15 May,
2008. Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. CONAPESCA, 2009, Acerca
de. Retrieved January 2009 from
http://www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/cona/cona_mision_y_vision_acerca.
CONAPESCA comes from the name of the agency in Spanish, la Comisión Nacional
de Acuacultura y Pesca.
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José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15
May, 2008.
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associations of fishermen that share investment capital, resources and profits, and
requires permits for access in sensitive areas.254

State Governmental Agencies
SEDUMA, SEDETUR and the State Government
Mexico’s governance efforts relevant to the Mesoamerican basin take place
almost exclusively in the state of Quintana Roo. As a result, certain state governmental
agencies were identified as relevant by epistemic community members. The state
Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Medio Ambiente (SEDUMA) can create zoning
ordinances through the Programa de Ordenamiento Ecológico Territorial (POET), a
regulatory framework allowing SEDUMA to assess environmental loading capacities and
determine appropriate land use policies for biologically sensitive sites. Zoning can
function to endorse or proscribe certain activities from being adopted in a geographically
described area.255 In addition, the government of Quintana Roo can propose protected
areas to be administered at the state level. Similar to the federal government, the state
can determine appropriate borders wherein restrictive policy applies and file areas as
protected under law.
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José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15
May, 2008; A. Hernández, F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. Castro y J.
Medina-Flores. 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros de Banco
Chinchorro. (CONANP/WWF-México), pg. 11; Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación,
2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura y Pesca (Quintana
Roo: SAGARPA), pg. 13 - 14
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David Martínez, author interviews conducted April 29, 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording.
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In practice, the application of POETs is almost exclusively restricted to the
northern third of the state, while in the southern two-thirds, only the Laguna Bacalar, a
small site north of Chetumal, was assigned a POET zoning policy at the time of writing.
At the time of writing, the extension of POETs was being considered for the Othón P.
Blanco municipality, wherein sites incidental to the SAM Project, including Xcalak,
Majahual and Banco Chinchorro are located.256 However, the use of POETs as a
regulatory tool was challenged by civil society respondents, skeptical of the commitment
of the state government to restricting development:
[T]hese have not been sufficient to brake the lack of control of economic
development. Instead of allowing a fixed quantity of construction per unit
area, whenever there is a certain interest, the quantity is changed and
increased, which permits greater degradation than what was originally
thought.257
Finally, the tourist secretariat of the state government of Quintana Roo
(Secretaría de Turismo del Estado de Quintana Roo or SEDETUR) is responsible for
promoting the development of tourism in the state. In practice, this means acting as a
liaison for tourist interests to state and federal environmental agencies, clarifying
regulatory policies applicable to prospective construction and hotel development, and
developing recommendations for best practices, for example, in hygiene and
hospitality.258

256

Gustavo Olivares, author interviews conducted April 9 and 10, 2008.
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Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording.
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SEDETUR, 2010, Conócenos. Available online at
http://www.caribemexicano.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
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Managers from the Civil Society and the Private Sector
In this case, the epistemic community engaged actively with private sector
managers with de facto regulatory power over environmental degradation and
biodiversity loss. These private actors consisted of the economically significant tourist
industry, as well as marginalized fishing populations in coastal communities.

Fishing Cooperatives
Fishing communities along the coast of Quintana Roo are organized into profitand equipment-sharing cooperatives. They vary in the number of members, access to
equipment and techniques employed, ranging from the 9 member SCPP Horizontes
Marino, to the 90 member SCPP Laguna Macax.259 In addition to serving as a source of
income to marginalized and low-income populations, fishing has some cultural
importance, as the occupation is transferred intergenerationally among families of
fishermen. In the aggregate, the actions of cooperatives can have significant implications
for fish populations and hence biodiversity governance in the reef ecosystem. As an

=306&Itemid=420; David Martínez. Author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.
Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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See chart of surveyed cooperatives for state research published in Comité Técnico
Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura
y Pesca (Quintana Roo: SAGARPA), pg. 47. See also references to differences in size
and practices of cooperatives in CONANP, 2007. Programa de Conservación y
Manejo, pg. 24 – 25. A. Hernández, F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M.
Castro y J. Medina-Flores. 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros
de Banco Chinchorro. (CONANP/WWF-México), pg. 11.
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example, in 2001, Quintana Roo fishermen captured 45% of the total lobster catch in the
Mexican Gulf and Caribbean Sea.260

The Hotel Industry: An Oligopoly of Tourism
Internal practices of the economically significant hotel sector are also important to
ecosystem stability and governance. Whereas the fishing community consists of
decentralized actors, hotel capital and ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few
actors, who in turn have formed statewide neocorporatist business associations for the
protection of tourist interests. The primary associations in Quintana Roo are: the
Asociación de Propietarios e Inversionistas de la Riviera Maya (APIR), Grupo Quintana
Roo, la Asociación de Clubs Vacacionales (ACLUVAC), and the Centro Coordinador
Empresarial y del Caribe (CCEyC).261 Hoteliers have considerable leeway in
determining the point of construction of hotels, as well as the size of hotel infrastructure,
the number of rooms and the presence and extent of treatment facilities. In addition,
because hotel chains may provide reef access to tourists as part of vacation packages,
hotel policy and regulations on recreational diving could influence the impact of human
activity on reef health. The list of relevant managers and policymakers is provided in the
table below.
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Secretaría de Economía, 2009, Fideicomiso Fomento Económico Quintana Roo
2025 Cluster Pesca y Acuacultura. Retrieved online, August 2009 from
http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p2757/Sector_Pesca_QROO.pdf. Pg. 3.
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Taken from interviews with David Martínez, conducted April 29, 2008.
136

Transnational Mobilization around the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef
The Emergence of the SAM Epistemic Community
Between 1995 and 2001, self-identified stakeholders in Mexico, the other
countries implicated in the SAM Project, the United States, and international
governmental and non-governmental organizations began a diffuse process of
information-sharing and mobilization for improved reef governance in the Mesoamerican
basin. Over time, the network developed specific policy proposals, an intersubjective
consensus on the relevant causal relationships, a shared understanding of processes, and
shared policy preferences and tactics for engagement. By 2001, a core group of actors
had emerged, sharing the characteristics of an epistemic community, and holding a
common management approach for the reef (see Table 3.2: List of Epistemic
Community Members in the SAM Project).
One of the earliest identified ENGOs involved in reef advocacy is the Mexican
branch of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF-México), which had been conducting research
in discrete sections of the Mesoamerican reef system since 1982. By promoting local and
transnational governance efforts for reef and coastal management in Quintana Roo, the
agency acted as a catalyst in a process of network-building among other organizations
and agencies. In 1986, WWF-México lobbied the federal government for the application
of federal protection to what is currently known as the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve.
The Reserve had been established as a state protected area in 1982, subsequent to prior
research on biodiversity conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones de Quintana Roo
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(CIQRO), a state research organization.262 WWF-México’s 1986 successful petitioning
for federal protection at Sian Ka’an also led to the creation of Los Amigos de Sian Ka’an,
a civil society research organization, based in Cancún. Los Amigos adopted a mandate to
monitor human activity and environmental processes in the newly created federal
protected area, to promote compliance with environmental regulations.
The emergence of environmental reef and coastal activism in Mexico in the 1980s
occurred as these and other ENGOs began advocating for improved environmental
governance in other Mesoamerican countries. WWF affiliate, WWF-Centroamérica
similarly lobbied for the creation of what became the Hol Chan marine reserve in Belize
in 1987.263 A quasi-state organization, the Coastal Zone Management Institute (CZMI)
emerged from a local network of actors in 1989 to monitor environmental processes in
the newly created protected area.264
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CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo: Reserva De La Biósfera
Sian Ka’an, Reserva De La Biósfera Arrecifes De Sian Ka’an Y Área De Protección
De Flora Y Fauna Uaymil (México, D.F.: CONANP) pg. 4 – 5.
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WWF-México, 2004, MAR Strategic Plan: 2004 – 2009, pg. 10; Unidad
Coordinadora del Proyecto. 2003. Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs
de Proyectos Turísticos, pg. 27; Sale, Peter F., Ernesto A. Chávez, Bruce G. Hatcher,
Colin Mayfield and Jan J. H. Ciborowski, c. 2000, Guidelines for Developing a
Regional Monitoring and Environmental Information System: Final Report to the
World Bank (INWEH/UNU) pg. 22, Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, author interviews
conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording
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Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from
transcript of audiocassette recording. Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto. 2003.
Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos Turísticos, pg. 27.
The Sian Ka’an area is particularly important to the health of the reef system. It has the
highest amount of coral coverage of the reef in the Mexican territorial waters. See
CONANP, 2007. Programa de Conservación y Manejo, pg. 28.
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The Germination of Transnational Links
In the 1990s, concern about reef management in Mexico assumed a transnational
dimension, as Mexican stakeholders created cost- and information-sharing links to a
growing network of domestic, regional and international actors. For example, in the
Mexican town of Xcalak, local fishermen became concerned that tourist development
would, by harming coral reefs, lead to losses in fish stocks important for subsistence and
commercial production.265 In 1994, these fishermen and local activists formed the
Xcalak Community Committee (XCC) to articulate and aggregate interests and lobby for
the protection of Xcalak’s reefs. In 1995, the XCC contacted Los Amigos and WWFMéxico, requesting assistance in their plans to lobby the federal government to create an
AMP in the reefs, granting local fishermen exclusive access to fish resources.266 In the
process of assisting the XCC, Los Amigos and WWF-México partnered with the Coastal
Resources Center of the University of Rhode Island (URI-CRC) to conduct studies on
populations and migratory patterns of reef fish.267
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Beth R. Chung, 1999. “A Community Strategy for Coastal Zone Management of
Xcalak, Mexico,” Community-Based Land Use Planning in Conservation Areas:
Lessons from Local Participatory Processes that seek to Balance Economic Uses with
Ecosystem Protection (América Verde Training Manual No.3. América Verde
Publications, The Nature Conservancy) pg. 3 - 4
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Bezaury, J.C., C.L. Sántos, J. McCann, C. Molina Islas, J. Carranza, P. Rubinoff, G.
Townsend, et al, 1998, Participatory Coastal and Marine Management in Quintana
Roo, Mexico. Proceedings: International Tropical Marine Ecosystems Management
Symposium (ITMEMS), pg. 6 – 7; CONANP, 2004, Programa de Manejo, Parque
Nacional Arrecifes de Xcalak (Mexico City: CONANP) pg. 8 – 9.
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CONANP, 2004. Programa de Manejo: Parque Nacional Arrecifes de Xcalak
(México, D.F.: CONANP) pg. 2; Bezaury, J.C., C.L. Sántos, J. McCann, C. Molina
Islas, J. Carranza, P. Rubinoff, G. Townsend, et al, 1998, Participatory Coastal and
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From 1994 to 1995, Los Amigos and TNC conducted studies in the Sian Ka’an
Reserve, and concluded that the preservation of ecosystem stability required the addition
of a buffer zone in areas contiguous to the Reserve.268 In response to their lobbying
efforts, the federal government established an additional 100,000 hectares in 1998 at what
is now known as the Área de Protección de Flora y Fauna Uaymil in the south, and at the
reefs off the coast of Sian Ka’an. Currently, the Sian Ka’an Reserve constitutes the
single largest contiguous national protected area in Quintana Roo, with a surface area of
528,147ha.269 Between 1994 and 2000, over 700,000 additional hectares of federal and
state areas were declared in Quintana Roo.270
However, although the size and quantity of protected areas in the state grew in the
1990s, it was not clear to the emerging network that management was environmentally
effective, as the efficacy and commitment of policymakers to regulation varied
significantly. For example, although the Sian Ka’an Reef and the Área de Uaymil
increased the total coverage at Sian Ka’an, the three sites had management plans that

Marine Management in Quintana Roo, Mexico. Proceedings: International Tropical
Marine Ecosystems Management Symposium (ITMEMS), pg. 6 – 7; CONANP, 2004,
Programa de Manejo, Parque Nacional Arrecifes de Xcalak (Mexico City: CONANP)
pg. 8 – 9.
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CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo, pg. 5
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CONANP, 2007. Programa de Conservación y Manejo, pg. 5; The declaration of
the Área de Uaymil took place in the Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF), 17
November, 1994. UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de
Proyectos Turísticos, pg. 28 – 29.
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UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos
Turísticos, pg. 28 – 29.
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were developed in isolation from each other.271 Other protected areas, such as AMPs at
Puerto Morelos and Xcalak, completely lacked management plans when they were first
created.272 In addition, fisheries management at the time focused primarily on identifying
and regulating individually over-fished species.273
These approaches were criticized as piecemeal forms of biodiversity
management: for fisheries, monitoring and regulating individual species was costly, but
failed to consider environmental problems in coral reefs in their function as fish
habitats.274 As researchers became aware of the link between environmental processes in
areas previously considered separate, they argued that a management approach treating
AMPs as discrete entities would be thoroughly ineffective, by failing to understand the
link between ecosystems.275 Finally, indicators of reef health, such as coral reef coverage
and fish stocks indicated that management was failing to address negative environmental
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CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo, pg. 12 – 13.
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J. C. Bezaury et al, 1998, Participatory Coastal and Marine Management in
Quintana Roo, Mexico, pg. 4 – 5. CONANP, 2003, Parque Nacional: Arrecifes de
Xcalak, México (CONANP/SEMARNAT) pg. 7. See a general description and critique
of Mesoamerican environmental protection in UCP, 2001, Reporte de Avance No. 1, pg.
6 and World Bank 2000, Regional (Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico):
Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, pg. 8
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WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices, pg. 5 – 6.

274

Sale, Peter F., Ernesto A. Chávez, Bruce G. Hatcher, Colin Mayfield and Jan J. H.
Ciborowski, c. 2000, Guidelines for Developing a Regional Monitoring and
Environmental Information System: Final Report to the World Bank (INWEH/UNU)
passim, especially pg. 35 - 36.
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Peter Sale, author interviews conducted August 26, 2008. Taken from typed notes
of interview via Skype. Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, author interviews conducted
February 2008. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording.
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change; coral reef coverage was being lost at a rate of 3% per annum, and fish stocks
continued falling in the periods under investigation.276

The Emergence of a Core Pool of Knowledge: ICZM as a Unifying Concept
Throughout the late 1990s – 2001, advocacy groups and research institutions in
the emerging network began developing a new management approach. Now, the network
sought to shift the focus of governance from its emphasis on piecemeal, site-specific
management to incorporate a holistic view of ecosystem health. In addition, whereas the
SAM was considered a collection of separate reefs, it was now described in epistemic
community documents as a unitary reef system, second in size only to the Great
Australian Barrier Reef.277 In this timeframe, the network began expanding further and
increasing the robustness of social ties among the members, as various researchers began
conducting new studies and sharing information on environmental processes within the
basin.
Various transnational forums, including workshops provided by the International
Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), an umbrella NGO consisting of marine ecologists and
researchers, contributed to the development of shared ideas and knowledge. In 1995,
276

Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices, pg.
5 – 6.
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This concept that the Barrier Reef System was second in size only to the Great
Barrier Reef ofAustralia was mentioned independently in almost every interview
conducted with epistemic community members and policymakers in the process of field
research, as well as cited in documents including the UCP, 2002, Plan Operativo Anual
Periódo: Julio 2002 – Junio 2003 (Belize City: SAM), pg. 1, among others.
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ICRI held a series of workshops in Cancún to consider links between Caribbean reef
management and processes in marine currents, benthic habitats and trophic webs in
coastal and marine environments.278 Participants at these workshops included actors
relevant to transnational mobilization in the Mesoamerican reef, such as WWF-México
and TNC in Mexico, as well as NGOs from the other three Mesoamerican reef countries
and the industrialized world.

Creation of the SAM Project
In 1996, regional political activity provided an additional networking forum. That
year, the Central American Commission for Development (CCAD) issued a general
statement calling on the Central American countries to promote environmental
management.279 To carry out this pronouncement, the governments of Mexico, Belize,
Guatemala and Honduras drafted and signed the Tulúm Declaration, pledging to
coordinate management efforts in the Mesoamerican reef.280 In 1997, CCAD and
environmental ministry representatives of the four countries invited WWF-México and
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WWF-México, 2004, MAR Strategic Plan 2004 – 2009, pg. 10; Gonzalo Merediz
Alonso, author interviews conducted February 2008. ICRI, 2002, Declaration from
ICRI Regional Workshop for the Tropical Americas, held Cancún, June 14 – 22, 2002.
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UCP, 2004, Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable, pg. 2. Original text reads: “...para
impulsar el desarrollo regional por la senda de la sustentabilidad económica, social y
ecológica”. See also the CCAD website, available at http://ccad.sgsica.org
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Adela Vázquez Trejo, 2005, La cooperación acerca de la cuestión ambiental en
Centroamérica. (Co/incidencias No. 2 (July – Dec): 35 – 43), pg. 41; UCP, 2004,
Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable, pg. 3; UCP, 2001, Plan Operativo Anual Período:
Julio 2001 – Junio 2002 (Belize City: SAM) pg. 1
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the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to participate in project design for what was to
become the GEF-funded Proyecto de la Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema
Arrecifal Mesoamericano, a project cited as relevant to the Tulúm Declaration and the
CBD.281
To the emerging transnational network, the Tulúm Declaration and the planned
CCAD project offered “a framework for perhaps the most viable and transcendental
opportunity on the planet for carrying out a multinational conservation effort” to integrate
coastal and marine management with reef conservation.282 With an institutional role in
project design, actors in the reef network began holding meetings and workshops aimed
at constructing a management approach to reef governance that incorporated the
emerging understanding of the reef ecosystem.
In this timeframe, the concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)
became one of the core organizing principles of the emerging epistemic community.
ICZM, developed between 1998 and 2001, elaborated an ecological approach to
management incorporating ecosystem wide characteristics. In 1998, epistemic
community member organizations and a transnational network of global reef stakeholders
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UCP, 2004, Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable, pg. 3; A Hernández, author
interviews conducted May 15, 2008. The World Bank, 2000, Regional (Belize,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico): Conservation and Sustainable Use of the
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System – Submission for Work Program Inclusion (Office
Memorandum prepared for GEF Secretariat) Annex 3, pg. 5; WWF-México, 2004,
Meosamerican Reef Strategic Action Plan 2005 – 2009 (WWF).
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Bezaury, J.C., C.L. Sántos, J. McCann, C. Molina Islas, J. Carranza, P. Rubinoff, G.
Townsend, et al, 1998, Participatory Coastal and Marine Management in Quintana
Roo, Mexico. Proceedings: International Tropical Marine Ecosystems Management
Symposium (ITMEMS).
144

participated at a symposium in Australia to evaluate ICZM application at existing and
proposed Mexican AMPs at Xcalak, Yum Balám and Sian Ka’an.283 In 1998 and 1999,
ICZM was used by the Atlantic and Gulf Reef Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) project, an
international endeavor by the UN Institute of Water, Environment and Health (UNUINWEH), to evaluate methodologies for measuring reef health.284 In addition, in 1999
Juan Bezaury of TNC, formerly of Los Amigos, and Bessy Aspra de Lupiac of Honduras
conducted a Threat and Root Cause Analysis to evaluate the primary anthropogenic
threats to biodiversity in the Mesoamerican basin.285 At this time, the network had
expanded beyond the initial groups of stakeholders that had emerged in the early 1990s to
include: Mexican academic institutions el Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios
Avanzados (CINVESTAV), el Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR, formerly CIQRO);
the Brazilian agency CZMA/I, staffers at the Hol Chan reserve; governmental staffers at
the Cayos Cochinos Research station in Honduras; and federal employees from marine
parks at Punta Cancún and Punta Nizuc in Mexico.286
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Bezaury, J.C., et al, 1998, Participatory Coastal and Marine Management in
Quintana Roo, Mexico.
284

Atlantic and Gulf Rapid Assessment, AGRRA, available online at
http://www.agrra.org/index.html. AGRRA Methods Workshop, held in Miami in 1998.
List of participants available online at http://www.agrra.org/workshops/attend.html.
AGRRA is a civil society network interested in developing strategies for post-crisis
rapid response coral reef monitoring in the Caribbean Sea. See also the AGRRA
Methods Workshop, held in Akumal, Mexico in May 17 – 21, 1999.
285

Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis (Draft)
(Presented for Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef
System)
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A list of participants of the AGRRA workshops was accessed in March, 2009 online
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At the same time as the development of the CCAD project, WWF-México began
planning and carrying out research for an autonomously designed conservation efforts.
The WWF-México efforts further contributed to what was becoming a pool of scientific
knowledge and policy relevant information regarding environmental processes specific to
the Mesoamerican reef system, through workshops with a participant list that overlapped
significantly with the CCAD workshops. These included workshops in Cancún and
Belize in 1999 to construct an understanding of the basin by mapping relevant ecological
features, including benthic habitats, marine and downriver current flows and physical
characteristics.287 The WWF-México planning efforts were concluded in 2000, with the
creation of the WWF Mesoamerican Reef Alliance Project (WWF MAR Project), which
similarly applied an ecological focus to fisheries management.288

at http://www.agrra.org/workshops/finalrep.html#Appendix%201. See further lists of
participants for shared members at: Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root
Cause Analysis (Draft) (Presented for Conservation and Sustainable Use of the
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System), pg. 15 – 16. The World Bank, 2000, Regional
(Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico): Conservation and Sustainable Use of the
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System – Submission for Work Program Inclusion (Office
Memorandum prepared for GEF Secretariat), pg. 16.
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Participants at these workshops included agencies involved in the CCAD project,
such as members of Los Amigos, TNC and the Belizean Coastal Zone Management
Authority and Institute (CZMA/I). See WWW-México, 2004, MAR Strategic Plan
2004-2009, pg. 11. Philip A. Kramer and Patricia Richards Kramer, 2002, Ecoregional
Conservation Planning for the Mesoamerican Caribbean Reef (WWF-Centroamerica),
pg. 27; Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis (Draft), pg.
3; Philip A. Kramer and Patricia Richards Kramer, 2002, Ecoregional Conservation
Planning for the Mesoamerican Caribbean Reef (WWF-Centroamerica)
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See Appendix A and Appendix B in Philip A. Kramer and Patricia Richards Kramer,
2002, Ecoregional Conservation Planning for the Mesoamerican Caribbean Reef
(WWF-Centroamerica), also maps beginning pg. 54. World Wildlife Fund México
(WWF-México), 2008, Draft WWF MAR Strategic Action Plan (Cancún: WWF146

In 2001, the CCAD-planned SAM Project was finalized, and was declared active
on the 30th of November.289 The regional goals of the project were coordinated by the
Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP) which would, among other things,
recommend areas of focus (such as developing monitoring techniques, modernizing and
standardizing protected areas management programs, and identifying legislative gaps) by
creating yearly Plans of Action (Planes Operativos Anuales or POAs) for the relevant
management authorities. These POAs were informed by formally established Technical
Working Groups, or Grupos Técnicos de Trabajo (GTTs), groups of scientists, mobilized
annually to gather data relevant to regional reef management.290
In Mexico, as in the other three countries, responsibility for project
implementation was accorded to a National Reef Committee. The Mexican Committee
was headed by CONANP, and staffed by civil society actors from Los Amigos and
WWF-México. Under CONANP regional director and marine biologist Alfredo Arellano
Guillermo, the Committee was responsible for inter alia conducting an inventory of
biodiversity in the area, evaluating the necessity of creating new federal AMPs in

México) passim
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Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from
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(IBRD/SAM/CCAD) pg. 1. UCP, 2001, Reporte de Avance No. 1, pg. 1. UCP, 2001,
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ecologically sensitive areas, and recommending legislative and regulatory instruments for
reef management.291
After the adoption of the project in 2001, the network of information expanded
further with the addition of academic agencies to the knowledge pool. CONANP
established Memoranda of Understanding with agencies such as ECOSUR and
CINVESTAV for assistance in monitoring and analysis in specific aspects of the SAM
Project, in matters such as chemical, physical and pollution analyses at selected sites.292
Like the Forestry Department in Jamaica, CONANP functioned both as a policymaker
organization and as an epistemic community organization, gathering data as part of the
Reef Committee, contributing members to research gathering workshops, and recruiting
from civil society agencies in the epistemic community network. In 2002, Global
Visions International (GVI), a British ENGO interested in coastal ecosystem integrity,
created a formal relationship with CONANP and Los Amigos to conduct research and
recreational expeditions in Sian Ka’an.293
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By 2001, the core actors of the epistemic community had established a
comprehensive series of network links, and a broad network comprising of various actors
from a range of organizations in the public and private sector. Although measurement is
complicated by the amorphous nature of the coalition, it was apparent that this network
was substantially larger than the epistemic community identified in Jamaica. Table 3.2:
Partial List of Epistemic Community Members identifies only 17 individuals within
the network, but Los Amigos, which is entirely comprised of epistemic community actors,
alone has 14 members. ECOSUR, based in Chetumal, similarly counts another eight
more members who are involved in studying marine and coastal environments in the
Mesoamerican reef region, while URI-CRC counts an additional eleven. These 31
additional members suggest that a very conservative estimate of the size of this epistemic
community would give a network of over 60 members, and perhaps as much as 100.

Maintaining the Network
This comparatively large network was maintained by more regularly established
links than the network active in the Cockpit Country, although informal ties played a role
as well. Most informally, but perhaps quite significant in developing network links,
several epistemic community organizations had exchanged members during the period of
advocacy. Specifically, both CONANP and TNC hired staffers away from Los Amigos
between 1997 and 2000.

alternativo en Quintana Roo (Global Vision International: Mexico).
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In addition, there have been a series of regular physical meetings between
epistemic community organizations throughout the Yucatán peninsula. For example,
between 1998 and 2004, URI-CRC conducted six meetings in Chetumal with UQROO
and local actors, five in Xcalak with Los Amigos and the XCC, and additional meetings in
Belize and Cancún with ENGOs involved in Mesoamerican reef management. As part of
the conduct of the SAM Project, epistemic community members from the various
organizations jointly participated in several meetings a year since 2001, not only as part
of the annual GTT meetings held in rotating countries, but also in periodic Meetings of
the Experts held by the UCP, one held between 2001 and 2002, three between 2002 and
2003, and two from 2004 to 2005, as well as myriad other meetings referenced
throughout the chapter. Further, these network links were supplemented by other
processes, including the drafting of widely cited jointly-authored reports, such as the
Threat and Root Cause Analysis, the electronic circulation of information through a
database on reef management operated by UQROO, and through financial support,
particularly from TNC, which gave research grants to Los Amigos and GVI.
In Figure 3.4: Diagram of Mesoamerican Reef Epistemic Community Links,
there is a partial diagram of the above mentioned connections between some of the core
agencies involved in the epistemic community network. As the number of connections
indicates, there were agencies that were identified as central to the maintenance of the
network, namely Los Amigos, CONANP, WWF-México and TNC. These organizations
were similarly identified in interviews as key actors in constituting the network.
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The Emergence of a Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN)
The emergence of this epistemic community was also paralleled by the emergence
of coalitions of civil society actors concerned about ecological processes in the reef and
coastal ecosystems. As described above, one of these was a transnational advocacy
network (TAN) of reef management stakeholders, who were committed to global and
regional reef management. This TAN emerged from organizations such as ICRI, which
provided funds and created networking forums,294 and the UNU-INWEH AGRRA reef
monitoring workshops, all of which were integral to the generation of scientific
knowledge relevant to reef management.
Although ICRI and other organizations within the coral reef TAN shared a
scientific epistemology with the epistemic community, these were nevertheless separate
networks. An epistemic community is constituted by actors who share common policy
goals,295 and several participants in the AGRRA and ICRI workshops were not directly
involved in policy advocacy pertinent to reef management in Mesoamerica. For example,
participants in the AGRRA network include the Venezuelan academic institutions Simon
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Bolivar Universidad and la Universidad Central de Venezuela, as well as the University
of the West Indies and the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA/NEPA) in
Jamaica, all of which are focused on managing local reefs.
In addition to this TAN, a local network emerged in Mexico in the 1990s. In
contrast to the reef TAN and the epistemic community, this network had an exclusive
interest in the management of mangrove zones. At the same time, the objectives of the
local network and the transnational networks overlapped substantially. Like the
epistemic community, the mangrove network argued that mangrove swamps were
important as repositories of biodiversity and as buffer zones against coastal erosion and
hurricanes.296 Similarly, the mangrove network was concerned about key coastal sites in
Quintana Roo, including: the Cancún-Tulúm corridor; Sian Ka’an; Xcalak; Chetumal;
Cozumel; and Banco Chinchorro.297
This network consisted of stakeholders from research organizations such as the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and groups local to states such as
Grupo Ecológico Mayab (GEMA) of Quintana Roo and Pronatura Noroeste of Baja
296
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California. As a national movement, this group also had visible political support from
then environmental minister Lichtinger and party members in the Green Ecological Party
of Mexico (PVEM) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), particularly from
assumed PRI presidential successor Luis Donaldo Colosio.298 Although the local
network did not coordinate advocacy efforts with the epistemic community, the efforts of
this network later played an important role in the federal management of coastal hotel
development.

The SAM Epistemic Community Develops an Ecological Managerial Approach
This epistemic community mobilized and recruited new members around the
principle that improved environmental management in the reef was necessary as a matter
of ecosystem stability, linking biodiversity conservation and protected areas management
to ecological health and functioning ecosystems. As occurred in the Jamaican Cockpit
Country, epistemic community members were also concerned about the impact of
management on the employment and subsistence potential of marginalized communities
who depended on access to, and the exploitation of natural resources.299 Granted, the
Jamaican case focused on agricultural, rural communities in the limestone forest, while
the SAM case study concerned coastal fishing communities. Nevertheless, the ecosystem
management goals of the epistemic community had to confront not only the interests of
298

Exequiel Ezcurra, author interviews conducted May 2009. Taken from handwritten
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The World Bank, 2000, Regional: Conservation and Sustainable Use of the
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nationally significant economic actors, but also the interests of disenfranchised
populations. The following section indicates the internally held ecological perspective of
the epistemic community by discussing interviews and documents held by its members.

The Impact of Biodiversity Loss
By focusing on ecosystem-level processes, the epistemic community portrayed
biodiversity loss as a threat to overall ecosystem integrity, where a loss in the
functionality of any area of the ecosystem could lead to irreversible harm in the entire
ecological network. The Normas Practicás studies, among others, framed mangrove loss
as a problem of a loss in nursery habitats of fish, and eventually depleted fish
populations.300 Moreover, mangroves were cited as important to ecosystem stability, as
mangrove trees buffer against marine surges during storms and hurricanes.301
Biodiversity in fish populations was also considered important in itself, and also because
a healthy genetic variation in fish populations would have positive impacts on coral reef
health by:
…[providing] the corals the capacity to maintain their vital functions in
healthy conditions for their growth, reproduction and development, while
the presence of numerous coral structures gives the fish places where they
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can be protected, where they can find food, reproduce and maintain other
vital functions.302
The link between mangrove health and overall reef health, and between fish and
coral reef biodiversity was emblematic of the interconnectivity described as important by
epistemic community members:
There is a very close relationship between the mangrove and the health of
the reef. Because for many species of fish and other species that keep the
reef healthy, part of their life cycle is developed in the mangrove zone.
Then, when someone destroys this part of the ecosystem, the mangrove,
people generally think, “The reef is over there, and what I’m destroying
are these trees here.” But all these species have a very important
interaction.303
If you remove coastal material, in the mangrove and the forest, it’s a chain
that affects everything. In other words, the forest that is over here,
contributes energy to the mangrove, and the mangrove contributes energy
to the lagoon, to the reef lagoon, and the reef lagoon – but then people
don’t understand this trophic or ecological chain.304
The epistemic community was also concerned with the impact of natural resource
and “biodiversity and ecosystem equilibrium” for economic resource generation and
sustained consumption among low income populations.305 From this perspective, certain
processes were seen as the primary threats to successful ecosystem management.
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Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Transcript of digital
voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Identifying the Primary Ecological Threats
The primary threat was seen as hotel development, which not only degraded the
reef ecosystem, but also competed with the land ownership claims of indigenous and
lower income populations,306 threatening the economic sustainability of these
communities by preventing sustainable use of natural resources.307 Although hotel
development at present is largely restricted to the Riviera Maya in the northern third of
the state, officials in SEMARNAT, the state agency SEDETUR and the research
community have indicated that the southern third of the state, including in rural and
undeveloped areas such as Majahual, is a target for future development and hotel
expansion.308
As indicated above, coastal hotel development contributes a range of direct and
indirect threats to reef ecology. Further, hotel development and the attendant tourism
exacerbate the stress caused by other activities, such as increasing the demand on fishing:
The principal threat is tourism… not just because of the people who are
maybe directly diving, or fishing, or stepping on the reef… [If] you have
10 million tourists a year in one place, these tourists generate solid
residues… waste water from human activity, from bathrooms, from
whatever… When there’s fishing in certain places, the fish will probably
306
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be overexploited… If there weren’t tourism, fishermen wouldn’t need to
fish these enormous quantities to support the demand.309
Nevertheless, there was no call within the community for a ban on hotel
construction. Given the prominence of hotel tourism to state and federal GDP, such an
approach would probably not have been politically tenable. Rather, epistemic
community members proposed reform in practices and policies governing the physical
location, size, and environmental management practices of newly constructed hotels:
And currently, at the international level, and also here in Mexico, we are
promoting the sustainable use of resources… In Cancun, where anyone
can come and fish, and they don’t need a permit, we don’t imagine that
this is sustainable… At the same time, if we want sustainability in fishing,
we want tourism to become sustainable as well.310
Overfishing is similarly recognized as a major threat in ecosystem management in
the SAM. Scaled fish, particularly red snapper (Epinephelus morio), and shellfish such
as lobster and conch, are targeted for commercial and subsistence fishing throughout
Quintana Roo.311 Unchecked, the stress of commercial fishing is likely to increase, as
fishing rich sites along the coast at Majahual, Banco Chinchorro and Xcalak are
recognized as potentially lucrative, and attract a growing number of inland migrants.312
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Creating a Managerial Framework
Concerned about ecological integrity, the epistemic community developed a
management approach focusing on the interconnectivity of biodiversity in the reef.
…[At] a scientific or practical level, biodiversity is a necessary component
for ecosystems to last… [It’s] like the different organisms that we have in
our bodies. Everything has a function, and we can live without a piece, or
without one organ… The same thing happens with an ecosystem… If you
remove one of the species, you would probably think that the ecosystem is
not going to collapse. But each time you remove one, and another, and
another, you’re closer to the point where the ecosystem stops
functioning.313
In particular, epistemic community members were dismissive of the idea that
additional AMPs would lead to improved biodiversity conservation, if the management
practices were not improved:
When we get into this topic, when we get into biodiversity, the
government acts like everything is OK. Because they argue: “In Quintana
Roo, we have a high percentage of coastal areas as protected areas. We
are carrying out management.” …For me, the concern is where there
aren’t any protected areas, right? There, there has been a very strong
impact.314

Fishing Practice Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef (WWF), pg. 32 notes that in
one year (2004), the population of resort areas in Quintana Roo increased by 10.4%, a
figure confirmed in interviews with CONANP staff working at the Puerto Morelos
National Park and AMP, SEMARNAT staff in Chetumal and with Los Amigos staff in
Cancún as a consistent rate of increase since the 2000s. At that rate, the population
would double every 7 years.
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The ICZM approach, developed in the UNU-INWEH and the ICRI workshops,
posited that protected areas management should be fundamentally reformed to reflect the
range of environmental processes in the region. Similarly, effective management in
fisheries would incorporate concern about ecosystem stability, while maintaining the
ability of marginalized communities to earn a livelihood.

Framing Alignment
The adoption of a management approach organized around ICZM changed the
focus of some of the core organizations of the epistemic community. Prior to the
emergence of the network, organizations such as Los Amigos were focused on improving
management in specific locations, rather than on the reef as an integrated ecosystem. As
described by Gonzalo Merediz Alonso of Los Amigos, ideas about managing the reef as a
unitary ecosystem evolved over time, as the various organizations participated in the
constitution of the network:
… [Over] the years we understood that it wasn’t making sense to have a
Reserve being conserved like an island, right? Sian Ka’an exchanges
water with the area, the reefs are linked, the forests are connected.315
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Measuring the Epistemic Community’s Knowledge Consensus
In addition to sharing a rationale for action based on an ecological understanding
of the reef, this network shared a causal consensus on the relationship between human
activity and environmental degradation. As occurred in Jamaica, not only did the various
researchers agree on the scientific causal explanations, but they also were aware that a
general agreement existed within the network. As explained by Patricia Santos of
CONANP, this agreement emerged for specific reasons:
First, because the data is generated by experts. Experts whom almost all
of us know, because we are friends, or colleagues, or teachers, or students.
Or, we know they’re experts because we read each other’s publications.
Second, because the methodology that is used is standardized, which
makes it trustworthy. Third, there is no reason for anyone to dress up the
information being collected.
This consensus did not apply to all the potential threats addressed by the SAM
project, however. While the consensus was strongest in relation to hotel development
and fishing practices, there was an admitted lack of clear scientific knowledge linking
inland industrial and agricultural development to offshore marine degradation. At the
same time, these processes were not an overt part of the policy advocacy campaigns. The
following section assesses the level of consensus on the identified threats.

Knowledge Consensus on Tourism Development
Tourism Development: Agreement on the Causes
There was a universal recognition within the community about the causal
significance of coastal tourist and hotel development on environmental degradation in the
reef. Project reports such as the Threat and Root Cause Analysis produced for the SAM
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Project, as well as interviews indicate a shared awareness of the association between
tourism-based development and its various impacts on reef environmental health.316
Similar to bauxite production in Jamaica, coastal tourism in Quintana Roo is seen
as a prominent threat due to its privileged position in federal and state economic
development. Since the 1970s, the PRI government had promoted coastal tourism as a
key driver of the economy. Cancún and the Riviera Maya were specifically established
through a federal program as major sites for tourist development, with the government
providing credit and investing in infrastructure for the development of large-scale
tourism.317
Economically, this proved a windfall for Quintana Roo and Mexico. Between
1997 and 2003, the number of hotel rooms in the Riviera Maya increased from 4,000 to
28,000, and by 2007, Cancún and the Riviera Maya combined had 59,000 rooms.318
From 1999 to 2006, between 28% and 38% of the total tourism revenue in Mexico and
316
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Enero 2007. Available online at
http://sedetur.qroo.gob.mx/estadisticas/2007/enero.php; Alfredo Arellano Guillermo,
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between 75% and 80% of the total state revenue of Quintana Roo came solely from
earnings based on Cancún and the Riviera Maya.319 As a result, hotel development has,
over the past four decades, been a significant part of the politics of development in the
reef region.

Tourism Development: Agreement on the Consequences
In interviews and project documents, respondents indicated a high level of
awareness of the consequences of tourism-based development for the ecological health in
the reef. Members universally acknowledged that tourism-based development led to
depleted mangroves, which in turn caused a chain reaction of coastal erosion, loss in reef
cover, and exposure to tidal energy.320 Because of this contribution to various processes,
epistemic community members ranked tourism-based development as the main
environmental threat to coastal management in interviews, and in threat assessments
conducted since the 1999 AGRRA studies.321
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The primary threat is tourism. Right now, in the Maya coast, the reef
system is directly at risk, because of the explosive boom of tourism. Not
just the tourists that come to enjoy the beach, but those that come to
construct, let’s say, a support infrastructure for tourism… [starting] a
process of urbanization that deforests, that impacts…more than just the
wetlands, but also the forest, the coastal landscape.322
We believe that coastal development, particularly in the case of Mexico, is
the principal threat to the integrity of the ecosystem. Coastal
development, which, in the majority of the cases, is associated with tourist
development.323

Knowledge Consensus on Fishing
Fishing: Agreement on the Causes
Fishing, though less economically significant than tourism, is still a significant
source of income for coastal communities, and the political economy of this practice
similarly contributes to the impact of this activity on the reef ecosystem. Although
fishing contributes an average of only 0.8% toward internal state revenue per annum,
over 3,000 fishermen in the state earned an average of MX$60,939 per year, or
approximately US $6,000, an attractive income to marginalized populations.324 While
recognized as a causal threat by the epistemic community, there is some equivocation
about the causal weight of fishing in the Mesoamerican basin. As occurred with the
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peasant agricultural practices in the Cockpit Country, Jamaica, clandestine activity
prevents precise models of the impact of fishermen on reef biodiversity.

Fishing: Agreement on the Consequences
Overfishing is universally cited as a source of pressure on the marine ecosystem,
both in interviews and confirmed in reports conducted by TNC on fish populations and
spawning sites, or areas in which gathered to fish reproduce.325 Overfishing as described
by the epistemic community could result in population collapses, leading to disruption of
the benthic cycle and trophic network of the marine ecosystem. Again, there was some
uncertainty insofar as the impact of clandestine activity is unclear.

Measuring Consensus on Inland Industry and Agriculture
Inland Industry and Agriculture: A Lack of Agreement on the Causes
The epistemic community lacks a scientific consensus for other threats cited in
SAM Project documents, such as inland agricultural and industrial development.
Although information is available indicating the presence of pesticides commonly
associated with agricultural runoff in coastal and marine areas, specific information about
the contribution of various point sources to marine pollution is nonexistent, due to a lack
of information about the direction of subterranean river flows in the Yucatán.326
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A Consensus on the Aggregated Extent of Environmental Degradation
Studies on the reef ecosystem have created an aggregate measure of the projected
and current extent of environmental degradation in the Mesoamerican reef. In 2005, the
epistemic community concluded a baseline study of reef conditions in the four countries
in the basin. In Mexico, the sites studied were Cozumel in the north and Banco
Chinchorro and Xcalak in the south. In this study, researchers gathered information on
indicators of reef and ecosystem health including: the size, density, species and average
cover of coral species; the diet, nesting patterns and biomass of 23 indicator species of
fish; the quantity of seagrass; and the density of mangrove cover as measured by number
of trees per hectare.327 In addition, studies of pollution in the Bay of Chetumal generated
figures on the presence of chemical and organic compounds from agricultural pesticides
and plaguicides, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and DDT, as well as
generating information on the chemical and physical composition of water.328
Some studies were more narrowly tailored towards specific threats. For example,
CONAPESCA and the FAO had conducted longitudinal studies on declines in catch size
and populations of important commercial species, such as spiny lobster, snapper and

inland pollution via underground rivers.
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M. García-Salgado, et al, 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrecifal
Mesoamericano, pg. 120 – 153, especially pg. 151 - 153.
165

conch, dating back to the 1970s.329 The CONAPESCA and the baseline studies were
shared among epistemic community members through member participation in the
various threat assessment workshops and research methodologies workshops conducted
among network participants for the SAM Project.
With high agreement on the extent of environmental degradation, as well as a
stated awareness within the community about the existence of this agreement, the data
indicate that consensus is high for two of the identified threats relevant to management
under Mexican jurisdiction: tourism-based development and overfishing, but absent for
inland agriculture and industry.

Measuring Network Socialization with Managers
High Levels of Socialization with SEMARNAT and CONANP
In this case, the epistemic community established strong socialization ties to
federal agencies, particularly in the environmental secretariat, SEMARNAT and its
executive agency in protected areas management, CONANP. As described above, the
SAM Project was administered by a National Reef Committee staffed by CONANP and
by epistemic community organizations Los Amigos and WWF-México; the GTTs that
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The Quintana Roo delegation of CONAPESCA provided figures of population
changes over time, noting a general tendency to decrease over time in Comité Técnico
Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura
y Pesca (Quintana Roo: SAGARPA). Specific charts referencing these figures are
sampled above in this chapter. See also The World Bank, 2000, Conservation and
Sustainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, pg. 5, discussing the
increasingly visible decline in catch sizes and biomass among commercially harvested
fish in the reef region.
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provided recommendations to the coordinating UCP were also comprised of CONANP
and ENGO organizations from the epistemic community. Beyond these formalized links
under the SAM Project, CONANP held occasional additional information-gathering
meetings with researchers from epistemic community organizations, such as ECOSUR
and CINVESTAV in the course of its duties as manager of protected areas.330
These ties were strengthened by the exchange of personnel and training between
CONANP and the civil society. Former staffers of Los Amigos were employed by
CONANP in reef monitoring during the period of field research, and the agency
participated in regionally coordinated training workshops with civil society actors, such
as a 2003 workshop held in Belize to evaluate protected areas management.331

Low Socialization with State Managers in Quintana Roo
CONANP was the most integrated of the policymaker agencies relevant to SAM
governance. The epistemic community did create additional ties to agencies in the state
government of Quintana Roo, but these were only weakly established. There, epistemic
community members invited state officials to participate in the 1990s Xcalak reef
management workshops, to design appropriate management strategies with civil society
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UCP, 2003, Principios de Manejo para las Áreas Marinas Protegidas: Manual
(Belize City: SAM). Developed through a workshop titled “Capacitación en los
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managers.332 However, this process of socialization did not mirror the regularized
meetings with CONANP. It was limited to discussions on the Xcalak management
workshops, but did not extend to discussions on hotel management, either with
SEDETUR, or the state government itself.

Socialization with SAGARPA and CONAPESCA
For the governance of fisheries, the epistemic community reinforced its links with
CONANP, as well as creating ties to federal agencies in SAGARPA and CONAPESCA.
For the WWF MAR Project, the epistemic community organizations WWF-México,
CINVESTAV and ECOSUR held a series of information-building and exchange
workshops on fisheries management and conservation with federal agents in CONANP
and CONAPESCA throughout the 2000s.333

Socialization with Fishing Cooperatives
In addition, the epistemic community fostered ties to private sector actors in
fishing cooperatives. This gave the fisheries governance efforts a multilevel dimension,
as it involved the civil society as well as public policymakers. As fishermen had regular
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Beth R. Chung, 1999, “A Community Strategy for Coastal Zone Management of
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See a list of participants in the WWF MAR workshops in WWF-México, 2007, How
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access to the reef and a store of knowledge about fish populations and migratory patterns,
cooperatives were identified by policymakers and researchers as crucial sources of
information in areas relevant to management, including: identifying common sites of
capture, measuring diversity within and among fish species, and identifying capture
techniques.334 Consequently, they were included in the WWF MAR Workshops with
SAGARPA and CONAPESCA. For the fishermen, these workshops resulted in the
publication of manuals and recommendations for safety precautions, appropriate fishing
techniques and population monitoring.335

Socialization with Private Sector Actors in Hotel Management
Epistemic community members also created formal and ad hoc channels of
communication with private sector managers in the tourism sector. Los Amigos and URICRC conducted periodic studies on the relationship between coastal hotel construction
and environmental degradation, and issued a series of voluntary recommendations titled
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Normas Prácticas to hotel managers in the Riviera Maya.336 In addition, transnational
epistemic community organizations such as Conservation International and Los Amigos
established the Mesoamerican Reef Tourism Initiative (MARTI), an informal association
of hoteliers and civil society researchers. Like the Normas Prácticas studies, the MARTI
initiative was created to promote voluntary good environmental practices in the tourism
sector, including in the operation of cruise ships, reef visitation practices, and hotel
operation and construction.337

Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community
As described above, the epistemic community had variable levels of socialization
with environmental managers in the public and private sector in Mexico. Similarly, the
epistemic community used economic framing, or the linkage of environmental
management to the wellbeing of nationally important productive economic sectors, in
different campaigns to promote environmental management in the Mesoamerican reef.
This formed a strategic choice, as interview respondents indicated that the network,
continued to be internally motivated by broader concerns about biodiversity and
ecosystem integrity:
But I believe that what should be recognized is that the [natural] resources
have a value per se… They’re valued not just because they might be
336
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valuable to mankind. Or, they’re not just valuable because we can get
some money from them. They’re valuable per se, by the fact of their
existence, from all that they represent for evolution, all the complexity and
their place in the biosphere.338

Using Economic Frames with Hotel Managers
The primary framing tactic of the epistemic community was to link biodiversity
loss to economic harm in the hotel sector, identified as the primary economic productive
sector in the state. This link allowed epistemic community members and knowledge
brokers to argue to hotel managers that proper environmental management would avoid
the erosion, attendant pollution and reef sedimentation that could damage hotel
infrastructure and the market appeal of coastal landscapes. For example, the Normas
Prácticas studies conducted by Los Amigos projected that coastal erosion would
necessitate the construction of buffering walls to maintain the long-term structural
integrity of the coastal buildings (see Figure 3.3: Effect of Erosion on Hotel
Construction), theoretically creating a picture whereby environmental loss would
negatively affect long-term profit margins:
Those gentlemen that want to do away with the mangrove should
understand that if they do away with the mangrove, they’re doing away
with the coral reef, which is what they want to sell. Or that if they tear out
the seagrass near the coast, their fine sand beach is going to be lost.339
Well, each one of [the hoteliers] wants to get the maximum utility from
their hospitality, from their investment in the land. And to get the
338

Patricia Santos, autor interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from transcript of
audiocassette recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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maximum utility, they have to build a lot of rooms, a lot of concrete, they
have to alter the landscape a lot. When you speak to them about
environmentally friendly development, something less destructive… they
look at it from an accounting perspective.340

Using Economic Frames with Fishing Managers
Similarly, environmental management was linked to the economic interests of
cooperatives in their capacity as managers of coastal fishing practices. The multilevel
workshops coordinated by WWF-México and the epistemic community were designed to
persuade fishermen that overexploitation would result in a decreased future ability to
utilize coastal resources.341 While not a prominent economic sector, this nevertheless
counts as economic framing, as the cooperation of civil society fishing managers
(cooperatives) was sought by convincing them of the economic benefit of environmental
action. Moreover, the sustainability of commercially harvested fish populations was
linked not only to overharvesting per se, but also to the maintenance of health of other
populations and the degradation of terrestrial and marine ecosystems external to the
reef.342 Reports produced for the SAM by epistemic community members also
emphasized the economic merit of conserving and sustainably managing fish harvesting:
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…Overfishing and a lack of regulations in reproductive and nursery sites
can bring the size of commercial captures to a decline, possibly close to
collapse.343
One can consider that the protection of reproductive aggregation sites is
similar to the protection of a savings account in a bank. If possible, we
should capture the interest, not the savings capital… This analogy is
particularly appropriate when one considers the management of
reproductive aggregations – source sites for the reproduction of the
majority of the commercially important reef fish in the regions of the
SAM.344
In interviews, epistemic community respondents indicated that the choice of
economic language to describe the impacts of biodiversity loss and environmental
degradation was necessary to persuade these local stakeholders about the rationality of
environmental management and good practices. Again, respondents indicated that the
use of economic language was a strategic choice, as it differed with internally held
reasons for biodiversity management, which emphasized the holistic rather than the
consumptive value of reef ecosystems:
[U]nfortunately, our society is based largely on the issue of costs and
compensation for environmental impacts… [If] we don’t carry out that
kind of valuation, the people will not, they might not pay it any mind. 345
If we look at it from the perspective that the people do, that is, only
economic, well [biodiversity] does have its value, right?... [B]ecause it’s
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UCP, 2002, Reporte de Avance Técnico y Financiero. Reporte No. 3. Período:
Julio 2002 – Diciembre 2002 (Belize City: SAM) pg. 17. Translated from Spanish.
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Will Heyman and Nicanor Requena, 2003, Informe Final de la Consultoría, pg. 13.
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Alfredo Arrellano Guillermo, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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generating economic revenue for them. As a naturalist or biologist, the
value that it has is for human health.346
This case gives variation on two of the independent variables, framing and
socialization, but again has no variation on consensus in regards to the policy campaigns
studied. As described above, the community generated a robust intersubjective
consensus on two of the primary anthropogenic threats assessed here: fishing and coastal
hotel development. The other threats, inland agriculture and industry, were not addressed
by the advocacy efforts. Second, the community created strong social links to
policymakers in the environmental and fishing governmental agencies, particularly in the
federal level, as well as with private sector managers in the hotel and fishing sectors.
Third, in the interest of persuading actors and policymakers interested in the economic
exploitation of natural resources, the epistemic community adopted strategic frames
attempting to demonstrate the economic importance of biodiversity conservation to
hoteliers and fishing cooperatives. The following section assesses the success of the
community in influencing biodiversity policies and practices in the Mesoamerican basin.

Environmental Policy Advocacy
Bounding the Cartographic Limits of the Ecoregion
In contrast to the Jamaican Cockpit Country project, where the Cockpit Country
remained amorphously described, the epistemic community in this case was more
involved in establishing specific geographic limits in the GEF-funded project. The
346

Rosa María Loreto Viruel, autor interviews conducted April 18, 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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outcome of this process was that the community exercised additional influence on the
eventual management approach taken by federal environmental policymakers in Mexico.
The area studies in the 1999 Threat and Root Cause Analysis, which was intended to
understand the environmental threats in the Mesoamerican basin, was chosen to
“approximate the limits defined by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for the Meso-American
Caribbean Reef Ecoregion” (see Figure 3.1: Map of WWF Defined Ecoregion).347
This control also allowed the epistemic community to include references to ecological
management in the project, including coastal with marine management. As adopted by
the coordinating body, the Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP) of the SAM
Project, the areas relevant to biodiversity management in the reef included coastal and
marine environments, such as mangroves and seagrasses,348 some of the core principles
of ICZM developed by the emerging scientific network during the late 1990s.
Second, in relation to project design, the epistemic community promoted the
adoption of a standardized investigative methodology to evaluate reef health, also based
on the principles of ICZM and an ecological understanding of the environmental
processes in the reef. Prior to the launch of the SAM Project, Mexican natural resource
policymakers had not established a standard methodology for monitoring federal and
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Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis, pg. 2
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CCAD, 2001, Documento de Evaluación, pg. 2 states: “In pristine areas exist
wetlands, lagoons, beds of seagrass and coastal mangrove forests; these sustain an
exceptionally high biodiversity and provide an important habitat for threatened species”
(Translated from Spanish).
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state AMPs.349 In 2002, the CCAD and the UCP requested the development of a
standardized, scientifically valid monitoring program to investigate regional reef health
for the SAM. In May of 2002, a transnational consortium of researchers headed by Peter
Sale of UNU-INWEH held a workshop in Cancún to this end. Over 35 scientists from
the four countries and the international community participated in this workshop,
including members of Mexican epistemic community organizations, Los Amigos, WWFMéxico, and CINVESTAV ,and organizations such as CZMA/I from the broader regional
reef TAN.350 The methodology developed by the consortium was called the Programa de
Monitoreo Sinóptico (PMS), and was synthesized from earlier studies, including the 1999
AGRRA workshops, and the ICZM symposia.351 The PMS specified monitoring
methods, environmental modeling, biodiversity indicators and relevant sites of
investigation in the region, and by using the ecosystem framework developed in ICZM,
incorporated coastal mangrove zones and seagrasses in the monitoring approach. Much
as occurred with the geographic area defined in the 1999 Threat and Root Cause
Analysis, the PMS was incorporated as part of the regional management approach in the
SAM Project.
349
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SEMARNAT and the Federal Branch: Expand the ZFMT
A minor campaign in the epistemic community advocacy attempt was the goal of
reforming a coastal zone referred to as the Zona Federal Marítimo-Terrestre (ZFMT).
The ZFMT consists of the coastal area measured 20 meters from the average tide level, in
which large development projects such as hotel construction are subject to an
environmental impact assessment, and have to be approved by SEMARNAT and
PROFEPA.352
However, at present the epistemic community considers the ZFMT as an
inadequate management tool. Studies of beach erosion cited in the Normas Prácticas
studies have demonstrated that large structures between the first sand dune and the
coastline are severely disruptive of sand replenishment and contribute to beach erosion.
As the location of the first sand dune on a beach may be substantially more than 20
meters away, hotels constructed out of the ZFMT and hence free from this federal
oversight may contribute strongly to coastal erosion and reef sedimentation.353 However,
this became a site of policy advocacy for a small subsection of the epistemic community,
only in the Normas Prácticas studies of Los Amigos and URI-CRC recommended that the
352
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federal government expand the ZFMT from 20 meters to a construction-free zone
extending up to 5 meters behind the first sand dune.

SEMARNAT and CONANP: Reforming AMPs
In addition, the epistemic community sought the reform of SEMARNAT’s and
CONANP’s practices in managing federal AMPs in sites relevant to the SAM. Los
Amigos recommended the addition of federal AMP status in currently non-protected
areas, primarily at Majahual and Xaban Ha, an area near Cozumel.354 Los Amigos and
other epistemic community organizations, including ECOSUR and WWF-México sought
the incorporation of ecological principles established under ICZM in existing protected
areas, both in those without plans, and in those with insufficiently designed plans. This
was explicitly advanced to CONANP and SEMARNAT: in 2003 civil society
organizations and CONANP participated in a series of workshops in Belize to discuss
incorporating the principle of ecosystem loading capacity in general AMP
management.355 Throughout the conduct of the SAM Project, epistemic community
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members in WWF-México and ECOSUR sought to persuade CONANP to redraft
existing plans at Xcalak and at the “buffer zones” at Sian Ka’an, Área de Uaymil and the
Reefs of Sian Ka’an, such that they conform to a “scientific or ecological point of view of
biodiversity.”356

Fishing Cooperatives: Reform Existing Practices
For fishing management, the epistemic community took a multilevel approach to
governance. In the WWF MAR Project, epistemic community participants in CONANP
and WWF-México directly engaged with participating fishing cooperatives, promoting
the adoption of sustainable fishing practices, such as the voluntary adoption of size
restrictions on lobster, compliance with fishing regulations, and protecting spawning
sites.357 Epistemic community members combined this approach with encouragement
that fishermen curtail the quantity of fish extracted for commerce or subsistence, by
shifting toward other forms of income generation such as catch-and-release or sport
fishing. Promoting internal compliance and the voluntary adoption of sustainable
practices was necessary to effective governance, as the cost to the government of
monitoring and enforcing marine practices is extremely prohibitive. The epistemic
26; CONANP, 2003, Informes de Logros 2003. Retrieved August 2009 from
http://www.conanp.gob.mx/pdf_informes/logros_2003.pdf, pg. 32; UCP 2003, Diseño e
Implementación del Foro de Turismo Sustenible del SAM pg. 46 – 48.
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community sought to persuade cooperatives to take this action by arguing that these
restrictions would improve the long-term durability of fish resources necessary to
continued economic exploitation.358
For the SAM, fisheries management only has two activities... The search
for new, alternative livelihoods for fishermen, so that they change their
practices. So, training for sport fishing, so that they move toward tourism,
ecotourism, whatever... And the other is monitoring the reproductive
aggregations.359

SAGARPA and CONAPESCA: Reform Fishing Regulations
At the policy level, epistemic community members recommended that
CONAPESCA establish regulations identifying and protecting fish spawning sites. In
2002, TNC and other organizations conducted a study identifying spawning sites
throughout the Mesoamerican basin.360 As sensitive areas and crucial to fish biodiversity,
the epistemic community argued that CONAPESCA ban or restrict fishing in these
zones.361 Moreover, the epistemic community recommended that CONAPESCA,
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CONANP and SEMARNAT coordinate the protection of spawning sites with AMP
management. AMPs created by CONANP and SEMARNAT in fishing spawning sites
would be governed as exclusive access zones for registered cooperatives who would in
turn could contribute to reef governance through monitoring and the adoption of
sustainable practices.362

Hoteliers: Change Hotel Management and Land Use Practices
As described above, the MAGTI partnership and Normas Prácticas studies
attempted to convince hoteliers to change practices by using economic framing
arguments. These focused on practices such as aggressively implementing
recommendations for recreational reef access, voluntarily restricting the height and
coastal proximity of hotels, and generally incorporating environmental best practices:
For the hotels that are currently in operation, what we do is carry out a
diagnosis with them, on how to manage energy, water, toxic residues…
Things that are practical and that help them to save energy, water, money,
and that is an element, to answer your question, as to how we approach
them. So that they see that [the environment] has an economic value as
well.363

para su monitoreo y manejo (Belize City: SAM) pg. 11 – 13; UCP, 2003, Reporte de
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Evaluating Epistemic Community Influence
In this case as well, the epistemic community had mixed success in promoting
their preferred management approach in the governance of the region of concern.
Epistemic community members had considerable success in persuading environmental
policymakers in CONANP, SEMARNAT, and CONAPESCA to adopt new policies.
Similarly, the epistemic community attained some success in persuading fishing
cooperatives to change practices. However, the community had little success in engaging
with the governance of coastal hotel construction, either as taken by hoteliers, or by the
state government of Quintana Roo.

Managing AMPs under CONANP and SEMARNAT
In AMP management, epistemic community influence filtered from the top-down,
as the regional SAM institutions in the UCP and CCAD adopted the recommendations
issued by the civil society network. The PMS methodology designed by the UNUINWEH consortium, and which was based on ICZM studies carried out by epistemic
community members during the late 1990s, was adopted by CONANP and SEMARNAT
as the monitoring strategy for AMPs in the Mesoamerican basin.364 After the SAM
Project concluded in 2007, the federal agencies continued to employ PMS, indicating that
its adoption was not contingent on GEF support.365
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The domestic management of AMPs was also directly influenced by epistemic
community advocacy. In the Sian Ka’an area, CONANP and SEMARNAT replaced the
1993 management plan with a plan designed with assistance from civil society
organizations such as Los Amigos and TNC. Under the new plan, monitoring and
protection of the Biosphere Reserve was integrated with management of the Reefs of
Sian Ka’an and the Área de Uaymil, and incorporated into what is currently referred to as
the “Sian Ka’an Complex,” with over 652,000 hectares, or approximately half of the total
protected area coverage in Quintana Roo.366 In addition, the agencies entered into
sponsorship agreements with UNESCO and international MNCs, such as Gillette, to
purchase sections of coastal wetlands in Sian Ka’an for conservation, monitoring these
areas through joint efforts with actors in the epistemic community, namely TNC and Los
Amigos.367
Similarly at Xcalak, epistemic community members WWF-México, TNC and
URI-CRC successfully drafted a federally accepted management plan, with the approval
of CONANP and SEMARNAT for the newly created AMP; this plan included limitations
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on the quantity of divers (recreational or otherwise) based on ecosystem loading capacity,
prohibitions on the use of SCUBA and other types of augmenting fishing equipment, and
the creation of zones of no-capture and restricted access for registered cooperatives.368
Not all recommendations were incorporated into the policies of the environmental
agencies, however. At the time of writing, the adoption of additional federal protected
areas status at sites recommended by the epistemic community, such as Majahual, were
not carried out. CONANP members were concerned that the adoption of AMP status in
these areas, though preferred by Los Amigos, was not justified, due the environmental
health of the area.
This suggests a further split in the overall consensus within the epistemic
community, as both agencies are prominent members of the network. Nevertheless, this
difference was not an observed source of tension within the network, as it was not
mentioned outside of one interview with CONANP staff, and the reason given for
refusing protected areas status was based on a pragmatic consideration of the costs of
managing marginally important zones.
There are zones where, even if there are corals, the population density is
very low. There’s just pure rock, sand, seagrass, and one little coral here,
another over there, one here, and we can’t call that the reef, nor can we
call it a coral community… And then, when a place is already very
altered… it doesn’t merit having a category of protection that requires
money, personnel, equipment… In other words, it’s so deteriorated that
it’s not worth the trouble to give it a special category of protection.369
368

CONANP, 2001, Programa de Manejo: Parque Nacional Arrecifes de Xcalak,
México (CONANP), passim, especially section 10, treating the administrative rules of
the AMP, pg. 86 - 107.
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Patricia Santos, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Multisectoral Governance of Fisheries
The practices and policy of fisheries management was also directly influenced by
the epistemic community. After the project to monitor spawning sites concluded in 2003,
the epistemic community identified additional sites in Mexico, increasing the recognized
number from 27 to 39.370 In these sites, SAGARPA and CONAPESCA adopted policies
requiring permits for fishing cooperatives, establishing seasonal allowances, and limiting
the use of fishing boats to those with small outboard motors.371 CONANP also
coordinated with CONAPESCA to manage spawning sites, classifying them as protected
areas under environmental law, and banning commercial fishing in them in the interest of
maintaining ecosystem health.372
Fishing cooperative practices demonstrated some epistemic community influence
as well. Throughout the coast, there were some exemplary cases of the reform of fishing
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A. Medina-Quej et al, 2002, La Agregación del Mero Epinephelus Striatus en “El
Blanquizal” en la Costa Sur de Quintana Roo, México (ECOSUR); Álvaro Hernández,
autor interviews conducted May 15, 2008; José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, autor
interviews conducted between 12 and 15 May, 2008. Will Heyman et al, Informe Final
de la Consultoría: Sitios de las agregaciones reproductivas de peces en la zona del
SAM: Recomendaciones para su monitoreo y manejo, pg. V. Reports generated by
epistemic community members indicate that spawning aggregation sites may have
existed in the northern third of the state, but have long been collapsed due to
overexploitation. See Heyman et al, Informe Final, pg. 4.
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Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal,
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CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo: Reserva de la Biósfera Sian
Ka’an, Reserva de la Biósfera Arrecifes de Sian Ka’an y Área de Protección Flora y
Fauna Uaymil, (Mexico, DF: CONANP).
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practices, such as at Xcalak. After the involvement of epistemic community
organizations in the constitution of the XCC, the fishing community established no-take
zones, limited appropriate extractive techniques to low-impact methods, and agreed to
protect overall health in the region, all without additional government regulation.373 At
Punta Allen, the cooperatives adopted a voluntary ban on the use of SCUBA equipment
for lobster harvesting.374
At a broader level, in a 2006 CONAPESCA survey of fishing cooperatives,
26.7% were identified as carrying out a high level of sustainable management and
extraction, including using low-impact fishing techniques and regulated harvesting; 40%
carried out moderate action, but stopped short of specifically targeted conservation of
stocks whereas 33% carried out no discernible management effort.375

Multisectoral Resistance to Hotel Management and Coastal Land Use Reform in
Quintana Roo
While the community had some success in informing protected areas and fisheries
management, specific reforms aimed at restricting coastal tourism and development,
through either regulatory policy or practice, failed to take place. Although federal policy
eventually led to significant restriction on coastal construction, this was due to advocacy
373

Beth R. Chung, 1999. “A Community Strategy for Coastal Zone Management of
Xcalak, Mexico,” pg. 5
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SAM/FMAM/CCAD, 2004, Informe de Revisión de Medio Término 9 al 21 de
marzo, pg. 18.
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Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal, pg. 52.
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efforts outside the reef epistemic community. Despite the efforts of the epistemic
community, beachfront construction remained the preferred model of coastal construction
by hoteliers, who remained unconvinced by economic arguments for ecological
conservation. In fact, epistemic community respondents noted that economic arguments
for limited coastal development would be unlikely to convince hotel managers, whose
economic calculations fundamentally diverged from the sustainable management
preferences of the epistemic community:
Traditionally, in the case of tourism in coastal development in Mexico, the
expectation of a return on investment among the major hotel developers, is
a return in six, seven, eight years. In sustainable development, the plan for
a return on investment of resources and benefits, we’re talking about the
long-term, possibly 15 years. To the way of thinking of the investor, it’s a
notable difference.376
In addition, attempts to encourage hoteliers to adopt measures to provide
municipal services for the spontaneously emerging “support communities,” and to place a
higher value on maintaining ecological integrity failed to take hold:
The mangrove bothers them, because it disturbs the hotel surroundings, or
it bothers them because of the mosquitoes. The hotels want to be on the
beach. They don’t want to be inland. And so – and they want to invest as
little as possible – and so, the easiest thing to do, is fill the mangrove.377
[Hoteliers] are supposed to come with a treatment plan and location for
services, for the hotel as well as for communities that form, the support
communities. But right now, the tourist developers are only thinking
about investing in their own hotel.378
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Alfredo Arrellano Guillermo, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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José Juan Domínguez Calderón, author interviews conducted Jan 24, 2008. Taken
187

State agencies did maintain that this development in Majahual and other
underdeveloped rural areas was compatible with environmentally friendly behavior.
Asserting that Majahual and southern coastal zones would be developed through a
different model of development, encouraging higher end customers for less intensive
development, officials at SEDETUR were assuring that development plans would be
minimally environmentally destructive:
Majahual has the concept of low impact development… Sure, there are
pressures on the part of hotel chains, as far as I know in this case from
Spain, that want to get permits to construct hotels of 1,000 or 2,000 rooms
in a place where the ecosystem cannot support this stress. But then, it
hasn’t had that explosive development [as in Cancún], precisely because
the POETs haven’t allowed it, and the government of the state and the
federation have maintained that the environment be protected.379
However, this perspective contrasted with the view of the epistemic communities
that, although sustainable coastal development was possible, current and planned
development systematically failed to incorporate ecological concerns into design. As a
result, scientists within the network continued to express their disapproval of
development in the southern third of the state.
But that area of Majahual, as I’m saying, is an area of pure mangrove.
Well, where there would be mangroves, that are now filled and cut, filled
with stone. And who cared? Who said anything? Sure, the scientists, but
so what? They had said that the zone was very fragile, that there should
be a zoning plan for minimal growth, low-impact ecotourism... In front of
Majahual is the biggest reef in Mexico, the Mesoamerican reef. Part of

from transcript of audiocassette recording. Translated from Spanish.
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David Martínez. Author interviews conducted April 29, 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
188

the Mesoamerican reef. But it’s not that [the hoteliers] don’t know, it’s
that they don’t care.380
As of the time of writing, there was no systematic data on compliance within
hotels on restrictions on loading capacity of reefs. CONANP managers did produce
regulations, including establishing sanctions, limiting the amount of recreational divers in
reef environments within AMPs, and also established monitoring patrols.381 However,
the cost of comprehensive marine monitoring is extremely costly, in time and resources,
and so the federal government has been unable to establish independent verification of
compliance with these guidelines. Finally, the recommendations to establish a wider
zone of restriction to replace the ZFMT have to date, not been enacted. Overall,
epistemic community influence has been mixed.

A Brief Look at Local Activism in Coastal Regulation
What success occurred in reforming coastal hotel development emerged not from
the epistemic community, but from the efforts of the national network in Mexico, which
lobbied the federal government to restrict future construction in the interest of protecting
the environment. In 2003, SEMARNAT adopted a federal norm titled NOM-022SEMARNAT-2003, following the publication of studies conducted by researchers in the
mangrove advocacy network on the importance of mangrove swamps to coastal
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Adriana Yoloxóchitl Olivera Gómez, author interviews conducted March 2008.
Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording. Translated from Spanish.
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CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo: Reserva de la Biósfera Sian
Ka’an
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ecosystems. NOM-022 established federal regulations such as barring construction
within 100m of mangrove zones, except where necessary to restore the function of
degraded mangrove zones and maintain the flow of fresh water to the open ocean from
inland sources.382 This policy had clear, positive implications for the management goals
of the epistemic community, by restricting legitimate coastal construction.
Over the next four years, this policy became the site of political contestation. In
2003, Minister Lichtinger was replaced by Minister Luege under Fox’s PAN
administration. After a spirited national campaign by neocorporatist hotelier associations
and state governors, including (from Quintana Roo) ACLUVAC, APIR, Grupo Quintana
Roo, and then governor Hendricks Díaz, Minister Luege added Section 4.43 to NOM022, stating that coastal construction and mangrove removal would be permitted,
provided developers paid certain “compensation measures,” generally measured as a onetime fine of $1,000 per hectare cleared, and received permission from the state
government.383
As the $1,000 fine was substantially less than the potential revenue stream per
hectare of hotels, and since littoral states such as Quintana Roo received a substantial part
of income from tourism, Section 4.43 functioned to remove effective sanctions from
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See NOM-022-SEMARNAT-2003, particularly section 4.
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NOM-022-SEMARNAT-2003, Section 4.43, allowing construction “as long as, in
the preliminary report or in the event of an environmental impact, compensation
measures are established to benefit the wetlands, and the corresponding authorization to
change the land use designation is obtained.” Translated from Spanish.
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coastal construction and mangrove clearing.384 Federal protection was later restored in
2007 after a national campaign from the mangrove TAN led to congressional approval of
federal Article 60 TER of the LGVS, prohibiting:
The removal, filling, transplant, cutting, or any work or activity that
affects the integrity of the hydrological flow of the mangrove; of the
ecosystem and its zone of influence; of its natural productivity; of the
natural loading capacity of the ecosystem for touristic projects; of the
zones of shelter, reproduction, refuge, feeding and fish fry.385
In Quintana Roo, this resulted in a halt of planned and current development and
construction throughout the state.386 Unsurprisingly, hotelier associations and governors
once again began a national campaign to repeal federal protection of mangrove zones. In
2007, Quintana Roo’s governor Felix González Canto led an association of 16 governors
from Baja California and other littoral states, requesting that Calderón’s administration
overturn Article 60 TER. The hoteliers supported this effort, arguing that “the people in

384

Exequiel Ezcurra, author interview conducted May 2009. Taken from handwritten
notes of phone interview. Figure also confirmed in a press release by PRONATURA, a
civil society organization in Baja California. Figures available online at:
http://www.pronatura-noroeste.org/manglaresdelgolfodecalifornia.php
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Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2008, Ley General de la Vida Silvestre (DOF
October 14, 2008), Article 60 TER. See also “Manglares, refugio de especies
comerciales importantes” in La Jornada, Monday 25 February, 2008; “Increpan
regidores del Verde Ecologista a García Pliego” in Novedades, Friday 2 February,
2007.
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Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008. Eloy Sosa, author
interviews conducted February 2008. El “Respaldo de SCJN a humedales será
fundamental para Q. Roo,” Periódico de Quintana Roo, Wednesday, 19 August 2009.
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the state aren’t going to live by eating mangrove,”387and that Article 60 placed an
excessive financial burden on the development potential of coastal states.388
[One] of the political processes that is trying deliberately to counter
[LGVS Article 60 TER] is the state government… It’s not just me saying
that, the press is saying that. The press has realized that there is a group of
governors that is intending, let’s say, to bend this law, or change this law,
and among them is the very same governor [of Quintana Roo].389
…[Now] there is the law of flora and wildlife, the [LGVS]. This law
impedes the destruction of mangroves by the hotels. And the powerful
businessmen are exerting pressure on the local government to give them
permits to destroy the mangrove. So, there is a very direct conflict that
SEMARNAT, and also PROFEPA, are confronting in this case.390
Yet, even though to date this policy advocacy has not resulted in a change of
Article 60 TER, media reports, research and interviews indicate that hoteliers often find
other ways to avoid the application of the law. For example, after hurricane Dean struck
the Yucatán peninsula in 2007, large areas of coastal mangrove were destroyed along the
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Quote taken from APIR president Miguel Ángel Lemus. Cited in “Promueven
industriales veto a reformas en ley de vida silvestre, denuncian ONG,” La Jornada,
Wednesday, 24 February, 2007. Translated from Spanish. In addition, various
accounts of hotelier mobilization and state support presented in interviews with
epistemic community members, and in the following: “Defienden por internet el
recurso natural,” Novedades Quintana Roo, Wednesday, 6 February 2008; Centro de
Estudios Jurídicos y Ambientales [CEJA], 2007, “Van empresarios contra manglares de
QR,” Noticias Ambientales. Retrieved online August 2009 from
http://www.ceja.org.mx/noticia.php?id_article=929.
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“Increpan regidores del Verde Ecologista a García Pliego” in Novedades, Friday 2
February, 2007. Also taken from interviews with epistemic community members
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Eloy Sosa, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from digital voice
recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Enrique Galvéz, autor interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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coast of Quintana Roo, including at Majahual. By effectively clearing the mangrove,
hurricane Dean opened the way for coastal construction, and by April of 2008,
infrastructure including road paving and hotels were taking place, disrupting the
hydrological flow of fresh water from mangrove zones.391 Hoteliers would also simply
resort to corruption where necessary.

Conclusion
Again, the results support one hypothesis, undermine another, and are
inconclusive in the third. Table 3.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes
summarizes the predicted and observed relationships between the independent variables:
economic framing, consensus and socialization, and the dependent variable: influence.
As the data indicate, socialization is present in every campaign in which the
epistemic community exercised influence. This supports the hypothesis H3:
Socialization improves the influence of epistemic communities. Notably, there was one
instance in which the presence of socialization did not result in network influence,
notably in the campaign to persuade hoteliers. This issue is addressed in more detail
below.
As described above, CONANP had staffers participating as epistemic community
members, gathering information and reports as part of a research network and sharing
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Observed through firsthand observation of Majahual during April 2008, in
conjunction with interviews with members of SCPP Andrés Quintana Roo, and Abril
Navarro.
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findings with civil society researchers including Los Amigos, WWF-México, TNC and
others. Similarly, CONAPESCA members and fishing cooperative members were also
comprehensively socialized with the epistemic community. The fishing management
workshops, for example, incorporated knowledge and capacity building exercises
between epistemic community members, fishing policymakers in the federal government,
and managers from various cooperatives. Like CONANP, CONAPESCA members
conducted joint studies of reef environmental processes, although targeted more
specifically at fish conservation rather than ecological management per se. Although the
justifications of management were driven by economic reasons, socialization
corresponded with the willingness of managers to adopt sustainable practices and policy.
This supports arguments that socialization leads to a willingness of policymakers to
accept the claims of the scientists and act accordingly.
The importance of socialization in promoting learning and norm sharing among
actors is challenged by the fact that hoteliers did not adopt the arguments of the epistemic
community. Socialization developed in the MARTI workshops and the jointly designed
Normas Prácticas diagnostics produced with Los Amigos did not result in changes in
behavior and understandings in private stakeholders that satisfied the ecological
management preferences of the epistemic community. The models constructed by the
epistemic community simply could not compete with the interests of resource and benefit
extraction adopted by hoteliers.
This suggests two characteristics of the impact of socialization on network
advocacy. First, an argument that socialization leads to epistemic community influence
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has to be a probabilistic argument, not a deterministic one. Second, socialization, while
necessary, is not a sufficient causal variable.
Again, in evaluating hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the influence
of transnational advocacy networks, the data suggest that scientific consensus, even if
shared by a publicly recognized network of experts, is insufficient to lead to a change in
behavior. While present in the campaigns in which the epistemic community exercised
influence, it was not enough to lead to policy support among the state government of
Quintana Roo, SEDETUR, or the hotelier associations. At the same time, since every
campaign evinced knowledge consensus (no variation on the independent variable), it is
not clear if consensus is necessary from this case, or from the previous chapter.
Finally, there is a lack of support for the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy
networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development
in order to influence LDC governments. While economic framing was present in
successful campaigns, namely the campaigns to reform fishing management from
governmental agencies in SAGARPA and CONAPESCA, it was also present in the failed
campaigns to influence hoteliers and the state government of Quintana Roo.
On one hand, economic arguments were cited by epistemic community
respondents as crucial in influencing fishermen in cooperatives to adopt changes to their
fishing practices.
And here, fortunately, in some areas that we have been able to
demonstrate, what the fishermen have been able to see is that protected
areas have served to protect their interests. There haven’t been any more
permits given out, for people to fish. And so, AMPs have become like
exclusive areas, and they see this as an advantage… “I recognize what
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you’re telling me, that we’re on a good path, and that now we have some
kind of sustainability with lobster fishing, and other species besides.”392
Economic arguments similarly were cited by CONAPESCA as relevant to
biodiversity management, as environmental protection was necessary to continue the
sustainable extraction of economic benefits from the natural resources.
The committee for inspection and state monitoring, which comes from the
fishing delegation of SAGARPA was created to coordinate with other
authorities, like the Army, PROFEPA, SEMARNAT, the Navy, for
improvement of our inspection and monitoring methods. Because
otherwise, by tomorrow, bit by bit, we won’t have anything left to sell.393
Similarly, CONAPESCA respondents registered support for increased protection
of mangrove and coastal zones under Article 60 TER, based on its contribution to
commercial fish reproduction, and by implication, economic sustainability among coastal
communities:
It’s a very good law. It’s a very good form of conservation because the
mangrove, besides helping us by forming dunes and impeding the direct
impact of the tide on the coast, well, it’s a very important area of fish
reproduction, for lobster larvae, right?394
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Alfredo Arellano Guillermo, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15
May, 2008. Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
394

José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15
May, 2008. Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
See also SAM/FMAM/CCAD, 2004, Informe de Revisión de Medio Término 9 al 21 de
marzo, pg. 6.
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However, economic arguments were ineffectual in persuading hoteliers to adopt
internal regulations, or comply with existing policy, on coastal development, and
unnecessary in influencing reform in CONANP or SEMARNAT.
CONANP adopted the PMS monitoring strategy and incorporated findings and
parameters of the environmental problem as espoused by the network of scientists. In
addition, CONANP staff members shared the ecological perspective of the civil society
actors within the epistemic community. In interviews, staffers of CONAP argued, like
the epistemic community, that the Mesoamerican reef region functioned as an integrated
ecosystem, rather than as a collection of discrete reef environments:
These aren’t the tiny little isolated communities like in other parts of the
world, right? And the SAM project, to me, it seems like it fulfilled a
primary attempt to understand the area, recognize how valuable this
barrier reef is at the environmental level and to classify it... There are
marine currents that come like so, from south to north, that implicate all
the richness and biodiversity in this zone.395
However, as the following chapter will make clear, knowledge consensus based
on scientific research principles, which is the distinguishing characteristic of epistemic
communities, remains an integral variable in the advocacy efforts of scientific networks.
Consequently, the following chapter illustrates a case of scientific advocacy by a
network that lacked a shared knowledge consensus. This network attempted to influence
terrestrial biodiversity management in the Yucatán peninsula relevant to the CBD did so
in part through a process of socialization and network-building with federal
policymakers. While epistemic community members themselves in this chapter and
395

Patricia Santos, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish.
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Chapter 2 suggested that economic arguments may be necessary to communicate with
policymakers, the data suggest that strategic framing has no independent impact on
changing patterns of behavior by state or civil society environmental managers.
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Table 3.1: List of Reef Policy Makers

CONANP

JURISDICTION
EST. THROUGH
Federal supremacy
over biodiversity;
Constitution; various
laws on natural
resources
SEMARNAT
agency

SAGARPA

1958 Law of
Ministries
and Departments

CONAPESCA

SAGARPA agency

Environmental monitoring. Defines
and regulates marine protected area
(AMPs).
Manages AMPs. Environmental
monitoring.
Regulates fisheries activities.
Certifies
permits granted to fishing
cooperatives
in Quintana Roo
Regulates and monitors fishing
activity
in Quintana Roo.

SEDUMA/ State Government
of Quintana Roo

State control over
natural resources

Administration of POETs / land
zoning management

AGENCY/MANAGER

SEMARNAT

Quintanarroense Cooperatives

Agency of the state
government
De facto control over
fishing practices and
excursions

Hotelier Associations

De facto control over
tourist activity

SEDETUR
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REGULATES

Promotion of tourist development
Internal control over fishing
practices, use of technology, possible
contribution to monitoring
Internal control over tourist
excursions, recreational practices, and
hotel/infrastrcture construction

Table 3.2: Partial List of Epistemic Community Members

ORGANIZATION

INDIVIDUALS

FUNCTIONS

SCIENCE
TRAINING

Los Amigos de Sian
Ka’an

Gonzalo
Merediz
Alonso

Protected areas monitoring.
Habitat health evaluation.

Marine
Biology

Protected areas monitoring.
Habitat health evaluation.
Designing monitoring
methodology

Marine
Biology

Albert
Franquesa
UNU-INWEH

The Nature Conservancy

CONANP

URI-CRC

ECOSUR
WWF-México

Peter Sale
Juan Bezaury
Creel
(formerly of
Los Amigos)

Ecology

Will Heyman

AMP monitoring

Land use
planning
Marine
Sciences

Alfredo
Arellano
Guillermo
Rosa Loreto
Viruel
(formerly of
Los Amigos)

Population monitoring. Habitat
health evaluation. National Reef
Committee coordinator

Marine
biology

Protected areas monitoring,
Puerto Morelos AMP
management

Marine
ecology

Juan
Domínguez
Calderón

Protected areas monitoring

Marine
biology

Patricia Santos

Population monitoring (fauna).
Flora taxonomy. Habitat health
evaluation.

Protected areas monitoring

Pamela
Rubinoff

Monitoring methodology

Eloy Sosa

Reef ecology monitoring

Felipe Serrano

Reef ecology monitoring

Laura Carrillo
Melanie
McField
Álvaro
Hernández Gil

Reef ecology monitoring
Threat analysis, monitoring
methdology
Habitat and marine fauna
monitoring
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Coastal
manageme
nt
Marine
ecology
Marine
ecology
Marine
ecology
Conservati
on ecology
Ecology

Table 3.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in Mesoamerican Reef
Advocacy
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Figure 3.1: Map of WWF Defined Ecoregion
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Figure 3.2: Graph of Declining Populations
Volume of Fisheries Production in Lobster (Langosta), Shrimp (Camarón) and
Conch (Caracol): 1978-2006.
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Volumen de captura (kg) /Langostay Tiburón
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Erosion on Hotel Construction

The title of the boxes are, clockwise from top left:
1. Before the wall (buffering wall to protect building from tides and storms)
2. Establishment of a wall
3. After 10 or more years (note depiction of building, formerly on hill, now at the
bottom of the ocean
4. After 2 or more years (note depiction of failing structural integrity)
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Figure 3.4: Diagram of Mesoamerican Reef Epistemic Community Links
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CHAPTER 4
MEXICO AND BIODIVERSITY MANGEMENT IN THE MESOAMERICAN
BIOLOGICAL CORRIDOR

Introduction
The previous two cases demonstrated that transnational epistemic communities
can successfully contribute to biodiversity governance in developing countries. In
Jamaica and Mexico, national governments adopted biodiversity management projects
after epistemic communities exposed an emerging crisis to internationally and regionally
important biodiversity. Later, these communities contributed to the creation of policy
and behavior by key managers, influencing including land use designations, monitoring
and project compliance efforts. Subsequently, natural resource policymakers and
managers learned from epistemic community claims, adopting the information, theories,
and policy conclusions drawn by scientists.
The previous two chapters strongly support the hypothesis H3: socialization
increases the influence of transnational advocacy networks. Socialization, or the
participation of epistemic communities and target audiences in knowledge exchange
processes, enabled epistemic communities to convince managers to take environmentally
friendly action for biodiversity management. These processes included processes
transnational information-generation forums, project development workshops and joint
training exercises relevant to the projects studied. When socialization was absent,
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epistemic communities were unable to advance environmental learning among managers,
even if network members shared an internal consensus.
However, while the previous two chapters indicate that knowledge consensus is
not sufficient to lead to network influence, it is not clear if consensus is necessary, due to
the fact that there has been no variation on this independent variable. In order to have a
clearer test of hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks must frame environmental
policy as relevant to national economic development in order to influence LDC
governments, this chapter process traces the advocacy campaigns of a transnational
network concerned about biodiversity governance in the southeastern states of Mexico.
This case is distinguished from the previous two, as this network did not generate an
intersubjective knowledge consensus on the causal dimensions of the problem.
What this chapter found is that consensus is, in fact, necessary (but insufficient)
for network influence. The network here generated measurable socialization with
targeted policymaker agencies in the Mexican federal government, but failed to generate
influence on some of the primary goals of policy advocacy. This suggests that
knowledge networks who do not have an unquestioned scientific authority on their side
are operating at a cognitive disadvantage in influencing policymaking; socialization is
necessary, but as this chapter indicates, insufficient.
This chapter also returns to testing the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy
networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development
in order to influence LDC governments. As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, economic
arguments have been ineffectual in independently persuading target audiences to change
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behavior. In this case as well, the transnational advocacy network active in this case was
unable to convert economic arguments into policy, as framing did not lead to network
influence. This supports the argument that the use of economic language cannot persuade
managers that long-term conservation efforts are a reasonable alternative to the shortterm developmental gains from continuing contemporary patterns of natural resource
exploitation. The remainder of the chapter explains how issue-framing, socialization and
knowledge consensus affected the ability of epistemic communities to influence
policymaking and terrestrial biodiversity management in Mexico. Where documents and
interviews were originally in Spanish, I have provided my own translation of the material
throughout.

Overview of Threats to the Mesoamerican Corridor
As in the previous two cases, this chapter involves TAN advocacy for biodiversity
management through a project funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) as
relevant to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This project, titled the
Proyecto para la Consalidación del Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México
(Project for the Consolidation of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor – Mexico, or
CBMMx Project), was carried out in the peninsular states of Campeche, Yucatán and
Quintana Roo, as well as in Chiapas (see Figure 1.3).
This Mesoamerican region, part of a transboundary zone connecting seven
Central American countries and the southern states of Mexico, is considered to be an
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internationally important site of endemism and biodiversity.396 The Mexican section is
comprised largely of a karst limestone base, with low lying wetlands in Quintana Roo,
dry forests in Campeche, rainforests in Yucatán and temperate mesophile forests in
Chiapas.397 Unique climatological and geomorphological features of this region,
including frequent hurricanes, thin subsoil, an absence of aboveground rivers, and
millennia of evolution under these circumstances have contributed to the exceptional
biodiversity characterizing the area.398
Studies of the peninsula have found thousands of different species of plants and
hundreds of mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians in the region, with as many as 900
different plant species and 200 animal species per hectare, many of them endemic.399
This biodiversity is subject to human pressure from various sources, as local
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communities, oil exploration and agro-industry extract benefits from the exploitation of
natural resources in the region.

Agriculture and Land Conversion
Agricultural activity, whether slash-and-burn agricultural cultivation among
peasant and indigenous populations, mechanized and commercial agro-industry, or cattlefarming, typically requires broad land conversion of pristine forest to monoculture crops,
such as the popularly consumed chili peppers. Land clearance also further allows easier
access for invasive species, including fast-growth plants such as guarumbo.400 Cattlefarming is particularly harmful, as the thin topsoil and poor vegetative conditions in the
Yucatán peninsula require an intensive use of resources, such as fertilizer, to create
conditions propitious to cattle.401 Moreover, cattle-farming has had a high level of
support from the federal government, which has, through the 1990s, provided subsidies to
cattle ranchers for the expansion of farms throughout the Yucatán. Agro-industry and
subsistence agriculture exacerbate problems associated with land clearance when
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practitioners introduce chemical pesticides and biocides, which accumulate as toxins in
terrestrial and subterraneous aquatic ecosystems.402
Land conversion and loss of forests for agriculture and logging also contribute to
regional forest fires. Degraded and poorly managed forests tend to accumulate
flammable debris, including discarded twigs and shrubbery, which exacerbates the
propensity of the spread of fires, in turn worsened by the prevalence of slash-and-burn
production among rural populations.403 Since 2005, the Mesoamerican states of Quintana
Roo, Chiapas and Oaxaca have been three of the top 19 states in the country affected by
forest fires.404

Logging
Unsustainable logging for firewood and timber production also contributes to
biodiversity loss. Timber production tends to be concentrated on a few commercially
viable species, such as mahogany and cedar, which are produced for the tourist market
and subsequently overharvested. By depleting these species, rural populations can
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degrade the regenerative capacity of the limestone jungle.405 Moreover, the demand for
these timber products creates incentives for rural populations to develop tree plantations
in jungle areas, which has caused problems due to the introduction of invasives in
sensitive ecosystems.406 Hunting for subsistence consumption or for sport among
different sectors of the peninsular population may also become problematic if
unregulated, particularly when endangered species are targeted.

Industrial Development
However, there are also significant industrial sources of environmental
degradation as well. The construction of roads and high-speed throughways in jungle
areas causes environmental stress by fragmenting ecosystems and interrupting migratory
patterns of land-based fauna.407 Incidental pollution from vehicle emissions negatively
affects the immediate environment of sensitive flora by contributing to the accumulation
of toxins in plants. Oil spills and other resultant pollution from petroleum extraction are
405
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significant threats to environmental integrity. Oil exploration takes place throughout the
states in Mesoamerica, namely Tabasco, Campeche, Veracruz, creating problems when
the toxic material is spilled, or when heavy machinery emits incidental air pollution.408

Tensions in National Economic Development
Again, there are tensions in conceptualizing national economic development
insofar as some of the goals of ‘national development’ conflict with the economic
wellbeing and natural resource management goals of marginalized populations. Oil
exploration, one of the most important national productive sectors, may contribute to
additional environmental and social problems. The disruption caused by mining and
drilling can impel the displacement of rural communities, who then migrate and
contribute to more extensive patterns of resource use and environmental degradation.409
In addition, subsidized cattle-farming, while ostensibly aimed at improving the
livelihoods of agrarian populations in the Yucatán, fractures ecosystems by converting
large areas to monocultural pasturelands, and economically displaces traditional and
subsistence agricultural practices.410
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Yet, environmental management problems are generally blamed on the activities
of low-income and rural communities in the Yucatán peninsula and in Chiapas.
Population growth is one of the drivers of environmental degradation, and in the
peninsula, the tourist center of Cancún and the Riviera Maya is a significant attraction for
in-land migrants. In the municipality of Felipe Carrillo Puerto alone, in-land migration of
low skilled workers seeking employment in the tourism center of Cancún and the Riviera
Maya has contributed to a tenfold population increase between 1970 and 2000.411
However, assigning responsibility for environmental degradation to the activities of
marginalized populations obscures the contribution of state-sponsored activities and
institutions to those same activities.

Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management
Federal Policymakers
As in the previous cases, the constellation of potential sources of anthropogenic
environmental degradation implicates a variety of federal and state institutions in the
process of biodiversity management. The following section details the various
governmental agencies involved in natural resource management pursuant to the
implementation of biological corridors in southeastern Mexico (see Table 4.1: List of
Policy Makers).
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CONABIO: Implementing Agency of the CBMMx
One of the primary agencies in the context of this project, and one targeted in
project campaigns, is the Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la
Biodiversidad (National Commission for the Study and Use of Biodiversity or
CONABIO), an intersectorial commission created under the federal government in 1993
with the overarching mandate of coordinating biodiversity management.412 CONABIO
carries out activities such as conducting inventories of national biodiversity stocks and
assessments of the impact of human activity on natural resources, and since 1997 has
been delegated as the agency responsible for designing the National Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan, required by states as signatories to the CBD.413 When the CBMMx was
launched, CONABIO was the agency assigned responsibility for disbursing funds for
local projects and activities in the areas identified as part of the constituent corridors.414
Indeed, as described later, CONABIO was a gatekeeper agency in determining which
zones would be included as areas covered by the CBMMx Project, and hence subject to
GEF funds. Later, after the project was created, administrative agencies established
specifically for the CBMMx were placed under CONABIO’s authority.
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SEMARNAT, CONAFOR, SAGARPA
In addition to CONABIO, individual federal agencies participating in natural
resource management include SEMARNAT, the Comisión Nacional Forestal (National
Forestry Commission, or CONAFOR) and SAGARPA. SEMARNAT conducts landzoning policies under programs such as Unidades para el Manejo Ambiental de la Vida
Silvestre (Wildlife Conservation Management Units or UMAs). When UMAs are created
and registered, SEMARNAT is responsible for determining what kind of resource
consumption is appropriate, whether hunting, preservation or agriculture, and governing
the rates of resource consumption available to incident populations.415 As described in
Chapter 3, SEMARNAT’s executive agency in CONANP monitors environmental
processes in protected areas, including in those near to corridor zones.416 SAGARPA
provides federal resources, such as funds, subsidies and development permits to states

415

Fuentes Rossi Vida, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from
handwritten notes. Simbiosis, 2006, Memorias: 1er Seminario de Unidades de Manejo
para la Conservación de la Vida Silvestre en el Sureste de México (Chetumal, Q. Roo:
Simbiosis), pp. 15 – 16. The article goes on to indicate that federal authority through
SEMARNAT is located in a variety of legislative articles, including several articles in
the LGVS, articles 83 and 87 in the aforementioned LGEEPA, and NOM-059-ECOL2001.
416

Taken from ICRI National Committee Progress Report – Mexico, available at
www.icriforum.org/secretariat/word/CebuCPC_13.doc. Interviews with Alfredo
Arellano, March 2008. Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording. José Juan
Dominguez Calderón, author interviews conducted Jan 24, 2008. Taken from transcript
of audiocassette recording. CONANP, 2006, Qué es la CONANP? Retrieved January
2009 from http://www.conanp.gob.mx/qienes.html. Unidad Coordinadora del
Proyecto, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos
Turísticos (Belize City: SAM) pp. 32.
216

and municipalities for agriculturally based development.417 CONAFOR, created in 2001,
is an administrative agency of SEMARNAT and manages forestry resources, including
restoration and conservation activities in corridor zones.418 In particular, these agencies
were responsible for designing and adopting biodiversity conservation projects under the
rubric of the CBMMx.

CDI
Corridor management also impacts on indigenous rights issues, as the majority of
the population of corridor zones in Quintana Roo, Chiapas and Campeche is indigenous.
Most of the land within these zones are organized into ejidos, or communally owned
agrarian areas, wherein the low-income population is highly dependent on subsistence
and commercial agriculture.419 In these areas, the Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo
de los Pueblos Indígenas (National Commission for the Development of Indigenous
Peoples or CDI), a federal agency created in 2003, promotes economically oriented
projects and activities such as agricultural and artisanal practices.420 In addition, CDI
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assists in legal advocacy for indigenous communities, particularly in Chiapas, where
ejidos often lack official documentation and legal recognition of land ownership, placing
individuals in these areas at risk for land appropriation and dispossession.421 At the same
time, its role as a target audience for transnational advocacy is comparatively small, and
limited to the concomitant development of sustainable conservation projects in
marginalized communities.

State Governments in the CBMMx
Corridor management involves coordinating activity with state governments,
which provide technological training and subsidies to local communities for agricultural
production. Under the CBMMx, the governor’s office of each state was encouraged to
formally include references to biological corridors and biodiversity management in their
periodic State Development Plans, and to incorporate ecological concerns in the
management and zoning of POETs described in Chapter 3. In addition, state level
agencies in natural resource management, such as the Secretariat of Ecology in
Campeche, inform state governments of appropriate land use management. Some of the
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key agencies relevant to the management of biological corridors are listed in Table 4.1:
List of CBMMx Policymakers.

Mobilization around the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor
Emergence of the Network and the Corridor Concept
The concept of biological corridors, introduced to Mexico through the process of
transnational activism, was discussed in the United States as early as 1967 in studies
conducted by Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson. Wilson argued that the ability of species
of fauna and flora to thrive was a function of the size of their available habitat. Even
when species are placed on protected reserves, fauna and flora become more vulnerable
to threats, degradation, and predators if the allotted habitat is too small. Consequently,
when protected areas are established, care has to be taken to ensure that they do not
fragment ecosystems into tiny islands of biodiversity, but that they permit the free
movement of migratory species in “biological corridors.”422
In the 1980s, international wildlife specialists from the University of Florida and
the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) observed that ecosystem fragmentation was a
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common problem in protected areas management in Mesoamerica.423 Concerned about
the conservation of migratory species, the WCS headed a coalition of actors in 1989 to
advocate for more effective management under a project called the Paseo Pantera. The
Paseo Pantera, which relied on the biological corridor concepts described by Wilson and
contemporary researchers like Reed Noss of the University of Florida, advocated for the
creation of a regional biological corridor between Mexico and Panama. This proposed
corridor would theoretically allow comparatively safe passage for migratory wildlife
between established protected areas and preserves.424 Within Mexico, some of the areas
identified as important to biodiversity management included the Biosphere Reserve of
Calakmul, near the border of Guatemala.425
From 1989 through the early 1990s, the TAN advocacy efforts found fertile
political ground for a regional biodiversity project. In the buildup to the 1992 Rio UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the Central American states
and Mexico endorsed the idea of multilateral environmental management through a
variety of forums and conventions supported by international institutions including the
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Central American Commission for Development (CCAD).426 Although Mexico was not
an official member of CCAD, its transboundary forest zone with Guatemala, known as
the Selva Maya, made it essential to the goal of biodiversity management in the region.427
In 1993, at the first Wildlife Congress, CCAD and Mexico discussed ways in
which they could improve the regional management of biodiversity. Here, experts on
biological corridors, including Dr. Reed Noss who was attending as part of a legal
network addressing land use policy, recommended the adoption of biological corridors in
Mesoamerica.428 At this point, the proposals on biodiversity management advanced in
the Wildlife Congress made specific reference to including non-mammalian animal
species, including arthropods and insects, and plants, in ecosystem management, moving
it beyond the Paseo Pantera project, which was limited to charismatic megafauna.429
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In February 1996, the CCAD states and Mexico met at the second
intergovernmental Tuxtla Summit (Tuxtla II) in Costa Rica, and agreed that biological
corridors were the appropriate management mechanism for improving the regional
management of biodiversity. To concretize this goal, the member states issued a
statement called the “Mechanism of Dialogue and Concertation,” supporting the creation
of a Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano or
CBM).430 The Mexican component of this project was titled the Corredor Biológico
Mesoamericano – México (CBMMx). With the formal adoption of a plan of action on
the Mechanism of Dialogue in 1996, the government of Mexico began requesting
information and research on regional biodiversity from local and transnational experts on
biological corridors and on biodiversity in Mesoamerica.431

Organizing around Biological Corridors
These knowledge-building efforts fostered the expansion of the network
concerned with biological corridor management. Although civil society organizations
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were numerically important, the efforts of the federal agency CONABIO were
instrumental in constituting the network. CONABIO’s central role emerged in part from
the fact that the agency had historically been involved in supporting cooperative research
endeavors between itself and other environmentally oriented investigative institutions.
For example, CONABIO provided research funds to academic institutions including the
Intercultural Mayan University of Quintana Roo, the University of Quintana Roo
(UQROO), El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), and the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM) when their purposes overlapped with CONABIO’s
mandate.432
In addition, CONABIO recruited over 125 organizations to help the agency draft
the country’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (Estrategia Nacional de la
Biodiversidad or ENB).433 Among these 125 organizations included TAN members such
as: locally active groups Los Amigos de Sian Ka’an, Yum Balám A.C., and Econcienca
A.C.; regionally active organizations Pronatura A.C. and Simbiosis SA de C.V.; and
transnational environmental NGOs Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy
(TNC) and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). By the late 1990s, these groups
had become involved in conducting research on Mesoamerican biodiversity by among
432
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other things, promoting nutrition and health among rural communities in the Yucatán
through traditional medicine; monitoring pollution in sensitive ecosystems; and educating
local communities about the legal framework of natural resource exploitation.434 Finally,
civil society agencies developed inter-network links autonomous from CONABIO, by
sharing research on ecosystems and biodiversity in the Yucatán peninsula in the early
1990s.435
After the Mexican government agreed to endorse the proposed CBMMx in 1996,
CONABIO took further steps to constitute a transnational network of experts on
biodiversity management and biological corridors in Mesoamerica. In 1996 and 1998,
CONABIO held a series of CBMMx planning workshops in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas
and Cancún, Quintana Roo respectively, with ENGOs and institutions such as ECOSUR,
Pronatura, Los Amigos, and Conservation International, some of whom had already
established ties with CONABIO.436 In 1999, CONABIO held an additional workshop in
Cancún, with participants from domestic and international academic institutions
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including UQROO, UNAM ECOSUR, Oxford University, the University of Central
Florida, and the California Academy of Sciences.437
These planning workshops were oriented around organizing an appropriate
management framework for construction biological corridors in Mesoamerica. Among
the issues raised were the identification and siting of ecologically important areas, the
development of appropriate conservation projects, the choice of appropriate regulations,
and an appropriate monitoring strategy. As corridor zones were organized into ejidos, the
decision was made to use existing ejidos and communities as focal areas for project
implementation.438 At the 1999 Cancún workshop, CONABIO finalized the project
proposal for the CBMMx, and submitted it to the GEF.439
By this time, this informal network which consisted of federal agencies, civil
society actors, and academics, formed a TAN. Researchers shared a common policy
enterprise, namely the development of managed biological corridors in Mesoamerica,
based on their understanding of the important ecological relationships in the area, and
built on information exchanges and shared values developed during the the Paseo
437
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Pantera project.440 After 2000, other organizations joined in the production of policy
relevant knowledge, of which a partial list is given in Table 4.2: Partial List of TAN
Organizations. The importance of CONABIO in constituting the network is suggested
in Figure 4.6: Diagram of TAN Links, which indicates that the majority of connections
within the network were fostered through CONABIO’s work in collecting biodiversity
relevant information.
As in the SAM Project epistemic community described in Chapter 3, this network
was substantially larger than the table indicates. Los Amigos, a member organization of
both networks, has a total of 14 members. ECOSUR has an additional nine involved in
studying terrestrial ecology and agroforestry and Pronatura A.C. has six members in its
Yucatán branch who are involved in researching terrestrial biodiversity and conservation.
Again, the size of the network is larger than the 12 organizations listed below would
indicate, and a conservative estimate would put the figure at 70 to 120 members, slightly
larger than the range given for the SAM Project epistemic community. The CBMMx was
officially launched in 2000 with the signatures of the World Bank and the government of
Mexico.
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Maintaining the Network
This network was maintained by the same processes as occurred in the SAM
Project, in part because, as is indicated by comparing Table 4.2 and Table 3.2, there is
significant overlap between the organizations of the SAM epistemic community and the
CBMMx TAN. For example, SAM epistemic community organizations such as TNC,
UQROO, UNAM, WWF-México and Los Amigos participated in a series of biodiversity
management workshops, threat analysis exercises, and taxonomic studies, both nationally
and focused on the Mesoamerican region between 1992 and 2008, along with CBMMx
specific agencies, such as Pronatura.
The CBMMx network links were reinforced by institutions that were created by
CONABIO and the federal government under the project itself. As part of the
administration of the CBMMx, CONABIO established agencies in each state called
Consejos Consultivos Estatales, or CCEs, to identify areas critical for biodiversity
management, evaluate funding requests for conservation pilot projects, and to
recommend appropriate environmental regulations and zoning policies in corridor
zones.441 These CCEs are staffed by locally based participants from ENGO, academic,
and social sectors including Pronatura, Econciencia, and Intercultural Mayan University
of Quintana Roo.442 At the local level, the CCEs held several meetings a year, albeit
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described as irregular and infrequent by participants. At the national level, CONABIO
held annual meetings with federal agencies, as well as with TAN member organizations,
such as Los Amigos and WWF-México. 443 These officially mandated meetings thus
comprised one of the ways in which the networks maintained cohesion throughout the
project.

Measuring Consensus
Agreeing to Disagree: Dissensus with the Network
Although this transnational network, like the SAM and the Cockpit Country
epistemic communities, was constituted by a growing number of researchers who shared
a concern about biodiversity management in a specific locale, this TAN did not hold an
intersubjective consensus on the causal relationships relevant to environmental
management. In interviews and project reports, TAN members and scientific
assessments universally agreed that, despite the shared interest in promoting biological
corridors, there was no shared agreement on key indicators of biodiversity management
and the dimensions of the problem. Simply put, academic researchers disagreed about
what comprised important biodiversity and how to measure it:

Ildefonso Palermo, author interview conducted March 2008.
443

CBMMx, 2009, Donacion TF-02437I - Proyecto "Corredor Biológico
Mesoamericano - México" Plan De Adquisiciones Y Contrataciones (PAC)Contratos
Sujetos A Examen Posterior Del Banco (available online at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/28/000333
038_20080128025407/Rendered/PDF/422180PROP0SPA101091101071Ver1Final.pdf
).
228

A researcher from ECOSUR can have an opinion about the state of
biodiversity in some region, or state, and it’s not necessarily the same
opinion as that of a researcher from a national university. And this has
happened, it’s happening constantly.444
A series of evaluations conducted by a consultant agency during the process of
project administration clarified that this lack of consensus had been a constant feature of
the CBMMx, observed as early as 2000, and again in 2004:
…[T]here is no unified scientific agreement regarding the role of corridors
to combine genetic, demographic, and other forces threatening small
populations nor is there accord on the relative importance of these
threats.445
…[T]here is still no established baseline [of information]… there are
absolutely no shared criteria about the geographic demarcation definition,
there are no shared geophysical, nor political-administrative, nor
biological, nor ecological, nor land ownership criteria…446
Without a knowledge consensus, this network cannot be considered an epistemic
community. However, this case study offers variation from the previous two cases on the
independent variable consensus, which makes it a useful test of the hypotheses.
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Measuring Network Socialization with Managers
High Levels of Socialization with Federal Policymakers
Having identified a network and measuring the lack of consensus, this research
then went on to measure the degree of socialization between the TAN and managers in
the CBMMx Project. In this case, the data indicate a high degree of formalized
socialization between the network and managers.

Socialization with CONABIO, Federal, and State Agencies
The federal agency CONABIO, responsible for, among other things, identifying
and selecting project areas was comprehensively socialized with the transnational
network. This formal socialization extended as well to federal natural resource
management agencies, such as SAGARPA, SEMARNAT, and CONAFOR, as well as
state governmental agencies. This pattern developed because one of the conditions of the
project was the construction of extensive, formal links between civil society experts and
governmental policymakers at both levels of government.
To administer the CBMMx, the Mexican government established an agency under
CONABIO called the National Technical Unit (Unidad Técnico Nacional or UTN). The
UTN is responsible for drafting annual Plans of Action (POAs), assessing the status of
project implementation, making recommendations for sub-projects, issuing funds for the
purchase of equipment, and conducting progress reports for the World Bank.447
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Subordinate to the UTN are two regionally based organizations called Regional
Technical Units (Unidad Técnico Regional or UTR), organized such that one is
responsible for all the peninsular states of Quintana Roo, Campeche and Yucatán, and the
other for Chiapas. These UTRs work with the aforementioned CCEs, which in addition
to serving as sites of information exchange between TAN members, are staffed by
governmental representatives at all levels; municipal, state and federal. Finally, the local
generated policy recommendations are transmitted back to the central administrating
body, CONABIO, after being revised by a national supervisory agency called the
Consejo Consultivo Nacional or CCN (see Figure 4.1: Diagram of CBMMx
Agencies).448 The CCN, which provides federal oversight of the project, is constituted of
federal agencies from the secretariats of environment (SEMARNAT), agriculture
(SAGARPA), social development (SEDESOL), transport (SCT), agrarian reform (SRA),
education (SEP), health (SSA) and trade (SECOFI), all of which had formally pledged to
collaborate in environmental management.449
Through these myriad agencies, civil society organizations in the TAN are
socialized with policymakers in generating biodiversity-relevant knowledge at each level:
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at the federal level with CONABIO and the CCN; at the regional level with the UTRs;
and at the state level with the CCEs. Both the federally-oriented CCN and the state-based
CCEs have formally established seats for civil society actors to participate in project
design. On the CCN, members of the transnational organization WWF and faculty
members from UNAM and ECOSUR were officially recognized as participants. At the
regional level, the UTRs of Chiapas and the Peninsula held a series of knowledgegenerating workshops between 2005 and 2009 with locally recognized ENGOs and
academics to assist in designing locally relevant projects for biodiversity management.450
Moreover, the civil society was encouraged to participate in the goals of the
CBMMx, particularly in the design of biodiversity management projects. TAN
organizations such as Simbiosis, Econciencia and Pronatura, and others with locally
relevant knowledge could submit project requests in areas such as ecotourism, artisanal
development and sustainable agricultural projects in corridor zones. Occasionally, TAN
actors worked directly with federal policymakers rather than through the CBMMx. For
example, SEMARNAT, which sought to rationalize ecological zoning through the
implementation of UMAs, participated in information-gathering seminars with TAN
members from Simbiosis, Pronatura, UNAM, ECOSUR and UQROO, as well as with
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state environmental agencies.451 In 2005, Econciencia A.C. worked with CDI to create an
ecotourism project in the rural ejido of Kantemó, one of the areas identified as relevant to
biological corridor management.452 As a result, the TAN generated patterns of
socialization with policymakers at all levels in CONABIO, SEMARNAT, SAGARPA
and state government agencies. The following section then tests for the final independent
variable, issue-framing.

Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community
The Strategic Choice of Frames: Persuading Natural Resource Policymakers
In this case, the TAN accepted the idea that biodiversity conservation would have
to be portrayed as a nationally economic good in order to persuade policymakers in the
federal and state government to take conservationist action. To be clear, this perspective
was advanced by governmental representatives at the planning meetings on biological
corridor design during the 1990s.
When biological corridors were proposed as a management approach in the Paseo
Pantera initiative, it was assumed by ENGO proponents in the WCS coalition that this
would entail the creation of additional protected areas. In response, the participating
governments in the 1996 Tuxtla II Summit indicated concern with what they described as
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a preservationist approach to protected areas and biodiversity conservation. Specifically,
governments in the CCAD coalition asserted that protected areas organized under a
preservationist, or “no-access” regime would lose political support, as marginalized
communities and policymakers would fundamentally oppose any regulations preventing
them from economically exploiting natural resources.453 In Mexico, federal policymakers
argued that economic developmental pressures would make it very difficult to gain
governmental support for environmentally restrictive policies.
The problem is one of development. How can we provide for the people
that live in these communities? We can’t say to them, “don’t sow, don’t
cultivate, don’t work,” because then they’ll tell us, “ok, then give me
something to eat.” We can’t do that. But at the same time, we have to
correctly manage the resources.454
Members of the WCS coalition disagreed with the characterization of the Paseo
Pantera efforts as antithetical to development, if development was linked to the interests
of local, marginalized communities. At the 2001 Congress of the Mesoamerican Society
for Biology and Conservation, Jim Barborak of the WCS linked ecological conservation
and biological corridor management with the wellbeing of agrarian populations.
Sustainable, low-impact, environmentally friendly management could lead to sustained
commerce among marginalized and poor populations, while incorporating locally
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oriented projects into corridor management could strengthen land tenure claims,
particularly among indigenous societies.455 While the Mexican government agreed that
biodiversity management could take place by “increasing economic viability for the
diversified and ecologically sustainable Mayan rural economy,”456 there was still an
assertion that biological corridor management should incorporate productive sectors in
domestic and international markets to receive governmental support.457
The link between economic value and environmental management was made
official after the project was launched, when the CCAD commissioned an economic
valorization of biodiversity management in corridor zones, assessing prices to services
provided by functional ecosystems.458 This valorization argued the following: The
underlying causes of biodiversity loss lay in the failure of the market to recognize the
economic value of natural resources, a problem widespread among “… thousands of
individuals acting in a decentralized manner in diverse points.”459 The impacts of
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biodiversity loss were economic, consisting of the loss of goods such as potable water,
tourism, artisan goods, and ecosystem damage in commercially important zones.460
Finally, the appropriate policies relevant to the CBM and corridor management were
those that acted as a “catalyst for sustainable development,” both for local communities
and for national economic development.461
In Mexico, this was conceptualized by linking development to the interests of
politically important productive sectors. At the state level, biological corridor
management was to be incorporated into the state government’s sexennial development
plans, while at the federal level, biological corridors were to be incorporated into
prominent industries, namely tourism in the Riviera Maya and the foreign export
market.462 TAN members agreed, observing that environmental arguments were more
likely to be politically supported if they were presented as economically oriented:
I don’t need to tell you what the government thinks about NGOs. We
went to the corridor meetings, and we said, “You have to conserve the
forest, and do so legally and sustainably,” and they said, “Yeah, yeah, it’s
those treehugger NGOs again.” …And so we said, “We’re going to get
certified as a business.” And as a business, the next meeting we had with
the government was incredible. We arrived, and “Oh, it’s those NGOs
CCAD/GEF), p. 40. Author’s translation.
460
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again.” “No, no, no,” we said, “We’re a business. We’re certified as a
business.” “Business? Oh, perfect.” …And with this in mind, we said
we’d better continue presenting ourselves as a business rather than as an
NGO.463

This case offers a useful test of hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the
influence of transnational advocacy networks, particularly since it is the first case to offer
variation on this variable. At present, data from the previous cases suggest that
consensus is insufficient for influence, but this does not necessarily mean that it is
unnecessary.
The test of this variable is made stronger by the fact that there is a high level of
socialization throughout the network advocacy process in this case. As the previous
cases suggest, tests of the hypothesis H3: Socialization improves the influence of
epistemic communities indicate that socialization is necessary for influence. Since
socialization is present throughout this case, a measured lack of influence would suggest
that first, socialization is insufficient and second, that consensus is necessary.
Conversely, if network influence is measured, this would suggest that socialization is
sufficient to lead to influence, undermining the necessity for advocacy networks to
generate consensually held, unquestioned scientific arguments. Finally, since economic
framing was used in this case as well, the data allow further tests of the hypothesis H1:
transnational advocacy networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national
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economic development in order to influence LDC governments by examining the
advocacy attempts of the network in Mesoamerican biological corridor management.

Policy Preferences of the CBMMx Transnational Network
Focus on Community-Based Agriculture
As indicated above, the CBMMx focused on improving environmental practices
in ejidos, identified as the relevant focal areas for project efforts. While oil exploration
was recognized as environmentally problematic, it was not considered a potential target
of advocacy, due to the perceived political difficulty in regulating such an important state
enterprise:
Well, here, the country depends on [the oil producing entity] PEMEX. So,
it’s an issue – criticizing PEMEX is like criticizing the Bible, or
something like that, right? Nobody is hearing anything about PEMEX [in
the CBMMx]; everyone is hearing about the forest fires… But it really
has a severe impact, with oil spills and other serious problems.464
Cattle farming lost importance as a threat to biodiversity, largely because after the
2000 change in administration, SAGARPA recognized that the thin subsoil and poor
plant conditions in the region were simply incompatible with the needs of cattle farming,
and thus did not merit additional federal subsidies.465 While cattle farming was still
taking place in corridor communities and ejidos, the areas affected by cattle farming were
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an insignificant proportion of the total corridor zone,466 and network advocacy efforts
focused on the reform of practices and policy governing agricultural activity in the
Mesoamerican corridor zone.

SAGARPA, SEMARNAT, State Governments: Create Local Projects
Throughout the project, TAN organizations advocated for state and federal
support, in the form of funds, subsidies, and market access for sustainably produced
goods, to assist with the creation of pilot projects in the CBMMx. These projects, to be
implemented in ejidos and rural communities, would combine the goals of biodiversity
conservation and local economic development. These included activities such as
promoting ecotourism in the Proyecto Kantemó by Econciencia A.C.; developing a range
of artisanal, hunting, agricultural and tourism projects by Simbiosis; and generating
support for ecotourism projects by Yum Balám and Los Amigos. In interviews, TAN
members asserted that a key element to pilot project design was the allocation of
CBMMx funds from state and federal policymakers to environmentally and economically
vulnerable populations:
There are communities here in Quintana Roo that receive some economic
support in order to stop them cutting trees down. This support allows
them to develop other activities that, at the same time, conserves –
activities that are related to the conservation of the forest. In other words,
like they’re paying the peasants to care for the forest. Well, they have to
do it this way, because the peasants don’t understand the value of
conserving the forest.467
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What is needed, is a discourse of the soul, rather than of the economy…
But at the end of the day, the people are carrying out these projects for
economics. And yes, we can speak about the importance of the
environment, that could be a second point. But we know very well that if
we don’t do it like this, if you don’t have [the economic argument], you
won’t have [environmental management].468

Federal Government: Define Corridor Zones
Given the importance of the allocation of GEF funds to corridor zones in
biodiversity management, an essential part of CBMMx management was the selection of
areas to be officially recognized as constituting the Mexican section of the biological
corridor. This process of identifying corridor zones was part of a prolonged campaign
between the emerging network and federal policymakers in the executive branch and
CONABIO.
Over time, the size and number of areas proposed as potential corridor zones
increased with the size of the TAN. Between 1989 and 1995, the areas recommended by
the TAN were fairly small, and focused primarily on the zones proposed in the Paseo
Pantera efforts, namely in the Selva Maya zone in the two states of Campeche and
Quintana Roo. At the 1996 Tuxtla Gutiérrez meeting in Chiapas, the participants
proposed a total of 10 corridors in four states, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and
Yucatán, adding to the zones previously identified near Calakmul.469 In the 1998 Cancún
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meeting, the network participants proposed a total of 31 corridors in Mesoamerica,
adding the states of Tabasco, Veracruz and Oaxaca to those four previously considered,
bringing the total states relevant to the CBMMx to seven.470 At the final conceptual
workshop in Cancún in 1999, these 31 proposed corridors were submitted in the final
negotiation for the CBMMx.471 Since the zones that were selected would receive funds
and support from the state government, the CBMMx institutions and CONABIO, the
selection of areas was of particular importance, not only to biodiversity management, but
also the economic wellbeing of marginalized populations, especially in ejidos and
indigenous communities.

Evaluating TAN Influence
Lack of Success in Defining Corridor Zones
However, when the project was launched, the zones accepted by the Mexican
government and CONABIO differed noticeably from the recommendations presented by
the CBMMx TAN in 1999. All identified corridor zones in the states of Oaxaca and
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Veracruz, as well as some of those in Yucatán were removed from consideration. Shortly
before the launch of the CBMMx in 2000, all identified corridor zones in the state of
Tabasco were excised, reducing the final number of recognized corridors to five, and the
number of included states to four. A series of maps illustrating how the outlines of the
Mexican component of the biological corridors changed over time is available in Figures
4.2 – 4.5 which demonstrate the changing political geography of the corridor zones.
Ultimately, the research indicates that this was due to the inability of the TAN to generate
an intersubjective consensus on the science behind corridor selection.

Mixed Success in the Promotion of Sustainable Projects
The TAN had some success in promoting state-supported sustainable
development projects in the zones that had been chosen in the implementation of the
CBMMx. In Quintana Roo, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and CONAFOR provided funds
for sustainable agricultural development in focal area ejidos within the Sian Ka’anCalakmul corridor in 2005.472 In Campeche, these agencies also held a series of
information and awareness-building workshops in ejidal focal areas, to foster local
support for government-directed sustainable use projects, as well as to evaluate
ecological zoning under the POET system.473 Ecological certification from the federal
472
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government was an important element in generating market demand, as it would add
value to sustainably produced goods in foreign markets:474
When you have a certification process – let’s say you’re producing deer
meat under conditions that don’t allow you to get the environmental
certificate. It’s a tremendous difference in price. And that’s also what we
want to do with timber, any timber that has the “green seal.” And with
this “green seal,” countries that buy the timber pay an enormous price.
Just like they’re doing with the certification of organic honey. Germany
and all those places, especially in Europe, are willing to pay extra for
honey that is certified organic, and that comes from here.475
The CBMMx and participating agencies promoted goods and services produced in
corridor zones through a variety of economically oriented publications and events
between 2005 and 2009. In 2007, CONABIO and the UTN published a catalogue of
commodities and services produced in corridor zones for promotion in regional
markets.476 Between 2006 and 2008, the UTR-Chiapas and the UTR-Peninsula
participated in a variety of forums linking the CBMMx with lucrative markets, including
a 2006 forum linking international tourism with the CBMMx in Chiapas, a 2007 forum
on organic certification and corridor goods, and a 2007 forum between producers of
corridor commodities and tourist conglomerates in the Riviera Maya.477
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In some areas, such as the management of forest fires caused by slash-and-burn
practices, economic interests did not play a visible role. For fire management, federal
agents in the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) assisted in the creation of
forest fire management teams in ejidos in Chiapas and Campeche.478 However, the
incorporation of corridor commodities in tourism forums, the production of the
Sustainable Use Commerce series, and the CCAD economic valuation demonstrate the
continued interest of the federal and state governments in linking corridor management to
economic development.
Problematically, from the perspective of biodiversity management, the use of
economic language confounded the broader goals of biodiversity conservation. In the
first place, an evaluation of the goals of the CBMMx found that the emphasis on
attracting funds from the World Bank for economically oriented projects superseded the
goal of promoting “…the development of sustainable use projects intended to benefit the
environment.”479 As observed by Barborak of WCS, some of the later project documents
focused on economic development such that “if not for a brief mention of the CBM, you
wouldn’t know that you were talking about a project whose original goal was
contributing to biodiversity conservation in the region.”480
478

COMADEP, 2005, Creación De Bases Para El Ordenamiento Ecológico Regional
Participativo, pp. 13.
479

PADEP A.C., 2004, Evaluación Técnica del CBMMx, pp. 21. Translated from
Spanish by author.
480

Taken from minutes from the symposium “Conceptualización Y Criterios Para
Corredores Biológicos En Mesoamérica” (V Congreso de la Sociedad Mesoamericana
para la Biología y la Conservación San Salvador, El Salvador).
244

Second, respondents from SEMARNAT and the Quintana Roo CCE noted that
the inclusion of corridor commodities in existing markets was complicated because, as
occurred in Jamaica, environmental advocates found it difficult to persuade managers to
actually invest capital and resources in action that required a longer timeframe for
economic turnover. For example, the attempt to promote peninsular ecotourism
commodities and sustainable development by linking it with the Riviera Maya market
failed to gather support from the state due to the comparatively low income projected
from ecotourism.
…[The] ecotourism projects are of no interest to the state government.
They don’t compare with the quantity of resources, the demand, the
number of businesses and the sources of finance there to develop Cancún,
Tulúm, Playa del Carmen, Cozumel. That’s a lot of money, it’s a
tremendous amount in comparison with the few, scanty resources and the
little capacity invested in the communities where there are also attractions,
and which could possibly be important.481
If we had the support of the state tourism secretariat, it would be easy.
But we don’t have it. There isn’t a center for sustainable tourism in
Quintana Roo. The only thing we have is Cancún, Cozumel, because
that’s where the millions come in.482

The Loss of Legitimacy and Local Support for CBMMx Initiatives
Moreover, mixed and laggardly influence in creating and implementing projects,
combined with very low influence in delineating which zones would receive GEF funds
exacerbated underlying problems affecting corridor management. At the local level,
481

Enrique Gálvez, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish by author.
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Arturo Bayona, author interviews conducted April 2008. Taken from transcript of
digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish by author.
245

TAN organizations such as Simbiosis, Pronatura, Econciencia and Los Amigos had, by
working with marginalized and indigenous communities in corridor zones and ejidos
since the 1980s and 1990s, established a broad base of legitimacy within these
communities.483 In contrast, distrust between ejidal residents and the federal and state
governments was driven by the history of indigenous marginalization, linguistic barriers,
problems with land tenure and property rights, and by violent ethnically based conflict in
the state of Chiapas.484 Simply put, political conflicts and historic disenfranchisement
created barriers to cooperation between rural communities and federal and state
policymakers. In these instances, ENGOs affiliated with the TAN have occasionally
served as intermediaries between the federal government and local communities,
encouraging residents to comply with federal and state environmental regulations, and
serving as advocates for indigenous and rural property rights.485
However, while TAN organizations could have served as useful intermediaries
between federal and state agencies involved in corridor management and ejidal residents,
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Cases on the Tropics. Boca del Río, Veracruz, México), which discusses the role of
Pronatura in aiding in the implementation of CONANP decrees in Chiapas.
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civil society actors were increasingly ignored in project administration, despite their
institutionalization in the bodies of the project. Despite occasional participation in
project design as described above, and despite official participation in the State Advisory
Councils (CCEs) and Regional Technical Units (UTRs), project design was dominated by
governmental interests, leaving TAN members skeptical of the extent of their de facto
influence:
Well, if we only get involved at the end of project proposals, we have no
way to influence how they’re designed and carried out. It’s done already.
But that is what is happening. And that’s how the majority of the council
members feel, at least in the academic and social sectors... Why?
Because it’s not in our hands to call a meeting. Or set the agenda. [The
policymakers] call the meetings; they set the agenda.486
These problems severely undermined project legitimacy. While the Mexican
government was supposed to constitute these councils as part of the administration of the
project, their implementation was laggardly, and the first CCE was launched only in 2003
in Quintana Roo, a full three years after the start of the CBMMx.487 Due to this delay,
the World Bank initially refused to release funds to CONABIO, and budgetary
documents and interviews reveal that project financing did not begin until 2005.488
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Unfortunately, the government of Mexico had, in an attempt to “sell” the CBMMx to
peasant populations, persuaded community members and local stakeholders that the
CBMMx would lead to significant economic revenue, with resources flowing from
international funding mechanisms to marginalized communities. Since these funds were
unavailable for several years after the predicted start date of the project, and since the
TAN had little to no control over where funds were being disbursed, ejido residents and
TAN organizations began doubting the commitment of corridor agencies to needed local
development efforts.
[The CBMMx] was planned for seven years. We’ve gone through almost
seven years now, about six years. But for five years, it didn’t operate.
The resources were there. The proposal was there. The personnel was
there – well, to oversee the political side of it, rather than the practical,
applied side. So, the resources weren’t in operation, practically nothing
was done. It was stagnating.489
…[The] government thought the CBMMx would be some World Bank
program, an international program, that was going to bring in funds to this
zone, because the political decision was to focus on this zone. But it
didn’t turn out that way… We heard our colleagues saying, “They’re just
paying for consultants, and consultants, and consultants, and they’re not
carrying out the projects they said they would.” …And we began to see
conflicts. And what happened is, we got to a point where the CBMMx
lost all credibility. And we saw various meetings where only two people
attended. They invited everybody in the zone, all the businesses and
everything, but nobody came… There were large expectations for the
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/28/000333
038_20080128025407/Rendered/PDF/422180PROP0SPA101091101071Ver1Final.pdf.
See also PADEP A.C., 2004, Evaluación Técnica del CBMMx, pp. 10 – 11; Pilar
Rodríguez, 2007, Promoción de la red de monitoreo ecológico multiescala en el
Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México (CONABIO); Enrique Gálvez, autor
interviews conducted February 2008.
489

Enrique Gálvez, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Translated from Spanish by author.
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project, and it didn’t meet the expectations. Even the NGOs began to
dissent.490
This loss of legitimacy was such that, in corridor zones of Chiapas, ejido residents
became convinced that the CBMMx was part of a federal government plan to seize
communally held lands and ejidos for the launch of a regional industrialization project.491
Since ejidos began resisting the government-led efforts to implement the project, the
administrative goals had to be changed after 2007, abandoning the previous ideal of
focusing on ecologically important focal areas, to the implementation of the project in
those remaining communities that were more likely to “have a good disposition toward
the project.”492 Overall, despite some success in launching pilot projects, the TAN in this
case had very low influence over project management.

Conclusion
In this case, an environmentally oriented TAN emerged in the 1990s to advocate
for increased biodiversity protection in Mesoamerica through the adoption of biological
corridors, administered and managed by governmental policymakers and the civil society.
However, while the TAN introduced the ideas of biological corridors, the network had
limited success in Mexico in influencing the administration of the CBMMx. Specific
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Pilar Rodríguez, 2007, Promoción De La Red De Monitoreo Ecológico Multiescala
En El Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México (CONABIO) pp. 2. Author’s
translation.
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goals of the TAN, particularly in regards to defining ecologically important areas, were
not realized, and TAN members were critical about the commitment of governmental
agencies to incorporate their input in project implementation. Table 4.3: Summary of
Observed and Predicted Outcomes summarizes the predicted and observed
relationships between the independent variables: economic framing, consensus and
socialization, and the dependent variable: influence. It should be noted that, although the
table indicates that the network had diffuse success through affecting (albeit in an
unsatisfactory manner) the design of sustainable conservation projects, this positive
impact is outweighed by the fact that the network lost influence on the campaign of
primary importance: the selection of biological corridor zones based on ecological need.
The loss of influence by the TAN over the selection of project areas supports the
hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the influence of transnational advocacy
networks, insofar as consensus is necessary for influence, but not sufficient. While TAN
respondents admitted that there was no shared consensus among researchers in the
network regarding the validity of each of the initially submitted areas, they were
unequivocal in stating that the final selection of important zones in the Mesoamerican
region was scientifically dubious. Although the official World Bank project documents
asserted that the final selection was based on “biodiversity significance,” as well as
“social viability, technical feasibility and social and political support,”493 TAN
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World Bank, 2000, Project Appraisal Document On A Proposed Grant From The
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund In The Amount Of $11.5 Million To Nacional
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respondents argued that the areas selected were not representative of biodiversity:
What we wanted to include in the corridor, and what was logical was,
[pointing to map] this is Sian Ka’an, and here is Calakmul. So, we said
that… the corridor should take all that’s right here, so Felipe Carrillo
Puerto, here is José María Morelos, Solidaridad, here is Othón P. Blanco,
which is the biggest municipality we have, and so on. And where there
are more forests, better conserved and everything. And more biodiversity
than in the rest of the state. But then the decision was to take only Felipe
Carrillo Puerto and José María Morelos. And a tiny little piece of Othón
P. Blanco. But they basically left the whole municipality out.494
There were discussions in which we weren’t all in agreement about the
project. And right now, there are some important ecological areas in
Yucatán for example, that are not connected at all with the rest of the
Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano. There are more ecosystems that
weren’t chosen, and now some people are saying: “What happened?”495
Moreover, some respondents suggested that political calculations, rather than
ecological considerations, were the primary driving factors inducing area selection. In
particular, respondents suggested that the selection of corridor zones was a patronage
effort by state and federal government agents, who sought to use international funds to
disburse resources to politically important areas:
The corridor design had a political function. Because they wanted to
focus on Felipe Carrillo Puerto – it’s one of the most politically conflicted
municipalities of the state… and José María Morelos. Those two
municipalities have been a little bit problematic, politically. So, they were
basically thinking that they were going to distribute funds with the money
that the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano project was going to bring in,
put in a whole heap of things for the people and all that.496
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María Villareal, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from transcript of
digital voice recording. Author’s translation.
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María Magdalena Vásquez, author interviews conducted February 2008.
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María Villareal, author interviews conducted March 2008. Taken from transcript of
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There is a concern that what started out as a science-based project has
become populist-based and less guided by ecological principles.497
…[Around] 1999 or 2000, I was contacted by some people with the World
Bank and other agencies, who wanted to include me in some research and
workshops related to design of the Mexican part of the corridor. However,
when it became clear (through conference calls) that I thought biological
considerations should drive corridor location, and that new core
conservation areas had to be part of legitimate corridor design, I was uninvited from the project.498
Even if insufficient for influence, knowledge consensus is nevertheless necessary,
as advocacy networks that lack an intersubjective agreement on the causal relationships
of an emerging problem will find it more difficult to influence policymakers and
managers to take appropriate action.499

Monitoring Under Low Consensus
This lack of consensus also negatively affected the TAN’s ability to influence
other areas of biodiversity management in the context of the CBMMx. One of the
primary challenges to network building and information gathering, was the problem that
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there was no standardized methodology for ecosystem monitoring in place in the
mobilization of concern around the CBMMx. Agencies involved in gathering
information on biodiversity, such as ECOSUR, UQROO, Pronatura, UNAM, and
governmental agencies in SEMARNAT and SAGARPA, did so in an uncoordinated
manner, focusing on research specific to their areas of expertise and interest, rather than
functioning as parts of an integrated monitoring system.500
Currently in the Corridor, we have a lot of work left to do in coordinating
methodologies and all that. I think that in the [SAM Project], we’ve had
more advances. I think the synoptic methodology, the synoptic
monitoring methodology [of the SAM] is a real advance in this sense. But
in this area, we have plenty, plenty of work left for the Corridor. For
example, various organizations are working in the area of bird and habitat
conservation, and, well, at this moment there just isn’t an agreed-upon
methodology to study and monitor bird populations.501
During the administration of the project, CONABIO attempted to remedy this
situation by contracting in 2005 a study on biodiversity monitoring with the Jorge L.
Tamayo Center of Studies in Geography and Geomathics (CentroGeo), a Geographic
Information Science modeling institution in Mexico. CentroGeo was supposed to
investigate the possibility of creating a standardized monitoring methodology under the
CBMMx by, among other things, establishing a standard series of indicators for
biodiversity health and creating a baseline analysis of the contemporary state of the
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environment through an “exhaustive investigation of existing methods.”502 In 2006, the
CBMMx UTR-Peninsula held a workshop to determine whether the diverse monitoring
methods could be integrated to create a coherent picture of biodiversity in the region.503
However, at the time of writing, CentroGeo and the CBMMx had yet to propose a
specific methodology, reiterating instead the need to generate a standard model of
investigation and baseline monitoring for an accurate picture of terrestrial biodiversity.504
Further, the data undermine the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks
must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order
to influence LDC governments. In none of the cases studied so far has the use of
economic rationales independently enabled transnational knowledge networks to
influence biodiversity governance in developing countries. In this case, TAN members
supported the use of economic language to evaluate biodiversity management, an
evaluative framework that was deliberately advanced by the federal government in the
CBMMx, yet as described above, the biodiversity management goals of the TAN were
confounded by the fact that state leaders were not persuaded of the necessity to invest in
low-return sustainable development.
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Finally, in testing the hypothesis H3: Socialization improves the influence of
epistemic communities, this chapter indicates that socialization is a necessary, but
ultimately insufficient causal variable in predicting network influence. In this case, the
TAN was comprehensively socialized with the array of natural resource policymakers
responsible for administering the project. In particular, the formal role the TAN agencies
played with the CBMMx, CONABIO and the CBMMx institutions suggest that those
organizations should have had significant influence on the design and selection of
corridor zones. However, this was not the case, as what influence was present was
limited, and undermined by policymaker interests in political constituencies.
The final question, addressed in Chapter 5, is whether socialization is more likely
in autocratic or democratic countries. In this and the previous chapter, Mexico as a posttransitional and centralized government demonstrated systematically more socialization
between policymakers and the civil society members of a transnational network than in
Jamaica. In the following chapter, I examine a transnational network that attempted to
influence the management of biodiversity and protected areas in Egypt, the most
autocratic of the three countries studied.
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Table 4.1: List of CBMMx Policy Makers

AGENCY

JURISDICTION
EST. THROUGH

CONABIO

Federal supremacy
over biodiversity;
Constitution; various
laws on natural
resources

SEMARNAT

See above

ACTIONS
Coordinates actions across other
federal agencies. Collects
information on biodiversity.
Developed National Strategy.
Housing agency of CBMMx
institutions
Establishes UMAs. Environmental
monitoring. Land zoning.

SAGARPA

SEMARNAT
agency
1958 Law of
Ministries and
Departments

Conducts environmental impact
assessments (EIAs); monitors
activities in protected areas
Assists in regulating UMAs.
Environmental monitoring. Funding
for agricultural development.

CONAFOR

SEMARNAT
agency

Parent institution to National
Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA)

PROFEPA

SEMARNAT
agency

CONANP

CDI

State Governments

Federal decree
State authority over
land use
management
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Enforcement of environmental laws
and compliance monitoring.
Evaluates jurisdictional conflicts
between agencies and ministries in
relation to indigenous rights.
Indigenous rights advocacy.
Include biodiversity management
objectives in state development plans

Table 4.2: Partial List of TAN Organizations

ORGANIZATION

Simbiosis SA de CV

INDIVIDUAL
S

FUNCTIONS

SCIENCE
TRAININ
G

Martín Balám

Ecosystem monitoring. Habitat
health evaluation. Project
development in corridor ejidos.

Biology

Los Amigos de Sian
Ka’an

Various

Ecosystem monitoring. Habitat
health evaluation. Project
development in corridor ejidos.
Population monitoring (fauna
and flora); biodiversity
monitoring; project development
in ejidos.

The Nature Conservancy

Various

Population monitoring (fauna).

Conservation
International

Various

Project development in corridor
ejidos.

University of Florida
Wildlife Conservation
Society

Reed Noss

Research on biological corridors

Jim Barborak

Yum Balám

Various

Pronatura A.C.

Various

Econciencia AC

Arturo Bayona

UQROO

Benito Presas
Alberto
Perreira
María
Magdalena
Vásquez

Research on biological corridors
Project development in corridor
ejidos. Monitoring.
Project development in corridor
ejidos. Monitoring.
Project development in corridor
ejidos.
Population monitoring of fauna
and flora. Ecosystem
monitoring. Human impact
studies
Population monitoring of fauna
and flora.

María Luisa
Villarreal
Sonora

ECOSUR

Various

UNAM

Various

Population monitoring of fauna,
arthropods, mites.
Population monitoring of fauna,
arthropods, mites. Ecosystem
monitoring. Human impact
studies
Population monitoring of fauna,
arthropods, mites. Ecosystem
monitoring. Human impact
studies
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Biology

Various
Ecology

Various
Conservati
on biology
Conservati
on biology
Various
Various
Biology

Biology
Biology

Biology

Primarily
biology.

Various

Table 4.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in the CBMMx
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of CBMMx Agencies505
Consejo Consultivo Estatal

Sector Federal
(3 posiciones)

Gobierno Estatal
(3 posiciones)

Gobierno Municipal Sector Académico
(2 posiciones)
(2 posiciones)

505

Sector Social
(2 posiciones)

ONG's
(2 posiciones)

Taken from a powerpoint presentation held by the CBMMx titled Retos,
Perspectivas Y Estrategias Del CBMM En La Península De Yucatán.
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Sector Empresarial
(2 posiciones)

Figure 4.2: 1995 Map of Relevant Protected Areas to CBMMx According to Los
Amigos, Including Areas in Tabasco
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Figure 4.3: 1996 Proposal from WCS Including Zones on the West Coast of
Campeche, Tabasco, Northern Third of Quintana Roo506
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Reprinted in Science, 2001, “Bold Corridor Project Confronts Political Reality,” pp.
2197
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Figure 4.4: 2000 CONABIO Final Selection, Having Removed Zones in West
Campeche, Northern Third of Q. Roo, and Tabasco
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Figure 4.5: 2006 Proposed Elements of Mesoamerican Biological Corridor from
the World Resources Institute, Based on 1996 WCS Proposal

263

Figure 4.6: Diagram of TAN Links
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CHAPTER 5
EGYPT AND THE MIGRATORY SOARING BIRDS PROJECT

Introduction
This final case study investigates further the factors that allow transnational
advocacy networks to generate influence over environmental policymaking in LDCs.
The research indicates that, of the three variables identified: issue-framing, knowledge
consensus, and socialization; two of these are causally important and necessary for
influence. Knowledge consensus functions as predicted by the epistemic communities
approach by delegitimating competing arguments, while socialization encourages target
audiences to internalize the perspectives of networks. Without socialization, target
audiences may very well believe the claims advanced by knowledge networks, but
nevertheless resist environmental reform.
This case offers no new variation on the independent variables, but does address
the question of whether increased autocracy and political centralization have a positive or
negative impact on socialization. Of the campaigns addressed in Jamaica in Chapter 2, a
small minority demonstrated the presence of socialization between policymakers and
audiences (see Table 2.3). As noted in the Introduction, the Jamaican case study took
place in the most democratic and politically open of the countries studied. On the other
hand, as Table 3.3 and Table 4.3 indicate, most of the reef campaigns in the SAM
Project, and all of the CBMMx campaigns in Mexico demonstrated the presence of
socialization. However, Mexico is a historically bureaucratic-autocratic state, and even
after 2000 is characterized by post-corporatism and greater political centralization.
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This suggests that the more democratic a state, the less likely that civil society
networks of experts will socialize with policymakers as knowledge is being generated. In
fact, some of the existing literature on knowledge networks suggests that, as politically
closed states tend to co-opt civil society groups, knowledge networks in autocratic states
are more likely to have greater access to decision makers. However, in process tracing
the efforts of a TAN in an extremely autocratic country, this research indicates that high
levels of political centralization preclude network influence. This chapter examines the
efforts of a TAN to influence natural resource management in Egypt to conserve bird
species and habitats in Egypt through a GEF funded project titled the Project for
Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors
along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway.

Overview of Threats to the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway
In this case, a TAN emerged in the late 1990s, concerned about an area referred to
as the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, part of the larger migration route known as the
African-Eurasian Flyway. This area can be imagined as an aerial corridor taken by
migratory birds traveling from states north of the Mediterranean Sea through the eastern
coast of the African continent, passing through the airspace of several countries,
including Egypt (see Map 1.4).507. This area is a crucial zone for global populations of
507

These flyways begin in Europe and Eurasia, near the Turkey-Syria border, one of
which splits off, crosses the Gulf of Suez, and heads south along the Nile Valley
through Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. See UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming
Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, p. 2; Leshem, Yossi & Yoram Yom-Tov,
1998, Routes of Migratory Soaring Birds (Ibis 140: 41 – 52); MSEA/EEAA, 2006,
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migratory soaring birds (MSBs), as for some species, between 50% and 100% of their
global population traverses the Red Sea flyway.508 Like the Northern Bald Ibis, several
of these species are listed on the IUCN Red List.509
The significance of this area for global biodiversity stems in part from the fact
that several of these species face extinction. In addition, effective management of birds is
likely to lead to improved management overall in sensitive ecosystems. Predatory MSBs
often represent the top of a food chain, and so losses in their population may have
negative ramifications for lower trophic levels and ecosystem equilibrium.510 MSBs also
serve as indicator species, and severe declines in populations could indicate a disruption
of the natural ecosystem. For example, the toxification of sensitive ecosystems,
including globally important wetlands, has been manifested in mass mortalities of MSBs
in bottleneck and resting sites.511

Biodiversity Conservation Capacity Building in Egypt (Cairo: MSEA/EEAA), p. 162.
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Some of the species identified in the project and in interviews include
UNDP/Birdlife International [Birdlife], 2006. Mainstreaming Conservation of
Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea
Flyway (UNDP Project Document) p. 2.
509

Graham Tucker, 2005, Migratory Soaring Birds: Review of status, threats and
priority conservation actions (Report to Birdlife International) p. 188
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Convention on Migratory Species [CMS] Secretariat, 2008, Press Release (Retrieved
online June 10 from
http://www.cms.int/news/PRESS/nwPR2008/10_Oct/CMS_Press_Release_Raptors_M
oU.pdf). See also Mohammed A. Ayyad, Amal M. Fahkry and Abdel Raouf A.
Moustafa,1999, Plant Biodiversity In The Saint Catherine Area Of The Sinai Peninsula
(Biodiversity and Conservation 9: 265–281) for a study of biodiversity in the Sinai
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The origin of the threats to MSBs owes much to the manner in which the birds
travel in their autumn and winter migrations. In order to conserve energy on the
transcontinental route, MSBs fly by soaring and gliding on hot air thermals, flapping as
little as possible, primarily on ascent. Because hot air thermals are formed primarily over
level ground, rather than large bodies of water and mountain ranges, MSBs have very
restricted migratory paths, and are funneled through identifiable “bottlenecks,” both
providing spectacular bird-watching possibilities, and exposing large numbers of birds to
human interference within a compressed time-frame.512 It is in these bottleneck areas that
MSBs are most vulnerable to human activities.513
First, since MSBs rely on thermals, they often travel at very low altitudes, easily
within rifle range.514 Persecution through, for example, unregulated hunting and
trapping, is one obvious way in which human activities threaten these birds. In some
instances, birds fly low enough that trappers need only construct large nets to capture

peninsula; See also Egypt Elbadry, Esam Ahmed. c. 2002. Protected Areas of the
Mediterranean MedWetCoast Egypt (Project document for the Mediterranean Wetlands
Coast Project), and Khalil, Magdy T. and Kamal H. Shaltout. 2006. Lake Bardawil
and Zaranik Protected Areas, p. 531. Zaranik, for example, is a registered Ramsar site
with over 900 species of flora and fauna, 5 of which are endemic.
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them.515 In addition, the use of lead shot in hunting creates problems when lead pellets
accumulate in rest areas and are ingested directly or indirectly by MSBs.516
Second, at rest areas along their migration route, even well-meaning but
uninformed tourists may disturb exhausted and under-nourished birds, leading to further
stress and hence death:
…in Sharm el Sheikh… the biggest majority of the storks from Eastern
Europe fly through this point, and have a resting place at a sewage farm in
Sharm el Sheikh. All these bikers going through the sewage farms are
scaring the birds away. They can’t rest, they have to fly further south,
some of them are exhausted, more of them will die.517
Third, and related, the onset of tourism and urban development in flyway zones
has exposed birds to toxic chemicals. This may occur either through improper waste
disposal in existing bodies of water, or through the creation of standing pools of polluted
water in, inter alia, sewage treatment plants, which attract dehydrated birds.518
Pesticides, rodenticides and poisoned bait, ostensibly aimed at pests such as feral dogs
plaguing agricultural areas, may also kill or harm some species of predatory or carrion
birds.
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Waterbirds (Retrived online from http://www.unepaewa.org/publications/publication_others/wi_lead_poisonwbirds_en_2000.pdf).
517

István Moldován, author interviews conducted October 11 – 18, 2008. Taken from
transcript of digital voice recording.
518

EgyBirdGroup, personal communication; UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming
Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, pp. 8, 137 – 138.
269

Finally, the construction of wind farms along the flyway may create hazards for
birds that become trapped in powerlines, or collide with wind turbines. The same wind
conditions that are most conducive to energy generation are also propitious for soaring
birds, which either risk collisions or have to detour from the flyway, again increasing the
chance of exhaustion and death.519

Tensions in National Economic Development
As in all other cases studied, the anthropogenic threats identified here incorporate
tensions between economic activity associated with the primary productive sectors of
Egypt, and economic activity associated with the wellbeing of marginalized populations.
On one hand, it is clear that the activities of lower-income Bedouin populations who
reside in the desert of the Sinai Peninsula and along the Red Sea Coast can contribute to
the stresses described above. Bedouin tribal groups, most of whom are not nomadic, do
engage in trapping and hunting of birds.520 On the other hand, prominent economic
sectors, particularly in tourism, contribute not only the primary sources of stress on desert
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biodiversity management, but also displace the potential of Bedouin communities to use
natural resources.
In some cases, this displacement is indirect. Waste disposal from tourist sites, or
excessive water usage reduces the utility of subterranean and groundwater supplies, upon
which Bedouin communities depend for subsistence agriculture.521 More directly, the
expansion of coastal tourism in the Red Sea and Sinai governorates has led to the
physical removal of littoral Bedouin campsites from areas planned for tourist
development.522

Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management
Environmental Management: The MSEA/EEAA and Subordinate Agencies
The management of these processes falls under the purview of a range of different
governmental authorities. Direct environmental management is the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and its executive agency, the
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA). The EEAA was established in 1994
under National Environmental Law 4/1994, and in 1997, ministerial restructuring made
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that agency the executive branch of the MSEA.523 The MSEA/EEAA has various
mandates, including the issuance of environmental impact assessments (EIAs); the
generation of national action plans; the setting of pollution standards; and the
coordination of regulatory activities with other ministries that may have jurisdictional
overlap in managed territories.524
Formally, the EEAA’s authority over natural resource management is
concentrated in the Nature Conservation Sector (NCS).525 The NCS is the focal point for
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) relevant to the management of migratory birds and transitory
habitats, including the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the Ramsar
Convention on the protection of wetlands.526 NCS authority is further delegated to a
National Biodiversity Unit and a Protectorates Division.527
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The Biodiversity Unit is charged with conducting national biodiversity
inventories, and with implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) by
drafting a National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity (NBSAP).528 Since some of
the areas important for bird management are found within the network of protected areas,
and under environmental Law 102/1983, the Protectorates Division has some authority to
determine entry conditions, regulate hunting permits, and appoint rangers to staff and
monitor established areas.529

The Governorates and Municipal Management
In addition, the Protectorates Division is tasked with coordinating management of
protected areas with Egypt’s governorates, of which there are 29 since 2009 (see Figure
5.1).530 Three in particular are important to MSB and flyway management: the North
Sinai, the South Sinai and the Red Sea governorates, although migrating birds have found
as far inland as Helwan. Some of the key protected areas addressed in these governorates
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are: in the Red Sea governorate, the Red Sea Islands; in the South Sinai govenorate, Ras
Mohammed and Sant Katherin National Parks; in the North Sinai governorate, Zaranik.
Governors manage local pollution standards, monitor waste management, and have
oversight over development projects in their jurisdiction. To coordinate with the NCS,
governors work through Environmental Management Units established in each
governorate.531

The Tourist Development Authority and the Military
Further, some of the conflicts between human activity and migratory soaring birds
involve management issues in other state bodies, in the Ministry of Tourism and the
military infrastructure. The Red Sea and the Sinai Peninsula are major sites of tourist
attraction. Of 5 million tourists visiting Egypt annually, approximately 2.1 million of
these participate in coastal tourism in the Red Sea.532 When measured in terms of
constructed hotel space, the Red Sea and the South Sinai governorates have 28% and
24% of the total share of Egyptian tourism respectively. The North Sinai governorate is
less important to tourism, with the lowest share of hotel rooms at 0.5% as of 2000.533
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The Ministry of Tourism and its executive agency the Tourist Development
Authority (TDA) are responsible for allocating resources and permits for tourist
development and infrastructure. Created by presidential decree in 1991, the TDA has an
autonomous budget and substantial authority to regulate land sales in tourist development
locations.534
Finally, the military apparatus has substantial formal regulatory power over
natural resource management. Due to the history of the Sinai Peninsula as a site of
conflict with Israel, as well as due to ongoing border concerns with Sudan, the military
has “retained use-rights to large tracts of land,” and can restrict at will the mobility of
researchers, academics and tourists in the interest of security.535 In addition to this
control, internal management within the military has implications for natural resource
conservation in Egypt. Military encampments and stations along the Red Sea coast can
contribute to the problem of improper waste disposal and the creation of standing pools
of polluted water, while military personnel have been observed using MSBs for target
practice.536 These agencies described above are those with the formal responsibility for
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managing natural resources in the context of MSB conservation in Egypt (see Table 5.1:
List of MSB Policy Makers).

Political Centralization and Institutional Distortion
At the same time, actual management authority is centralized to a degree not
found in either Mexico or Jamaica, and is concentrated in the executive branch (the Prime
Minister and the President) and the state security apparatus. The declaration of additional
land as protected areas is limited, as the Prime Minister has fixed the number and location
of all current and proposed protected areas in Egypt through the creation of a Land
Utilization Map in 1997.537 This map currently describes 27 existing and 13 planned
protected areas, comprising the 40 sites to be declared in 2017 on the Land Utilization
Map (see Figure 5.2: Map of Protectorates in Egypt, est. 1997 Land Utilization
Map).538
The political role played by governors concentrates the decision-making authority
over natural resource management in the center. Governors are appointed by the
President, rather than elected by the mass public, directing accountability toward the
executive branch. Further, the military has additional informal authority over natural
537
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resource management, as significant numbers of executive appointees to natural resource
management agencies come from the state security apparatus, regardless of training or
scientific background.539 Personal ties between apparatchiks in natural resource agencies
matter significantly in allocating authority over environmental management.
This personalist system, described as “embedded cronyism,”540 differs markedly
from the post-corporatist Mexican system and the patron-clientelist Jamaican system.
The importance of personal relationships and the centralization of land use authority in
Egypt is greater than those of the centralized, erstwhile bureaucratic-authoritarian
Mexican government, and the comparatively politically open Jamaican system. Further,
as will be indicated below, there are far greater restrictions on autonomous mass public
political expressions in this case than in the previous two countries studied. As a result,
the formal division of authority and institutional jurisdiction gives a distorted view of the
real allocation of power and authority, which is more arbitrary than indicated in the
management structure. It is within this context of de facto centralization and
personalistic structures of authority that the Project for Mainstreaming Conservation of
Migratory Soaring Birds developed.

Transnational Mobilization around the Red Sea/Rift Valley Flyway
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The Emergence of the MSB TAN and Policy Advocacy through the Development of
the Project
The emergence of the MSB Project followed the same essential pattern as the
previous three cases: concern about the management of globally important biodiversity
developed among a set of core, transnationally organized civil society actors who, in the
process of mobilizing support for management among target audiences, developed a
common policy enterprise. Again, identifiable ENGOs were crucial to the development
of a nucleus of concerned actors (see Table 5.2: List of TAN Members in the MSB
Project).

The Emergence of a Network Concerned about MSB Management
Concern about the bird flyways in the Red Sea and Rift Valley region developed
among a transnational network of birders in the 1970s. In 1972, ornithologist R. E.
Moreau compiled studies to map out the routes of the Eurasian-African flyway.541 The
Eurasian-African flyway was identified at the time as one of the three globally important
routes for migratory birds, the other two occurring in the Americas and the PalaearcticSouth Asian flyway (see Figure 1.5). This study was later cited as a foundational project
by other ENGOs who became concerned about depleting populations of MSBs in the
1980s and 1990s, such as Birdlife International.542
541
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In the early 1990s, Birdlife and other transnational stakeholders in MSB
management, such as the IUCN and Wetlands International, began conducting research
and sharing information to identify emerging threats and problems with the integrity of
the flyway. Between 1991 and 1992, Birdlife and Wetlands International, then known as
the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau, held a series of international
workshops to conduct threat analyses and map the geographic dimensions of the AfricanEurasian flyway.543 Between 1992 and 1995, Birdlife and Wetlands International
developed a series of projects to protect bird species in the European section of the
flyway.544
At the same time, Birdlife began establishing contacts with domestic sources of
expertise in Middle Eastern and North African flyway countries, such as Egypt. These
contacts between domestic expertise and Birdlife emerged as local actors similarly
developed concerns about management and populations of MSBs. In Egypt, a group of
researchers had created the Egyptian Ornithological Society in the 1980s. Though small
and short-lived, the group counted among its members Egyptian experts on birding, such
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as Sherif Baha el Din and Moustafa Fouda.545 Sherif became affiliated with Birdlife in
1989, when he married Mindy Rosenzweig, an American ornithologist hired by Birdlife
to work in Cairo. In 1990, Birdlife hired Sherif Baha el Din to be the official Birdlife
Affiliate in Egypt, assigning him the responsibility of conducting research on mapping
and species identification of birds in Egypt.546
In the middle to late 1990s, the efforts of the emerging TAN found purchase in
the international political arena, as governments in the region sought to demonstrate
compliance with MEAs relating to biodiversity and endangered species management. In
1995, Parties to the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species negotiated an MEA
subordinate to the CMS called the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA). In
AEWA, the Parties used the research on bird migration conducted between 1991 and
1995 from Birdlife, Wetlands International, the WWF and the IUCN, to promote
improved regional management of migratory birds and habitats among neighboring
countries in the flyway zone.547 In 1997, the Egyptian government explicitly linked
AEWA to its efforts to carry out the Convention on Biological Diversity.548

545

Mary Megalli, author interview, conducted October 4, 2008. At this time, Sherif
had published two books on Egyptian avifauna in 1985 and 1989, Common Birds of
Egypt and Birds of Egypt respectively. See PBS, 2010, Mindy and Sherif Baha el Din,
retrieved online June 2010 from http://www.pbs.org/saf/1106/hotline/hbahaeldin.htm.
546

Personal communication, Mindy Baha el Din; CV of Sherif Baha el Din; PBS, 2010,
Mindy and Sherif Baha el Din, retrieved online June 2010 from
http://www.pbs.org/saf/1106/hotline/hbahaeldin.htm.
547

D. E. Pritchard, 1999, Statement on Behalf of Non-Governmental Organizations (6th
COP Meeting to the CMS/1st MOP to the AEWA).
548

MSEA/EEAA, 1997, First National Report to the Convention on Biological
280

As Parties began planning the management and monitoring processes to carry out
AEWA, member governments drafted Action Plans, created with input from the network
of ENGOs, to use in situ conservation to protect waterbirds. In the Action Plan, Parties
reiterated some of the same concerns generated by Wetlands and Birdlife, highlighting
the significance of the flyway for global species and ecosystems, and discussing the need
to ban or phase out environmentally harmful activities such as: the use of lead shot;
illegal taking of birds; human disturbances in resting sites; and the use of poisoned
bait.549 After AEWA entered into force in 1999, members of Birdlife, Wetlands
International, the IUCN and the WWF became officially involved with the institutions,
by serving on its Technical Committee, and participating as observers in the Meetings of
the Parties (MOPs).550
During the late 1990s, Birdlife reinforced connections between the transnational
pool of knowledge and local expertise in the various countries. For example, between
1997 and 2003, Birdlife and the UNDP launched a project to identify Important Bird
Areas (IBAs) in Africa, defined as those areas in which at least 1% of a global population
of migratory birds pass through, or areas which function as bottlenecks.551 In Egypt, this
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was carried out by Sherif Baha el Din, culminating in the identification of 34 IBAs, most
of which were also identified as sensitive wetlands (see Figure 5.3: Map of BLI
Registered IBAs).552 As in the AEWA study, this report highlighted the geophysical
parameters of the flyway, adding specificity to the knowledge of important areas to birds,
and illustrated anthropogenic threats to MSBs including: tourist development, pollution,
agriculture and unregulated persecution.553

Creation of the MSB Project
By the end of the 1990s, reports and studies generated for AEWA, the IBA
program, and domestic studies indicated that the existing management structure was
insufficient to protect these birds and their habitats from existing anthropogenic threats.
In order to address this problem, Birdlife began developing an additional project to
improve management of all MSBs and habitats in the flyway region, drafting a proposal
for a GEF-funded effort in 2003.554
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As conceptualized, the project was intended to focus on those countries with poor
environmental governance, but which were critical to the effective management of MSBs
in the African-Eurasian flyway. These were Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and territories controlled by the Palestinian
Authority.555 The part of the flyway covered by these countries was called the Rift
Valley and Red Sea flyway. Like AEWA, the planned project initially took a sitespecific approach to the in situ conservation of IBAs,556 and was linked to other
biodiversity related MEAs, such as the CBD and the Ramsar Convention.557
In order to clarify the needs of the project, Birdlife commissioned a threat
assessment in 2004. Building on research conducted by Baha el Din in Egypt, and local
expertise in other countries, this assessment reiterated the need for improved legislation
and environmental regulation in the Red Sea/Rift Valley countries. Further, the
assessment, carried out by Graham Tucker of Birdlife, identified as significant regional
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threats some of the same concerns brought up earlier in the AEWA studies and the IBA
studies, namely unregulated hunting, tourism and improper waste disposal.558
The project proposal was finalized in 2005. That year, Birdlife ornithologists
Graham Tucker and Richard Porter conducted a study on the species of MSBs primarily
dependent on the flyway, and identified 37 species, which then became the primary
indicator species for the success of the GEF funded project.559 Thus, by the early 2000s,
an informally organized network oriented around conserving migratory bird species using
the African-Eurasian flyway had emerged, part of which was based in Egypt and
interested in the Red Sea/Rift Valley section of the flyway.

Centralization of Authority and the Management of the Project
Generally, Birdlife’s modus operandi is to delegate management authority and
funds garnered from GEF projects to local, affiliated ENGOs. However, whereas
countries such as Lebanon had civil society ENGOs approved to work independently on
migratory bird issues, Egypt did not. In order to keep Egypt involved in the Birdlifedeveloped project, the MSEA/EEAA was made the implementing agency, with the
understanding that a domestic ENGO would be incorporated later, become an official
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Birdlife Affiliate, and function as the implementing agency of the MSB Project.560 To
this end, Mindy and Sherif Baha el Din, along with associates from the Egyptian
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology and Cairo University created Nature
Conservation Egypt (NCE) as an ENGO in 2005.

The Creation of the NCE as the Site of Transnational Activism
NCE became a Birdlife Affiliate, and after 2006, resident birders from Egypt and
countries such as the United States, Romania and the UK joined the organization, which
currently numbers 28 members, to advocate for improved MSB and habitat management.
The network grew further with the creation of an email list called EgyBirdGroup,
established by Romanian ornithologist István Moldován, also an NCE member, to share
reports and information on birds with a transnational network interested in Egyptian
birding. The EgyBirdGroup network was an important source of technical information
for the TAN, as some of the ornithologists participating in the EgyBirdGroup mailing list
included Tom Coles and Nick Williams, both of whom were recognized experts on Sooty
Falcons (Falco concolor), one of the indicator soaring birds addressed by the project.561
By 2007, when GEF committed to funding the project, a transnational advocacy
network (TAN), concerned about managing the African-Eurasian flyway to protect
560
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migratory soaring birds (MSBs), had emerged in Egypt (see Table 5.2). This network
built on foundational research conducted in the 1970s and concretized between 1991 and
2003, demonstrating the importance of the flyway to globally endangered MSBs,
identifying key MSBs to be covered by management efforts, and highlighting the threats
faced in each flyway country.
Like the other networks identified in the research, the size of the TAN is larger
than is suggested in the provided table. The EgyBirdGroup alone counts 185 members,
but, like the 270 members of the WRC’s scientist database discussed in Chapter 2, most
of these actors were not a core part of the network. During the period of field research, of
the emails on the list, which included exchanges of draft reports, discussions of threats to
birds, and requests for hospitality for visiting researchers, most messages were sent by
ten to fifteen members. These included seven members of NCE, as well as researchers
from the Birdlife and from academic institutions in the UK, USA, and Germany. Given
that not all members of the NCE are involved in MSB advocacy, an approximation of the
network suggests that it counts between 30 and 40 members, larger than the Jamaican
Cockpit Country epistemic community, but smaller than the networks active in Mexico.

Maintaining the Network
The core knowledge of this TAN was built on transnational research conducted by
the Birdlife-Wetlands International-IUCN network, and embedded in local research and
expertise. In 2009, the Government of Egypt launched the project, with the
MSEA/EEAA and the NCE listed as the official implementing agencies.
286

The network maintained cohesion primarily through the informational exchanges
established through the EgyBirdGroup mailing list, and by virtue of the fact that NCE
recruited members from other institutions, including Cairo University and Birdlife
International. The link between transnational and Egyptian knowledge was facilitated by
the Baha el Dins, who later influenced the creation of the NCE, as well as through
Moldován’s creation of the EgyBirdGroup mailing list. In addition, transnational
researchers conducting field surveys of migratory birds had to work with locally-based
expertise in remote, desert sites. For example, Alaa el-Din, a ranger in the Red Sea
Protectorate, and István Moldován who conducted research near Hurghada, also in the
Red Sea, were contact points for Birdlife researchers, such as John Grainger and Nick
Williams, and researchers from other organization, such as Dick Hoek of WWF.
Notably, the Egyptian network was not maintained by a comparable level of regular
meetings and formalized processes as occurred in the other networks, especially the SAM
network. Nevertheless, the personal connections and informational exchanges were a
constitutive part of this TAN.
However, the TAN in this case faced substantial difficulties in translating
transnationally generated knowledge into meaningful action at the domestic level. First,
the TAN failed to generate an intersubjective and scientifically valid consensus on the
relationship between human activity and MSB population declines. Second, the political
system in Egypt, characterized by autocratic centralization, embedded cronyism, and a
domestically weak civil society, prevented the TAN from generating socialization with
policymakers.
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Measuring Consensus Within the Network
Lack of Consensus within the MSB TAN
As indicated in the previous chapters and the literature, knowledge consensus is a
defining feature of epistemic communities. As this network did not generate an
intersubjective consensus on the causal relationship between human activity and
depletion of bird populations, it is not an epistemic community. The TAN did share a
pool of common knowledge and a core rationale for action. By 2003, the transnational
network generated and shared information about the existence of the African-Eurasian
flyway, the location of the Red Sea/Rift Valley component, and agreed that human
activity, such as hunting and waste disposal, was negatively affecting migratory bird
populations. In 2006, the network agreed on the main species of MSBs at concern.
However, at the time of writing, there was still substantial uncertainty within the
network. While it was clear that human activity was contributing to declines in global
populations of MSBs, there was a lack of specificity in this information. There was no
clear agreement on how to disaggregate and measure the relative contribution of each
kind of anthropogenic activity to bird mortality rates at a regional or domestic level, and
in some cases, disagreement about whether observed mortalities were the result of human
activity. In a 2005 assessment of bottleneck sites, Birdlife ornithologist Richard Porter
noted that:
Whilst the main threats to soaring birds on migration have been studied
elsewhere in the world, there is a serious lack of quantitative data for the
Middle East. For example it is known that the shooting of raptors for the
288

stuffed-bird trade is a common practice in Syria but there is no
information on the numbers involved.562
The finding of substantial uncertainty was reiterated throughout the development
of the MSB Project. In 2005, the final project proposal for the MSB Birdlife project
noted the “lack of quantitative information”563 giving a clear picture of the contribution
of specific activities, such as tourism and hunting to MSB populations, observing that
“…beliefs about what threatens MSBs during migration may not be supported by
evidence.”564 In 2007, the German Development Bank commissioned an investigation of
the potential impact of wind farms on MSB populations in Gebel el Zeit in the Red Sea
governorate. Like the Porter report, this study concluded that clear, uncontested and
scientifically valid data on the likely impact of wind turbines on MSB populations was
not available.565 In 2008, the EgyBirdGroup circulated multiple reports of mass
mortalities of migrating White Storks near reservoirs in Sharm el Sheikh, a tourist
destination in the South Sinai governorate. Within the network, explanations for this
mortality varied significantly, and the scientists, including some from NCE offered as
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Bergen, 2007, Ornithological Expert Opinion, passim. The study concluded with a
recommendation that, in light of the lack of certainty about the impact of windfarms on
species, and considering the endangered status of several of migratory birds passing
through the area “…in terms of strict bird conservation aspects it is highly
recommended to avoid construction of a wind power plant within the whole
concessionary area [of Gebel el Zeit]” (pp. 55).
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potential reasons anthropogenic causes such as: consumption of polluted water; human
persecution; and natural phenomena, such as bacteria, bird flu and exhaustion.566 The
correlation between the number of observed storks and actual site mortality was also
debated, as one birder noted that the arid climate at Sharm el Sheikh desiccates and
preserves bird corpses, possibly leading to the over counting of bird deaths.

Measuring Network Socialization with Managers
Barriers to Communication in Egypt
One of the primary issues addressed by this chapter is whether political
centralization and autocracy is conducive to greater socialization or not. The data here
strongly suggest that high levels of autocracy preclude the possibility of socialization. As
described above, the Egyptian political system is very tightly closed. Formally, there is
minimal scope for the exchange of ideas and information between the civil society and
policymakers, and every interview respondent, in the civil society and in policymaker
agencies, has observed that there is no “mechanism”567 for communication between the
government and ENGOs. While Egypt has a few dozen ENGOs, most of which are
based in Cairo,568 they have little autonomy under the Egyptian legal system.
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EgyBirdGroup, personal communication; István Moldován, personal
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mortality, as at the time of the observation, there were no clear reports that White stork
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from Salwa Sharawi Gomaa, 1997, Environmental Policy-Making in Egypt (University
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As one example, the 2002 parliamentary Law 84 permits the dissolution of NGOs
by executive order, and criminalized any association between domestic civil society and
transnational NGOs without prior permission.569 The allocation of funds for the project is
similarly controlled by the government, as the MSEA/EEAA has the final authority over
fiscal management of the MSB Project.
Exacerbating communication problems associated with formal centralization,
barriers between the MSEA/EEAA and its subsidiary agencies in the NCS prevent the
flow of knowledge from the ground up, as ties between the civil society and the NCS do
not translate into ties between the civil society and executive agencies. At the time of
writing, there were formally established ties between the TAN and policymakers in the
NCS. The current director of the Nature Conservation Sector is Moustafa Fouda, former
member of the Egyptian Ornithological Society and erstwhile colleague of Sherif Baha el
Din. As of the time of writing, Sherif himself was in the employ of the MSEA/EEAA as
a technical consultant to the NCS and scientific advisor to the Zaranik Protected Area in
the North Sinai, making the Baha el Dins and Moustafa Fouda potential points of
connection between the civil society and policymakers in the NCS.

Press of Florida), pp. 20 and Appendix 2. In 2003, the Egyptian government counted a
few hundred, giving no specific number, in a GEF-funded project assessing the
government’s capacity for environmental management in EEAA/UNDP, 2003, SelfAssessment of National Capacity in Egypt to Manage the Global Environment (Project
proposal for GEF funding) pp. 3.
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Aziza Hussein, 2002, NGOs and Development Challenges (in M. Riad El-Ghonemy,
Egypt in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges for Development, New York:
Routledge) p. 203; UNDP/Institute of National Planning, Egypt, 2008, Egypt Human
Development Report 2008: Egypt’s Social Contract (Cairo: UNDP) pp. 92 – 94.
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However, these social links were sharply limited, as first, there was little
communication between other members of the TAN and Fouda or other policymakers,
and second, what links were present were described in interviews as ad hoc:
I think that maybe people like Moustafa Fouda get advice on scientific
matters on an individual basis, not in any organized manner. There is no
science advisory committee for these protected areas. It is not
accessorized.570
The isolation of the NCS in environmental policymaking further complicates the
communication between the civil society and the Egyptian government. First, as
described above, environmental authority over protectorates rests with the center and the
security apparatus through institutions such as personal ties and the power of the
governorates.571 Second, at the time of writing, the NCS was still chronically
underfunded, and did not have the authority to independently carry out essential
functions, such as allocating resources, hiring staff and setting priorities for management
in established protectorates, whether IBAs or otherwise. The Sant Katherin National
Park and Ras Mohammed in the South Sinai governorate generate revenue through the
imposition of user access fees. However, these funds are not collected and managed by
the Protectorates Division of the NCS, but submitted to a centrally controlled
Environment Protection Fund under the executive branch.572 Of the revenues collected
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by protected areas, about 57% are returned to the NCS, and the remainder allocated to
other projects taken by the MSEA/EEAA, subsidizing the Ministry’s other functions with
revenue generated in national parks.573 The NCS resources then have to be reinvested
across all areas, exacerbating the distributional problems in the allocation of funds. Parks
and protected areas in Ras Mohammed, Sant Katherin and the Red Sea Islands generate
approximately 96% of revenue from protected areas,574 yet receive only a fraction in
return as maintenance and upkeep.575

Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community
The Strategic Choice of Frames: Persuading Natural Resource Policymakers
Again, the TAN indicated that successful communication of environmental policy
to governmental agencies would depend on the use of economic arguments, in particular,
those that linked environmental management to the interests of prominent economic
sectors. Between 2002 and 2005, the GEF began promoting the concept of Biodiversity
Mainstreaming, described as the:
…integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use principles
into policies, plans, programs, and production systems where the primary
573
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In 2006 for example, Ras Mohammed generated US$1.9 million in revenue, of
which only US$353,000 was reinvested in park upkeep. See MSEA/UNDP/GEF, 2006,
Strengthening the National System of Protected Areas (UNDP/GEF) pp. 4.
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focus has previously been on production, economic activity, and
development, rather than on biodiversity conservation losses or gains.576
In the development of the MSB Project, one of the primary recognized threats to
the development of political will for biodiversity conservation was the fact that MSB
conservation was recognized as an area of very low economic value to the primary
developmental sectors in participating countries.577 As a result, Birdlife, in the 2003 draft
of the MSB Project and again in 2005, asserted that effective management would require
using the concept of “mainstreaming” to link biodiversity conservation with the interests
of prominent economic sectors. In particular, engagement with policymakers in the
tourism sector, namely the TDA and the Red Sea and Sinai governorates was predicated
on the idea that increasing environmental regulation over waste disposal, waste
management and tourist access would depend on increasing the economic attractiveness
of biodiversity conservation by linking it with the tourist industry.
You can't go to them and talk about conservation. You have to insert it in
other things, like ecotourism and so on, to make it sound like
development.578
…the decision makers understand only the economics. They don’t believe
in biology or in the importance of some – you can talk about only money,
and the importance of it, and how much they are going to lose. So, we
have to work for the importance of biodiversity this way, so they can
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understand. And I think most of it – not most – a lot of people understand
now, especially in the tourism part.579

Thus, while some degree of political centralization was conducive to civil society
communication in Mexico, this case suggests that extreme political centralization
associated with hardline autocracy is detrimental to socialization between networks of
experts and policymakers. The literature suggests that autocratic policymakers may
facilitate communication between themselves and networks of experts as part of the
process of controlling the production of policy relevant knowledge. However, it is clear
from this case that the risk faced by civil society networks in autocratic countries is that
the exercise of political control over information may disenfranchise experts, even in
comparatively politically innocuous issue-areas. As described above, the political
organization of the state left the MSB TAN isolated.
The fact that the network also failed to generate an intersubjective consensus also
suggests that the influence exercised by the MSB TAN in this case is likely to be low.
While the community adopted economic language as a strategy for policy advocacy, the
previous three cases argue that this would be unlikely to overcome the barriers presented
by scientific dissensus and low political socialization.

Policy Preferences of the CBMMx Transnational Network
Shifting from Site-Specific Management to Sectoral Approaches
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Tahr Issa, author interviews conducted September 20, 2008. Taken from transcript
of digital voice recording. Emphasis in original recording.
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By the launch of the project in 2009, the goals of the TAN had changed. Between
2005 and 2009, Birdlife and the UNDP agreed that a site-specific approach focusing on
protected areas management would have been inappropriate, in part since MSBs
exhibited some variation in flight patterns and resting arrangements.580 While still
necessary, protected areas management of key sites was to be complemented by a
“double-mainstreaming” effort, where practices conducive to the conservation of MSBs
would be adopted by ongoing projects in key development sectors. For example, since
tourist development had negative implications for MSB conservation, tourist
development projects in the Red Sea governorate were targeted by the TAN to become
more flyway friendly. All the sectors targeted for the “double-mainstreaming” approach
in Egypt were: hunting and persecution; poisoning from agricultural cultivation; improper
waste management; and collision with energy structures, including wind turbines and
power lines.581 The following section explains how these double-mainstreaming efforts
were carried out.

Improving Protected Areas Management
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Although shifting away from an exclusive site-specific approach, the management
of protected areas remained central to the goals of the TAN.582 Of the 34 IBAs identified
in Egypt, 15 are in currently existing protected areas, and 3 lie within future proposed
areas to be established by 2017.583 At the same time, only 6 of these were identified as
“receiving adequate protection”584 in 2000, leaving considerable scope for improved
management. TAN members advocated for reform of protectorate management, albeit in
an ad hoc manner. For example, István Moldován of NCE and EgyBirdGroup
participated occasionally in the training of rangers involved in protectorate management
in the Red Sea.585

Reforming Tourism and Promoting Ecotourism
The reform of tourist practices was key to TAN advocacy efforts. As described
above, the Red Sea and Sinai governorates are important areas for both tourism and MSB
management, as the Red Sea governorate has 9 of the officially identified IBAs in Baha
el Din’s study, while the North and South Sinai governorates have 5 each.586 As a result,
TAN efforts focused on mainstreaming MSB concern into ongoing projects in these
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areas, largely by promoting ecotourism organized around MSB bird watching. Through
this effort, policymakers in the TDA, NCS and governorates could regulate tourist
incursions into bird habitats and resting areas by promoting greater awareness of bird
sensitivity among visitors.587
For example, one of the tourist projects in the Red Sea is the Livelihood and
Income from the Environment (LIFE) project, a USAID funded effort to assist the Tourist
Development Authority (TDA) to develop sustainable tourism.588 This further builds on
earlier efforts started by the TDA, the Red Sea governorate, and the MSEA/EEAA to
launch ecotourism-driven development in the Red Sea in 2003.589 This project was
specifically chosen by the TAN as a potential demonstration case of the feasibility of
mainstreaming in tourism in Egypt, and the GEF funded efforts by TAN members to
undertake activities toward this end.590 As part of this effort, Birdlife funded a manual
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compiled by Sherif Baha el Din promoting eco-friendly birdwatching in the Wadi el
Gamal National Park on the Red Sea coast.591
Ecotourism, if supported by the government, would not only contribute to
national economic revenue generation and biodiversity conservation, but would also
contribute additional benefits through the inclusion of marginalized populations,
primarily of nomads and Bedouins. By acting as tour guides, Bedouins could contribute
local knowledge and expertise to protected areas management, and be compensated
through user access fees. This was an important step in improving governance, as local,
marginalized populations contributed significantly to stressors such as unregulated
hunting and excessive pesticide use while having historically been excluded from
management by autocratic park managers.592

Energy Management
Finally, the TAN sought to incorporate MSB concerns into the planned
construction of wind farms in Egypt, by having the government locate turbines in areas
less likely to interfere with the flight pattern of migrating birds. The main wind farm
project launched in the period of the project was a 2006 effort funded by the German
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Development Bank in Gebel el Zeit, an IBA in the Red Sea governorate.593 This farm
was intended to contribute a significant amount of energy to the power grid of Egypt –
potentially in excess of 3,000 MW. As part of the planning effort, the German
Development Bank commissioned a feasibility study from a team of ornithologists, led
by a German specialist in migrating birds, Gudrun Hilgerloh, from Johannes Gutenberg
University, and followed up with a later review in 2007.594 Hilgerloh, who had been
exchanging information on the EgyBirdGroup list, divided the proposed construction area
into three zones, and argued that construction should be limited to the northern-most
zone, the area least likely to lead to substantial losses in bird populations.595

Evaluating TAN Influence
Lack of Success in Influencing Protected Areas Management
Using these examples of environmental advocacy, the data suggest that the TAN
was unable to influence environmental management in the context of this project. The
results are summarized in Table 5.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes.
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While TAN members may have been occasionally included in ranger training, the
network had minimal success in influencing the reform of protectorates. Interviews with
former protectorates managers indicate that such collaborations between the civil society
and the government was under supported at best, and discouraged at worst.
If you follow the governmental system, you have to communicate to the
higher level of management. You are not allowed to communicate with
journalists, for instance. You are not allowed to communicate with
people, or elected officials.596
In addition, the general system of protectorate management is complicated by the
fact that the NCS remains marginalized within the MSEA/EEAA. As described above,
this means that the ostensible policymaking authorities on protectorate management are
limited in their ability to set management priorities in protected areas, regardless of civil
society participation.
Since the late 2000s, the government of Egypt has taken some steps toward
reforming protectorates management, and improving the autonomy of the NCS. In 2008,
the government submitted a proposal for a GEF-funded project, slated to begin in June of
2010, to improve protected areas management relevant to IBAs and migrating birds
covered by the MSB Project.597 As part of this project, the government has endorsed the
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delegation of further authority and autonomy to the NCS, a key step to improving policy,
and necessary to close existing institutional gaps.598
However, the historic implementation of protected areas management in Egypt
shows a considerable gap between legislation and practice. As observed by a prominent
Egyptian biologist from the UNESCO Man and Biosphere program,599 and a former
director of Red Sea protectorates, formally passed policies may go unfulfilled:
“…[the law] says that each nature reserve must have a Board of Directors.
No Board of Directors has been appointed until now for any one of the 27.
Only a Director. Number two; it says that the Ministry must designate a
buffer area around the natural reserve – this has not been done yet – in
which the Ministry has authority to control activities that will… affect the
nature reserve. So, according to that law, which is not implemented, you
can’t have a factory which will send air or water which is polluted to the
natural reserve. You shouldn’t do that, if you apply that law to the letter.
But it hasn’t been implemented.”600
…in Egypt, you can find a lot of protected areas, you know. They have
everything, you know. They have the infrastructure, they have the
management plan, but they don’t have the mentality, the good mentality of
the managers. Some of them are not even – they don’t know why these
protected areas are established.601
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Minimal Success in Promoting Tourist Reform
As described above, members of the TAN, particularly Sherif Baha el Din, had
some input in the design of formal ecotourism projects and in the inclusion of MSBs as a
developmental concern in the Red Sea area. However, TAN members indicated that this
inclusion was ephemeral at best. In particular, respondents indicated that gaining full
state support would rely on projecting improbably large and rapid returns on promoting
ecotourism based on bird-watching. Failing this, the project risked a loss of institutional
support.602 This was especially problematic, given that, as described in interviews,
commitment to improved management tended to fade when initial impetus – such as
funding generated from USAID and LIFE projects – ended.603
Another problem with these funded projects – I think they’re great when
the project is still funded, because they’re constantly putting in money. As
soon as they leave, all the money coming in, is gone. There’s no way to
maintain what is established.604
Further, despite the LIFE project’s inclusion of MSB management, the Egyptian
Tourism Federation, a public-private partnership between the Ministry of Tourism and
hoteliers, did not mention MSBs in their ecotourism plans in the Red Sea coast.605
Finally, as described below by a former protectorates manager from the South Sinai and a
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study on biodiversity capacity building in Egypt, the problem with ecotourism
implementation in Egypt is that policymakers and managers may use the term to refer to
a broad array of practices, even those which are contrary to the spirit of environmentally
sustainable management:
…all the hotels in Sharm say that they have an ecotourism. Because the
people come and enjoy the open air, the nature. But over there is not
completely – it’s not ecotourism. Ecotourism is going in your virgin
places and trying to not hurt that virginity, and using whatever minimum
resources… But you go over there, one guest over there in Sharm uses
about 2, 3 cubic meters of water daily, and about, let us say, 10, 20
kilowatts of electricity. So, it’s not ecotourism.606
While “ecotourism” has become a fashionable term used in the
development realm, its practical implementations have been of variable
quality.607

Integrate Biodiversity with Energy Management
The primary success in the TAN’s efforts to influence biodiversity conservation
and mainstream MSB concern occurred with energy management in the Red Sea. The
German Development Bank responded favorably to Hilgerloh’s suggestion, banning
construction in the southern three zones, and committing to search for alternative sites for
future construction in Egypt.608 In that case, the recommendations of the civil society
became practice. However, the fact that this took place in an area not administered by
606
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governmental agencies emphasizes the fact that the civil society had little influence in the
design and implementation of governmental policymaking in biodiversity conservation in
this case.

Conclusion
Formally, the effort of the TAN to “mainstream” concern about migratory soaring
birds in various sectors in Egypt was successful. As indicated above, concerns about
MSB conservation and habitat management were incorporated into existing plans for
protected areas management, including bilateral tourist development projects in the Red
Sea, national biodiversity management objectives, and into energy management plans.
However, the TAN remained dissatisfied with the actual institutional response to
MSB management. First, despite the formal recognition of MSB concerns in policy
documents and national strategy plans, the actual governmental response to new
information remained hampered by centralization and institutional distortions in natural
resource management. The Protectorates Division and the NCS continued to suffer from
a lack of resources and low institutional autonomy. The long-term commitment of the
MSEA/EEAA to MSB mainstreaming, beyond verbal inclusion in project documents was
not considered meaningful by TAN interview respondents.
Second, with few exceptions, the TAN remained excluded from the policy
decision process. Although the NCS maintained some ties with members of the MSB
TAN, including Sherif Baha el Din and Mindy el Din, this communication did not extend
to the rest of the NCE, or the MSB oriented network. Despite the formal inclusion of the
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NCE in the MSEA/EEAA’s efforts, interview respondents were unanimous in stating that
the NCE had no formal input into the implementation of the project, the allocation of
resources, or the priorities set in management. The one sector that evinced TAN success
was in wind farm construction, and that occurred primarily because ornithologists were
able to influence the German Development Bank, the funding agency behind wind farm
construction in Gebel el Zeit, not due to any success in persuading Egyptian
policymakers directly. At the local management level, members of the TAN were
occasionally able to make contact with park rangers in, for example, Red Sea
protectorates and Sant Katherin for training sessions and information exchange, but these
successes were unorganized, and unsystematic.
To some extent then, the failure of the TAN in this case may be overdetermined.
As argued in the previous chapters, there is no support for the idea that using economic
arguments will improve TAN influence in developing countries: H1: epistemic
communities and advocacy networks will be comparatively successful in influencing
environmentally friendly management in LDCs if they use economic arguments to justify
action. In addition, the network did not generate an intersubjective consensus, nor was it
able to socialize with policymakers in relevant natural resource management agencies.
Thus, both H2: epistemic communities will be more successful in generating influence
than other kinds of TANs and H3: Socialization improves the influence of epistemic
communities would indicate that the TAN would have limited chance of success in this
case.
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Here, the data suggest that low socialization, more so than a lack of consensus,
prevented the TAN from influencing management. In this case, the exclusion of the MSB
TAN from de facto project management, and the lack of support from the MSEA/EEAA
presented a barrier to the network’s information generation efforts. As suggested,
socialization between the civil society and policymakers, as well as the ability of the civil
society TAN to generate a knowledge consensus, were undermined by the personalist,
autocratic Egyptian natural resource management regime.

Implications for Effective Environmental Governance
As described in this and the previous three chapters, the domestic governance of
globally relevant biodiversity was influenced by the advocacy efforts of transnational
networks of experts. These networks were constituted when various researchers around
the world became concerned about ecosystem health in sensitive areas, and drafted or
participated in the design of GEF-funded projects aimed at supporting state capacity to
implement Party obligations to the CBD. As described throughout, these obligations
included carrying out activities such as state-driven in situ conservation and conducting
biodiversity taxonomies. Despite the beliefs of transnational advocates and
policymakers, strategically designed arguments highlighting the purported economic
attractiveness of environmental management had no independent impact on the influence
exercised by networks of experts.
When transnational networks generated an intersubjective consensus on the causal
dimensions of an environmental problem, and when they were able to socialize with
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policymakers in natural resource management agencies, state bodies were more willing to
undertake real reforms in biodiversity management. In addition, this chapter indicates
that the domestic political organization of the state also matters. Since socialization is
crucial to transmitting knowledge and beliefs from transnational networks to managers,
modes of political organization that preclude socialization, such as extreme political
centralization and autocracy, are not likely to support epistemic community influence.
While the reforms proposed by epistemic communities and advocacy networks
may not, in the long run, solve the problems of biodiversity governance in their
respective issue areas due in part to exogenous factors,609 epistemic communities and
advocacy networks can persuade states to take action where otherwise they might not
have. In other words, transnational networks of concerned experts contribute to the
effectiveness of international biodiversity governance.610 Indeed, as described in these
cases, understanding how transnational advocacy function is key to understanding how
states understand and implement MEAs.
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For example, with respect to Chapter 4 and the SAM Project, coral reefs are
sensitive to increasing ocean temperatures, which are driven by global climate change.
Therefore, even with unprecedented action by managers in Mexico, rising temperatures
could lead to a loss in coral reef coverage in the Mesoamerican basin.
610

Using positive change short of full compliance under a treaty as a measure of
environmental effectiveness is used throughout the literature on global environmental
governance, including in: Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993,
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental Protection (Cambridge:
MIT Press); Ronald B. Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation,
Compliance, and Effectiveness, in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed.,
International Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press); Carsten
Helm and Detlef F. Sprinz, 2000, Measuring the Effectiveness of International
Environmental Regimes (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(5): 630 – 652).
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The implication then is that other factors are less important in explaining effective
global governance. In particular, this conclusion differs from schools of global
environmental governance that attribute effective management to regime characteristics,
including the specificity of requirements, procedural transparency, and capacity building
in weak states.611 When regimes are improperly designed, states will be less willing to
carry out cost prohibitive management. This is particularly likely in environmental
problems such as biodiversity governance, where the global benefits of effective
management are dispersed, but the costs concentrated.
The following chapter therefore engages with the question of regime design, to
investigate whether variation in regime design explains the variation in state commitment
among these cases to carrying out domestic policies for biodiversity governance. As
mentioned in the Introduction and throughout, while all three states have signed the CBD,
it is not the only international or regional MEA relevant to the projects described. Each
participating case is situated in a sui generis complex of international agreements and
declarations, including the Tulúm Declaration in Mexico and AEWA in Egypt. As such,
it is entirely possible that variations in the characteristics of the MEAs relevant to each
country will explain variations in the state behavior described here.
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See Ronald B. Mitchell, 2006, Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the
Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, (Global
Environmental Politics, 6 (3): 72 – 89); Ronald B. Mitchell, 1994, Regime Design
Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (International Organization
48(3): 425 – 458).
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Table 5.1: List of MSB Policy Makers

AGENCY
Governorates (esp. Red Sea
and Sinai)
Tourist Development
Authority

JURISDICTION
EST. THROUGH

Political Geographic
divisions

MSEA/EEAA

Executive power
Law 4/1997l Law
102/1983

NCS

Agency of
MSEA/EEAA; Law
102/1983

Executive Branch

Formal and informal
executive power
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ACTIONS
Tourist regulations; municipal
management
Tourism regulations and support for
tourist development
Allocation of funds for environmental
regulation; Lead agency of NCS
Management of protected areas (in
Protectorates Division); Regulation of
biodiversity, including taxonomy (in
Biodiversity Unit)
Land use zoning, allocation of funds,
de fact political centralization of
power

Table 5.2: List of TAN Members in the MSB Project

ORGANIZATION

INDIVIDUAL
S

FUNCTIONS

SCIENCE
TRAININ
G

Birdlife International

Graham Tucker

Threat assessment, species
monitoring

Ornitholog
y

Richard Porter

Species monitoring

Ornitholog
y

Sherif Baha el
Din (also NCE)

Cairo University

Mindy Baha el
Din (also NCE)
Mohammed
Kassas (also
NCE)

NCE

Hala Barakat

EgyBirdGroup

Mary Megalli
John Grainger
(also
EgyBirdGroup)
Mohammed
Amin
István
Moldován

Ornitholog
y

Species monitoring
Protected areas ecology;
biodiversity studies

Species and habitat monitoring

Species and habitat monitoring
Species and habitat monitoring
Ranger training / habitat
monitoring/species monitoring

Tom Coles

Species and habitat monitoring

Nick Williams

Species and habitat monitoring

Dick Hoek

Species and habitat monitoring
Habitat monitoring and
protected areas management

Alaa El-Din
Gudrun
Hilgerloh

Habitat monitoring
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Ornitholog
y

Ecology
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ornitholog
y
Ranger
Ornitholog
y

Table 5.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in MSB Advocacy
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Figure 5.1: Map of Governorates of Egypt612

612

This map does not show the Helwan governorate.
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Figure 5.2: Protectorates in Egypt, est. 1997 Land Utilization Map
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Figure 5.3: Map of BLI Registered IBAs
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Figure 5.4: Diagram of MSB TAN Links
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CHAPTER 6
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ANALYSIS

Introduction
The previous chapters argue that the commitment of state policymakers to
environmental governance can be influenced by the actions of transnational knowledge
networks. As indicated, networks that generate socialization between themselves and
target audiences, as well as an intersubjective consensus, will be more likely to persuade
policymakers and managers to adopt their policy recommendations and act accordingly.
However, while policymakers, academics and advocates may believe that economic
framing increases the likelihood that networks will be able to influence state
environmental management, there is no support for this argument.
This gives a constructivist explanation for global environmental outcomes.
Changes in environmental behavior are attributed to the ability of transnational networks
to generate norms and persuade policymakers and managers to internalize these norms
and act accordingly. Consequently, the analysis here is engaged primarily with the
interplay between the transnational level of norms and knowledge and the domestic level
of local politics and civil society participation. As described throughout, this multi-level,
normative approach has implications for the study of international environmental
relations, by offering explanations of how governments respond to their obligations under
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).
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Conversely, a level of analysis that examines the relationship between states and
international institutions is discounted as not offering explanatory power. This focus on
transnational processes should be justified, as approaches at the international level argue
that state behavior is conditioned, not by norms deployed by non-state actors, but by the
structures and rules of international institutions. In general, state-centric approaches
argue that international outcomes can be meaningfully shaped by institutions that are
designed such that they, among other things, provide financial incentives to laggardly
actors; clarify appropriate rules; and specify requirements for compliance.613 The study
of international institutions has to include a two-level perspective, as obligations and
incentives have to be translated through domestic implementing agencies in relevant
cases. Nevertheless, from this perspective, the international regime, consisting of the
actions, expectations, rules and negotiations of states, comprises the “basic unit of
analysis,”614 so that variations in regime design explain variations in state behavior.
This argument should be tested, as the cases studied here in Jamaica, Mexico and
Egypt were embedded in different complexes of international institutions. These
613

See inter alia, Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime
Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press); Helmut
Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing International
Environmental Regimes from Case Study to Database (Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran
Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
(Cambridge: MIT Press); Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993,
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, ed., 1996, Institutions
for Environmental Aid (Cambridge: MIT Press).
614

Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing
International Environmental Regimes from Case Study to Database (Cambridge: MIT
Press) p. 229.
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complexes vary significantly in regards to their design structure, despite a common
concern with protected areas and biodiversity management. As indicated in Table 1.1 in
the Introduction, and as discussed in the chapters throughout, the projects emerged
subsequent to biodiversity-oriented MEAs and institutions. Some of these are held in
common across all cases, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility
(GEF), while others, such as the Ramsar Convention and the Convention on Migratory
Species (CMS) are only relevant to some. Consequently, in each of these cases, the
governmental natural resource agencies discussed throughout could be responding
primarily to the incentives and obligations contained in these institutions, rather than to
the norms and knowledge deployed by transnational networks.
In order to have confidence in the utility of the transnational network approach, it
is necessary to test the explanatory power of the institutionalist approach. The following
sections explain how institutions constrain state behavior, and then examine the
integration of natural resource agencies in international institutions across cases.

The Explanatory Power of International Institutions
Constraining State Behavior
The international institutionalist perspective argues that institutions, such as
international organizations, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), secretariats,
and Conferences of the Parties (COPs) can constrain the behavior of states. Institutions
do this by structuring incentives for action, generating shared expectations, coordinating
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behavior, and formalizing rules and obligations to which states generally abide. As such,
institutions can contribute to the effective management of global problems, by
encouraging states to take needed action where they otherwise would not.615 This applies
even if the behavioral change observed stops short of some ideal metric of compliance.616
Of course, the existence of an institution is not sufficient to cause changes in
behavior. Institutions have to be constructed in such a way as to maximize the likelihood
that governments and their regulatory agencies will carry out the domestic requirements
of institutional compliance. For example, where institutions provide clearer obligations,
link regime requirements to issues of concern to states, and establish greater financial
assistance, the behavior of participating governments will be more likely to converge on
the desired behavior of a given regime.

Designing Effective Institutions
The literature gives a fairly consistent set of explanations as to how institutions
may structure incentives for states to comply with international obligations. Effective
institutions, that is, those most likely to influence state behavior, are theorized to be those

615

Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting
Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press); Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and
Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing International Environmental Regimes from Case Study
to Database (Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of
International Environmental Regimes (Cambridge: MIT Press).
616

Ronald Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation (in Urs Luterbacher
and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed., International Relations and Global Climate Change,
Cambridge: MIT Press); Arild Underdal, 2002, One Question, Two Answers (in Miles
et al, Environmental Regime Effectiveness, Cambridge: MIT Press).
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exhibiting the “three C’s” described in 1993 by Haas, Keohane and Levy.617 That is,
effective environmental institutions will be those that provide or foster concern among
participating governments, a contractual environment conducive to making credible
commitments, and the capacity of participating states to carry out their requirements.
These are found in institutions that, among other things: provide financing or a funding
mechanism to needy states, establish clear and well-defined requirements, create a
credible monitoring and reporting system, and encourage the participation of NGO and
civil society experts.618 No single one of these features is sufficient, and in fact these are
inter-related and self-reinforcing.619 The following elaborates on the mechanics of
providing the “three Cs.”
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Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993, Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press). See Andrea K. Gerlak, 2004, One Basin at a Time: The Global Environment
Facility and the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics,
4: 108 – 141) for a recent discussion on the three C’s as applied to biodiversity
management institutions.
618

See inter alia, Ronald Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation (in
Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed., International Relations and Global Climate
Change, Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran Young and George Demko, 1996, Improving
the Effectiveness of International Environmental Governance Systems, in Oran Young
et al, eds. Global Environmental Change and International Governance (Hanover:
University Press of New England); Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of
International Environmental Regimes; Ronald B. Mitchell, 2006, Problem Structure,
Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements, (Global Environmental Politics, 6 (3): 72 – 89); Ronald B. Mitchell, 1994,
Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance
(International Organization 48(3): 425 – 458).
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Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
(Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 20.
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Concern
One of the fundamental obstacles to implementing the obligations of
environmental institutions is a lack of political will among the relevant governmental
agencies tasked with carrying out domestic regulation. After all, while the goal of
institutionalist approaches is to explain state behavior, international treaties are
implemented when governments translate requirements into domestic action. As a result,
effective regimes should promote sufficient concern about the need to take necessary
action among implementing states and their regulatory agencies and influential domestic
actors.
With regard to carrying out biodiversity-oriented MEAs, concern can be
generated in several ways. Within implementing states, the management of ecosystems
could be linked domestically to the interests of privileged sectors, such as tourism and
trade industries. In addition, the concern of the central government itself could be raised
by linking ecosystem management to other MEAs, such as those dealing with climate
change, land degradation or deforestation, thus raising the profile of a given issue.
An important component of concern as well, is whether credible, institutionalized
knowledge is available to all stakeholders. Institutions that provide a forum for
centralized knowledge gathering, and disseminate expert information to central
governments and to domestic sectors can lead to a growing awareness among key actors
of the severity of environmental problems and the need for urgent action.
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Capacity Building
One of the primary obstacles to generating positive change in environmental
policy and practice is the fact that without sufficient resources, even the most
environmentally sympathetic government will find it difficult to carry out needed
reforms. As a result, effective regimes should promote capacity in key states and
domestic actors. A prominent recommendation for building capacity in global
biodiversity management is the provision of a funding mechanism to relevant parties,
particularly developing countries.620 As observed earlier, one of the challenges facing
biodiversity governance is the fact that the costs of implementing regulations pursuant to
biodiversity MEAs are borne by LDCs, while the benefits received, whether aesthetic,
moral, or pharmaceutical, are dispersed globally. Providing sufficient funds to LDCs to
offset the costs of regulating and protecting the environment is thus critical. Financial
incentives are not the only means of capacity building, however. Accurate technical
knowledge, training, up-to-date information, and recommendations for effective
management practices can all contribute to the capacity of states to manage emerging
problems, by clarifying the most effective courses of action.
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For a recent synopsis of various arguments on enhancing capacity and aid, see in
particular Stacy D. VanDeveer, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. 2001. It’s Capacity, Stupid:
International Assistance and National Implementation (Global Environmental Politics
1: 18– 29). See Simon Lyster, 1996, Effectiveness of International Regimes Dealing
with Biodiversity from the Perspective of the North, (in Oran Young et al, eds. Global
Environmental Change and International Governance) for a specific discussion of the
role of financial assistance in generating capacity and will in LDCs pursuant to
biodiversity management.
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Contractual Environment
Finally, a hospitable contractual environment provides the ability for states to
make credible commitments, fulfill requirements, and generate converging expectations
of appropriate behavior. Again, this is a multidimensional metric, depending on several
interrelated factors. For states to make credible commitments, regimes should be
constructed so that it is possible to monitor the activities of states’ that impinge on the
goals of constructed regimes. Regular monitoring and reporting not only verifies when
states are in violation of treaty requirements, but may also assist states in gathering
information on domestic environmental activity. For example, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) requires
Parties to collect data on the status of domestic legislation on species and habitat
management, while identifying and maintaining national records on the transit of species
governed by the Convention.621 Similarly, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), as part of their reporting and
monitoring requirements, have to create national monitoring centers, using
methodologies created by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to
evaluate domestic contributions to global climate change.622
However, having states monitor and report on compliance efforts will not
necessarily lead to effective management unless it is clear what compliance entails. For
621

Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Article 7, 13 March 1992.
622

See relevant decisions in Kyoto Protocol, Articles 5, 7 and 8, and the 3rd Conference
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/CP/1997/7.Add.1 Decision 2/CP.3
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example, a requirement that Parties take a specific step toward treaty implementation,
such as requiring a 30% cut in sulfur emissions or transboundary fluxes among
neighboring European states,623 allows actors to make accurate assessments about
whether or not states are fulfilling their obligations. Conversely, broad, open-ended
obligations, for example exhortations that Parties improve governance, allow for
substantial ambiguity in measuring compliance. Thus, the more specific the requirements
for treaty implementation are, the more the treaty enhances the contractual environment
of compliance.

The Role of the Global Civil Society
Institutionalists do address the potential participation of the global civil society.
As dynamic sources of information, civil society actors such as ENGOs and epistemic
community networks can contribute to all dimensions of effective regime design.624 As
proselytizers about emerging problems, the civil society can contribute to state concern.
As sources of expertise and knowledge, they may contribute to state capacity to respond
to emerging problems. Finally, by contributing to monitoring and reporting, the civil
society may enhance the contractual environment of regimes by ensuring that infractions
will be recorded.
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Taken from the Helsinki Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (UN ECE LRTAP).
624

See Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime Effectiveness:
Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press).
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This argument, while asserting some agency to non-state actors and transnational
NGOs, differs from the cognitivist-ideational approach taken by the dissertation. The
global civil society matters in regime design, not because they influence how states
conceptualize of their interests and identities, or because of their ability to shape the
normative assessments of emerging environmental problems, but because they can
contribute a knowledge base necessary for rational decision making.625 While potentially
important to the conduct of regimes, their inclusion in institutions is purely functional,
and again constrained by the rules of participation allowed by states.626 Thus, rather than
shaping norms and commonly held understandings, networks of experts function as
problem-solvers. At the same time, understanding how regimes and institutions constrain
states still requires that some attention be paid to the actions of non-state actors, such as
ENGOs.

Comparing Regimes: Variation in Project Embeddedness
With this in mind, the following section describes the institutions invoked by the
projects studied. As described above, each of the projects examined in the case studies is
embedded in a different constellation of international institutions; each references
ecosystems, species, and management approaches that invoke different international and
regional MEAs created to manage, inter alia, fish, flora, coral reefs, wetlands and
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Arild Underdal, 2002, One Question, Two Answers.
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See in particular, Kal Raustiala, 1997, States, NGOs, and International
Environmental Institutions (International Studies Quarterly, 41: 719 – 740)
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rainforests. Some projects invoke specific obligations of MEAs, some are only
tangentially related.
In the following section, I identify which MEAs are invoked by the GEF Projects.
I measure how each constellation of MEAs generates concern, provides capacity, and
enhancing the contractual environment among Parties in the interest of global
biodiversity management. In particular, I examine how these MEAs and obligations are
incorporated into the natural resource agencies discussed in each case. As indicators of
concern, I examined whether the relevant institution linked biodiversity management to
other local or international issues, and disseminated promotional information on the state
of the environment. To measure the capacity building strength of the institution, I
examined whether the institution provided financial support for project implementation,
or fostered the production of expert knowledge linked to effective project management.
This was enhanced if the institution made recommendations of best practices in
environmental management.
Finally, to identify whether the contractual environment of an institution was
conducive to carrying out biodiversity management, I examined the goals of the
institution to see if they reinforce and replicate the goals of the project. For example,
institutions will enhance the contractual environment of a project if they call on Parties to
take action in specific geographic locations, or to protect the species identified in the
GEF-funded projects.
The indicators of concern, capacity-building, and the hospitableness of the
contractual environment were measured by examining the features of the various
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institutions invoked by the projects. These features included the texts of treaties and their
associated Protocols, resolutions, and recommendations adopted at various Conferences
of the Parties (COPs). I also examined domestic and international institutions created
pursuant to the various treaties, including domestic standing technical or scientific
bodies; funding mechanisms; and central clearing houses of information. In each case,
the mechanisms through which the institution promotes the three Cs are explained below.

Regime Design: the CBD and the GEF
Since the projects were established pursuant to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), these
institutions are the first addressed here. All parties are members of the CBD, and all have
received funds from the GEF for carrying out these projects. As a result, the ratification
of these institutions will not predict variation between the Parties in their commitment to
the domestic implementation of global biodiversity obligations. Nevertheless, insofar as
they contribute to the ability of states to carry out biodiversity management, the CBD and
the GEF are discussed below.

Concern
As currently designed, the CBD has a variety of mechanisms that were designed
with the purpose of promoting greater concern about biodiversity in participating states.
First, the Parties to the CBD created mechanisms to promote and disseminate information
highlighting the global importance of biodiversity conservation. At the first Conference
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of the Parties (COP-1) in 1994, member states cited Article 18.3 calling on Parties to
create a central clearing house of information within the Convention, called the Clearing
House Mechanism (CHM).627 Between 1994 and 1999, the CHM entered into a pilot
phase, and succeeding COPs elaborated on the function of the institution. COP-2
recommended that Parties establish national CHM focal points as part of a global
information exchange network,628 and COP-4 requested that Parties promote the
inclusion of knowledge generated from local and indigenous communities.629
These and other recommendations emphasizing the decentralized collection of
biodiversity-related knowledge and the dissemination of such knowledge among Parties
were adopted after the end of the pilot phase at COP-5.630 Currently, the Information
Centre of the CHM continues the mandate of disseminating knowledge by producing
synthetic reports on the state of global biodiversity, including the Global Biodiversity
Outlook and assorted newsletters.
Second, the CBD and the GEF have attempted to link biodiversity conservation
with other international obligations as a means of generating concern. At COP-6, the
Secretariat of the CBD linked biodiversity loss with the goals of other MEAs, including
the Convention to Combat Desertification, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (reiterated at COP-10), the Cartagena Convention, and the Ramsar Convention
627

UNEP/CBD/COP/1/Decision I/3

628

UNEP/CBD/COP/2/Decision II/3.4, Decision II/3.5

629

UNEP/CBD/COP/4/Decision IV/2.10

630

UNEP/CBD/COP/5/INF/3
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on Wetlands. This was carried out to highlight the synergy between the CBD and other
MEAs, some of which are specific to the countries discussed in the dissertation.631 As
suggested above, the fact that multiple treaties invoke the same, or overlapping
obligations, arguably reinforces the concern of member states to carry these obligations
out.
Further, pronouncements made at COP-6 and COP-7 of the CBD recommended
that parties link biodiversity management with important domestic concerns, especially
those with economic development implications, such as tourism, trade and labor.632 The
link between domestic development and biodiversity was reinforced in 2006, when the
GEF promoted “biodiversity mainstreaming,” or the integration of “the sustainable use of
biodiversity into the sectors of the economy that strongly impact biodiversity outside of
protected areas,”633 pursuant to a recommendation made by its Scientific and Technical
Advisory Panel (STAP).634

Domestic Internalization
In each case, this concern was incorporated into domestic natural resource
management agencies. Pursuant to Article 18.3 and decisions taken at COP-2, the

631

UNEP/CBD/COP/6/Decision VI/15/Annex II.14

632

UNEP/CBD/COP/6/Decision VI/15/Annex II.15; UNEP/CBD/COP/7/Decision
VII/14
633

GEF-4 Biodiversity Strategy, pg. 8.

634

GEF-4 Biodiversity Strategy, pg. 8.
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relevant countries created national Clearing House Mechanisms as part of a global
information-sharing network. There was, however, some difference across cases in the
relationship between the national CHM and the government. In Jamaica, the national
Clearing House Mechanism was a quasi-independent institution, housed in the Institute of
Jamaica (IOJ), a governmental cultural organization. In contrast, the national CHMs of
Mexico and Egypt were more directly involved in natural resource management. The
Egyptian CHM is located in the Nature Conservation Sector, a branch of the
environmental ministry (MSEA/EEAA), while the Mexican CHM is situated in the
Comisión Nacional para el Uso y Conocimiento de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO).635 As
described in Chapters 3 through 5, the MSEA/EEAA and CONABIO are two of the
major policymaking institutions in the MSB Project in Egypt, and the CBMMx Project in
Mexico respectively, while the Jamaican CHM functioned primarily as an additional
actor within the epistemic community network. Nevertheless, this process indicates the
interplay between domestic level structures and international institutions.

Capacity
The primary capacity building institution within the biodiversity regime is the
GEF, administered financially and technically by the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). The GEF was created specifically to transfer funds and technical expertise to
635

Information on the location of the national CHMs is taken from the CBD’s webpage
on the Clearing House Mechanism, retrieved online, February 2011 from
http://www.cbd.int/chm/
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developing countries, under the rationale that most of the terrestrial biodiversity exists
within the jurisdiction of LDCs, and that urgent action within these countries is central to
effective conservation of biodiversity.636 While the World Bank and the UNDP are the
prominent financiers of GEF activity,637 the UNDP and UNEP also engage in capacity
building, through project support, and conducting technical training with natural resource
agencies in Parties.638 In the most recent funding cycle for GEF, for 2006 – 2010, the
organization allocated $2.8 billion for biodiversity management projects in Parties to the
CBD.639
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UNEP Global Biodiversity Assessment, cited in Rosendal, Interacting International
Institutions pg. 3; see also Lyle Glowka et al. 1994. A Guide to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (IUCN: Gland, Switzerland) p. 1. This conclusion has also been
reiterated in meetings of the administrative bodies of the Convention, including the first
Conference of the Parties (COP-1): “The genetic resources are, to a large extent, found
in the developing countries” (UNEP/CBD/COP/1/Inf.9). The Global Environment
Facility (GEF) was chosen to act as an interim mechanism in the first COP meeting,
and was finalized through a Memorandum of Understanding as the permanent financial
mechanism in the third COP meeting. See UNEP/CBD/COP/3/10, which contains a
reproduction of the Memorandum.
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the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics 4: 108 – 141)
639

GEF, 2010, OPS4.
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Domestic Internalization
This capacity building process was further incorporated into domestic natural
resource management agencies. In the projects studied, the GEF provided substantial
funds to actors within the participating states. Again, there was substantial variation
between cases in regards to the incorporation of this capacity building exercise into
domestic institutions. In Jamaica, the GEF provided US$200,300 to Birdlife
International for the Project for Sustainable Conservation in the Cockpit Country.640
This project was to be carried out primarily by partnerships between Birdlife
International and local NGOs, including Birdlife Jamaica and the Windsor Research
Centre (WRC), and natural resource managers in the Forestry Department and the
National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA).
In comparison, the GEF provided more direct capacity building to national
regulatory agencies in Mexico and Egypt. The funds for the CBMMx Project in Mexico,
in the amount of US$14,840,000, were provided to the governmental financial agency,
Nacional Financiera A.C. to be distributed to CONABIO.641 In Mexico, GEF provided
US$680,000 directly to the MSEA/EEAA as the implementing partner, and another
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United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Facility
Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important
Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource
(retrieved October 2005 from www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp.
26
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World Bank, 2000, Mexico: Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (World Bank
project document), pp. 1
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US$1,100,000 through the Red Sea Governorate Project for MSB double-mainstreaming
efforts in Egypt.642

Contractual Environment
While the GEF and the CBD institutions do contribute to generating concern
among parties, and have established mechanisms for capacity building, the institutions
have a weak contractual environment. The GEF has made ratification of the CBD a
condition for receiving funds for the ongoing projects discussed in the research, thus
establishing clear rules for compliance, and a system of incentives for doing so.
Formally, the Convention is a binding treaty, and has specific obligations of which
compliance can be measured.
However, the substantive obligations of the CBD are vague enough that there is
sufficient scope for Parties to equivocate in practice, while formally complying with the
procedural requirements of the treaty. The primary specific requirement of the CBD is
the creation by Parties of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) to
outline the participating government’s approach to managing biodiversity
conservation,643 but the actual content of domestic implementation is left to the discretion
of states. Further, there is a monitoring mechanism for the CBD, which is carried out by
the Convention’s Subsidiary Body for the provision of Scientific, Technical and
642

UNDP/Birdlife International [Birdlife], 2006. Mainstreaming Conservation of
Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea
Flyway (UNDP Project Document), pp. 102
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Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 5.
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Technological Advice (SBSTTA).644 However, the SBSTTA depends largely on selfreporting by the Contracting Parties to perform this function, rather than on conducting
independent monitoring.645 Thus, on this metric, the CBD and the GEF provide a very
weak contractual environment for regime implementation.

Domestic Internalization
Although the contractual obligations of the CBD and the GEF Projects were
minor, they were nevertheless incorporated at the domestic level into governmental
institutions. As mentioned above, the national governments of Jamaica, Mexico and
Egypt all ratified the CBD prior to receiving funds for project implementation. In
addition, in all cases, natural resource regulatory agencies were directly involved in
drafting the NBSAPs, the Article 6 requirement. In Jamaica, the NBSAP was drafted by
NEPA, in consultation with local experts;646 in Mexico, the NBSAP was drafted by
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The SBSTTA also holds regular meetings, first meeting in 1995, having held 13
meetings to date. Taken from the Convention website on the SBSTTA, found at
http://www.cbd.int/sbstta/.
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Andrea Gerlak, 2004, One Basin at a Time: The Global Environment Facility and
the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics 4: 108 – 141)
646

National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA), 2003, National Strategy and
Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica [NBSAP]. (National Environment and Planning
Agency: Kingston);
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CONABIO;647 in Egypt, by the Biodiversity Unit, a subsidiary body of the NCS and the
MSEA/EEAA.648
However, the CBD and the GEF are not the only institutions in which the projects
are embedded. The following section describes the other MEAs relevant to the
management of biodiversity in each of the countries carrying out the GEF-funded
projects. In each case, the MEAs cited were taken from the ratified treaties listed by the
Ministry of Environment of each country. The MEAs contribute either generally to
biodiversity management pertinent to the project issue area, or contribute specifically to
iterated goals within the project, as illustrated below.

Jamaica and Cockpit Country Management
Of the four case studies, the project carried out in the Jamaican Cockpit Country
is the least embedded in additional international biodiversity institutions. Aside from the
CBD and the GEF, the biodiversity MEAs invoked in this project are: 1) the Convention
for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region649 (Cartagena Convention), 2) its 1990 protocol on specially protected areas and
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CONABIO, 2000, Estrategia nacional sobre biodiversidad de México
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MSEA/EEAA, 1998, Egypt: National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity
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Defined in Article 2 of the Cartagena Convention as “…the marine environment of
the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea and the areas of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent
thereto, south of 30 deg north latitude and within 200 nautical miles of the Atlantic
coasts of the States referred to in article 25 of the Convention.”
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wildlife (SPAW Protocol),650 and 3) the Ramsar Convention. A summary table of the
impact of these institutions on the management of biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is
given in Table 6.1: Summary Impact of Institutions on Cockpit Country
Management. The following section explains how the concern, capacity and
contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect with the
goals of the Project on Sustainable Conservation and local natural resource managment.

Concern
As discussed above, COP-6 of the CBD linked the biodiversity management goals
of the Ramsar Convention with the CBD. While Cockpit Country management does not
involve wetlands or littoral ecosystem management, this association arguably raises the
profile of biodiversity management in Jamaica, as it is a signatory to the Ramsar
Convention. In addition, NEPA, the environmental regulatory agency of Jamaica, is the
national Ramsar Administrative Authority. While the Ramsar sites in Jamaica are all
located on the south coast, there is some evidence that participation in this MEA has
contributed to concern for ecologically-oriented biodiversity management in the national
government. For example, the text of the Ramsar Convention and the 1999 COP-4 call

650

Kayenne Taylor, Report on the Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit
Country Conservation Project (Kingston), pp. 10, 76; (UNEP), Global Environment
Facility Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared
Resource (retrieved October 2005 from
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 88.
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on Parties to manage wetlands in part to conserve migratory birds.651 Since then, NEPA
has carried out bird monitoring in Ramsar sites, most recently in 2010.652 As mentioned
in Chapter 2, the integration of ecosystem management with bird welfare was an
important component of the Project for Sustainable Conservation. However, this
contribution to direct concern for biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country is
marginal.
The Cartagena Convention, drafted in 1983, was established subsequent to the
1979 Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP-UNEP), one of UNEP’s Regional Seas
Programmes. Cartagena establishes general obligations for Contracting Parties to
conserve and sustainably manage marine ecosystems in the Caribbean Sea,653 to limit
land-based sources of marine pollution,654 and calls on Parties to establish additional
protocols augmenting regional environment.655 While the Cartagena Convention is
primarily focused on conserving marine ecosystems, subsequent Meetings of the Parties
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Ramsar Convention, Article 5; Ramsar Convention COP-4, Recommendation 4.4
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NEPA, 2010, Wetland bird and habitat monitoring of 2 RAMSAR sites in Jamaica.
Retrieved online, February 2011 from
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(MOPs) of the Convention have illustrated the linkage of biodiversity conservation to
other global concerns, including climate change and coastal management.656
As a Party to the Cartagena Convention since ratification in 1987, chair of the
Monitoring Committee in 2000, and as host to the offices of the CEP-UNEP, Jamaica has
been central in the promotion of concern about biodiversity under the Cartagena
Convention.
The SPAW Protocol also tangentially links marine biodiversity management to
coastal and terrestrial ecosystems in the wider Caribbean ecoregion.657 As described in
the 1999 Legal Assessment of land use policy,658 Hayes-Sutton’s 2004 PAMP study,659
and in the GEF project documents,660 the SPAW Protocol could be invoked as a reason
for conserving the Cockpit Country, insofar as the downstream degradation of mountain
ecosystems could negatively impact coastal management.
Moreover, these elements of concern have also been incorporated at the domestic
level in the Jamaican political system. As discussed in Chapter 2, the finding that
downstream degradation from mountainous ecosystems was harmful to coastal
management was reiterated in the 1999 NBSAP studies conducted on behalf of the
656
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Preamble, Articles 4 and 5 of the SPAW Protocol.
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Kayenne Taylor, Report on the Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit
Country Conservation Project
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Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, Categorization of Protected Areas in Jamaica
(The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, 2004), pp. 7 - 8
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UNEP, GEF Project Document, pp. 88.
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NRCA/NEPA. More directly, the Jamaican national government is carrying out its
obligations under the Cartagena Convention through domestic natural resource agencies
involved in the Cockpit Country Project, namely NEPA and the Forestry Department.
Under a National Plan of Action drafted in 2003,661 NEPA is tasked with coordinating
environmental management to reduce, among other things, coastal sewage disposal
relevant to the goals of the Convention. In addition, the Forestry Department has the
mandate to declare additional Forest Reserves in coastal zones needing protection.
However, language associating mountainous ecosystems to marine management is not
found within the SPAW Protocol itself, indicating again only a marginal connection
between the MEA and the goals of the Project for Sustainable Conservation.

Capacity
Neither the Cartagena Convention, nor the SPAW Protocol, nor the Ramsar
Convention has established mechanisms for capacity building relevant to Cockpit
Country management. The information collected by the Secretariats for environmental
management pertains to marine ecosystems; mountainous ecosystems such as the Cockpit
Country, are not addressed. The primary capacity building efforts in regards to Cockpit
Country management stem from the CBD and GEF funds provided for the Project for
Sustainable Conservation.
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NEPA, 2004, Jamaica’s National Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Coastal and Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources of Pollution (Kingston:
NEPA).
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Contractual Environment
Similarly, none of the above listed MEAs impacts the contractual environment of
the Project for Sustainable Conservation. Although terrestrial ecosystems are mentioned
as potentially relevant to marine management in the SPAW Protocol, the Cockpit
Country is not specifically mentioned, nor are mountainous ecosystems in general.

Mexico and the Mesoamerican Reef System
The SAM Project and the CBMMx Project both invoke Mexico, and so there is
substantial overlap among the institutions in which they are both embedded. The
institutions pertaining to the SAM Project are: 1) the Cartagena Convention; 2) its SPAW
Protocol; 3) its Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities
(LBS Protocol); 4) The Ramsar Convention; 5) The Tulúm Declaration; 6) the
Centroamerican Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD); and 7) the
Caribbean Environment Programme of the UNEP (CEP-UNEP).
A summary table of the impact of these institutions on the management of
biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is given in Table 6.2: Summary Impact of
Institutions on SAM Management. The following section explains how the concern,
capacity and contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect
with the goals of the SAM Project.
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Concern
Concern about managing the Mesoamerican reef region is enhanced by the fact
that several MEAs and institutions highlight the importance of governance in this area to
myriad international obligations. The Ramsar Convention, as described above, raises the
profile of biodiversity management in wetland ecosystems such as the Sian Ka’an
Biosphere Reserve, part of the SAM Project’s focal points. As in Jamaica, local
regulatory agencies associated with GEF Project management have been incorporated
into the country’s obligations under the Convention. Mexico designated SEMARNAT
and CONANP as the Administrative Authority and Focal Point respectively of the
Ramsar Convention, requiring these agencies to participate in the regular Conferences of
the Parties.
The Cartagena Convention, ratified by Mexico in 1985, links marine management
in the Caribbean Sea, part of which includes Mexico’s territorial waters in the
Mesoamerican basin, to the broader goals of global biodiversity conservation. As
described above in Jamaica, the Cartagena Secretariat holds regular MOPs, highlighting
the importance of global marine management, and Article 7 of the Convention calls on
Parties to prevent or reduce land-based pollution of marine ecosystems. SEMARNAT is
the implementing agency of the Cartagena Convention
This concern in turn was reinforced by the adoption in 1999 of a Protocol
Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities (LBS Protocol) to the
Cartagena Convention. The LBS Protocol requires states to cooperate bilaterally or
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regionally to limit transboundary marine pollution,662 hold regular meetings of the
Parties663 and report to UNEP on the implementation of the agreement.664 Like the SAM
Project, the LBS Protocol is concerned with limiting terrestrial sources of marine
pollution. The contribution of these protocols to concern in domestic agencies in Mexico
is minimal however; the federal government has not to date ratified either of them.
Finally, the SAM Project took place in part due to a regional agreement between
the four Mesoamerican countries. The 1997 Tulúm Declaration, described in Chapter 3,
committed the participating countries to take jointly coordinated action to conserve the
shared ecoregion in the Mesoamerican basin.665 The Declaration linked sustainable
development and Agenda 21 to the conservation of the reef ecosystem as a site of
globally important biodiversity, a buffer zone against coastal erosion, and as relevant to
tourist development.666
Beyond MEAs and declarations, the institutions of the CCAD and CEP-UNEP
also raise the profile of marine management in the Mesoamerican reef. As discussed in
Chapter 3, CCAD asserted in 1996 that the regional governments of Central American
662
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Declaración de Tulúm. Reproduced in Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP),
2004, Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable de los Recursos Pesqueros, Turismo y Áreas
Marinas Protegidas Transfronterizas en el Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (Belize
City: SAM), pp. 3 – 4.
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countries and Mexico should cooperate for improved, multilateral environmental
management, particularly for transboundary ecosystems. In addition, CEP-UNEP,
established to promote regional cooperation in the Caribbean for marine governance,
produces promotional material for Parties illustrating the need to conserve marine species
and environments, including, since 2008, quarterly reports on environmental
management. However, the Declaration of Tulúm and the CCAD were not well
integrated into domestic regulatory agencies; the Mexican government only has observer
status at CCAD, and the Declaration was signed by the then president of Mexico, Ernesto
Zedillo, rather than a representative from SEMARNAT.

Capacity
The LBS Protocol and the CEP-UNEP further enhanced the capacity of states to
respond to problems associated with coastal environmental degradation from land-based
sources. The CEP-UNEP functions as a standing scientific body for the Protocol,
publishing information on the causes and types of marine pollution in the Wider
Caribbean Region, including 48 technical reports since 1989. In 1994, it concluded a
technical report highlighting the contribution of sedimentation, hydrocarbons, sewage
and agricultural runoff to marine environmental degradation, all of which pertain to
marine management off the coast of Quintana Roo.667 In addition, the organization
maintains highly technical information for Parties, such as databases on marine litter,
667

CEP-UNEP, 1994, Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the
Wider Caribbean Region (Kingston: CEP Technical Report No. 33. UNEP Caribbean
Environment Programme).
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protected areas management, and surveys on pollution loading in the Mesoamerican
basin.668
The capacity to manage ecosystems relevant to the SAM Project is also enhanced
by this MEA. To assist in the implementation of Ramsar, the Parties established a
standing investigatory body, the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), after
COP-5 in 1993,669 and since then, Mexico has had a national representative on the STRP
investigative body.670 In addition, the Mexican government is required to establish a
National Focal Point for the STRP, which is currently situated in the Institute of Ecology.
The STRP has, since 1994, held irregularly scheduled meetings (at least twice per
triennium) to, among other things, collect and centralize information on the management
of invasive species and propose guidelines on the appropriate management of wetlands.
The STRP has also promoted capacity building in Mexico by incorporating local
actors and ENGOs in information gathering pursuant to biodiversity management. In
2002, COP-8 of the Ramsar Convention reformed the STRP in order to institutionalize
the relationship the body had with civil society ENGOs such as Wetlands International
and Birdlife International, both of which are engaged in promoting conservation in the
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CEP-UNEP, 1994, Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the
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the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
345

Sian Ka’an Reserve.671 Currently, the STRP holds periodic workshops on Thematic
Working Areas (TWAs) on issues such as wetlands management and climate change.

Contractual Environment
The contractual environment of regimes pertinent to SAM management is
improved as well by the SPAW Protocol and the Ramsar Convention, both of which give
additional specificity in defining international regime compliance. Articles 5 and 11 of
the SPAW Protocol call on Parties to take specific conservation measures, including the
prohibition of activities harming endangered species of flora and fauna, the regulation or
prohibition of coastal sources of pollution, and the regulation of tourist and recreational
activities. Some of these species listed in the Annexes to the SPAW Protocol include the
coastal mangroves and seagrasses, all of which were identified as crucial to coastal
ecosystem management in the SAM Project.672
The Ramsar Convention also enhances the contractual environment pertaining to
the SAM Project, as it calls on Parties to take action in regions relevant to SAM
management in order to be in compliance with the regime. As a signatory to the Ramsar
Convention, Mexico is required to identify wetlands of international importance,
designate them as such in a centrally recognized List,673 and create domestically
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Ramsar Convention, COP-8, Resolution VIII.28.
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Ramsar Convention, Article 2
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established measures for conservation of the area through its Administrate Authority,
SEMARNAT and CONANP.674
Between 1990 and 2003, the time period of the generation of concern about SAM
management, the Ramsar Convention evolved further, developing more specific
recommendations about wetland designation. At COP-4 in 1990, in a Strategic Plan
drafted at COP-6 in 1996, and at COP-7 in 1999, the Contracting Parties agreed that the
kinds of ecosystems that could be considered for Ramsar certification should be extended
to include areas such as spawning grounds for fish and coral reefs, which were identified
as relevant to global biodiversity, and an important part of the SAM Project.675 As of
2010, several of the areas involved in the SAM Project are Ramsar sites, including the
Sian Ka’an Reserve (declared 2003), National Parks at Xcalak (2003), Puerto Morelos
(2004), Banco Chinchorro (2004) and Cozumel (2005).

Mexico and the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano
The CBMMx Project is embedded in similar institutions as the SAM Project.
These are 1) the Action Plan of the Tuxtla Gutiérrez II Summit; 2) the Ramsar
Convention; and 3) the CCAD. A summary table of the impact of these institutions on
the management of biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is given in Table 6.3: Summary
Impact of Institutions on CBMMx Management. The following section explains how

674
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the concern, capacity and contractual environment found within these MEAs and
institutions intersect with the goals of the CBMMx Project.

Concern
Like the Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM) Project, the efforts toward
managing the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México (CBMMx) emerged in the
background of regional efforts to coordinate environmental management, and as such,
several regional institutions raised the political profile of action in the biological corridor
region. The 1996 Tuxtla II Summit mentioned in Chapter 4 comprised a multilateral
meeting between the heads of state of Mexico and the Central American countries to
coordinate transboundary activity in security, trade and the environment. Subsequent to
this summit, the Central American states and Mexico issued the Tuxtla Declaration,
which called on states to promote the establishment of the Corredor Biológico
Mesoamericano.
First, the Tuxtla Declaration enhanced the level of concern around the eventual
CBMMx Project, in that it linked regional environmental cooperation to the broader goals
of regionalism and interdependence in matters of trade, transboundary crime, and social
development.676 Second, the CCAD, established to promote regional integration in
Central America and Mexico, similarly linked coordinated environmental management to
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Declaración Conjunta y Plan de Acción de la Cumbre Tuxtla Gutiérrez II, Preamble
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economic, social and ecological sustainability, and regional development.677 However,
like the SAM Project, these pronouncements were not directly integrated into the
practices of natural resource management agencies. As described earlier, Mexico only
has an observational relationship with CCAD, and the Tuxtla Declaration, like the Tulúm
Declaration, was an inter-presidential agreement.

Capacity
There is some capacity building in the institutions in which the CBMMx is
embedded. As described above in the SAM Project, the Ramsar Convention has
institutionalized a base of technical knowledge on wetlands in the STRP. As some of the
regions in the CBMMx, such as parts of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, are wetlands,
this base of technical pertains to CBMMx management. Again, SEMARNAT and
CONANP, natural resource management agencies implicated in the implementation of
the CBMMx, are Administrative Authorities of Ramsar.

Contractual Environment
The Ramsar Convention also contributed to the contractual environment of
biodiversity management pertaining to the CBMMx as the Convention calls on Mexico to
take action in areas designated as Ramsar sites that comprise parts of the biological
corridor, specifically the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve. Finally, the Tuxtla Declaration
indicates which areas are to be managed by Parties signatory to the Declaration, by
677
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defining the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor as the area running from the neovolcanic
zone in Mexico to Panama (Figure 6.1: Map of Neovolcanic Zone in Mexico).678
Although this zone was not well-defined, it nevertheless included areas in the southern
states of Mexico that eventually were subsumed in the CBMMx Project.

Egypt and the Management of Migratory Soaring Birds
The MEAs signed by Egypt that impinge on the management of the MSB Project
are: 1) the Ramsar Convention; 2) its Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat; 3) the African Convention on
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; 4) the Convention on Migratory
Species (CMS); 5) the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA); 6) the Protocol
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean
(under the Barcelona Convention); 7) the Protocol Concerning the Conservation of
Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of Protected Areas in the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden (under the Jeddah Convention). Of these seven MEAs, the Ramsar
Convention, CMS and AEWA were specifically cited in MSB Project documents, while
the remaining four reference elements of biodiversity management that are pertinent to
governance in the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway. Finally, the World Conservation
Monitoring Centre of UNEP (UNEP-WCMC) provides additional support for
biodiversity management to Egypt. A summary table of the impact of these institutions
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on MSB management is given in Table 6.4: Summary Impact of Institutions on MSB
Management. The following section explains how the concern, capacity and
contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect with the
goals of the MSB Project.

Concern
Concern for MSB species and habitat management in Egypt is highlighted by the
following factors: several institutions and MEAs raise the profile of biodiversity
management in the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway by reinforcing the importance of
migratory bird and bird habitat management to the goals of international environmental
governance. Moreover, concern is channeled through domestic regulatory agencies, in
particular the MSEA/EEAA of Egypt, which is at the center of the country’s steps in
carrying out international environmental obligations.
In 1998, concerned about the burden of national reporting requirements, UNEP
and the secretariats of the CBD, the CMS, the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the
World Heritage Convention (WHC) commissioned the WCMC to undertake a study on
the possibility of harmonizing reporting requirements between those five biodiversityoriented MEAs. In response, WCMC issued a report in 1998 asserting that biodiversity
management required effective coordination between the goals of those MEAs, all of
which were signed by Egypt, as well as potential future agreements and protocols.679
679

World Conservation Monitoring Centre [WCMC], 1998, Feasibility Study for a
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Subsequent to this report, UNEP-WCMC held harmonization workshops in 2000680 and
2004681 with the Secretariats of the following MEAs: the CBD, CMS, Ramsar
Convention and AEWA, all of which were cited by the MSB Project documents as
relevant to biodiversity management in the flyway.
These workshops asserted a common interest of these treaties in biodiversity
management, thus linking the goals of the CBD with migratory bird management under
the CMS and AEWA, and with wetlands conservation under Ramsar. As described in
Chapter 5, several of the ecosystems used by MSBs as resting points, particularly in the
North Sinai, are wetlands, and several resting areas are important to migratory
waterfowls. As in Jamaica and Mexico, the major environmental agency in this case,
namely the MSEA/EEAA through its Nature Conservation Sector (NCS) is the
Administrative Authority for the Ramsar Convention.
The importance of management within the flyway is further reinforced by the
Protocol Concerning Special Protected Areas of the Barcelona Convention (henceforth
wcmc.org/convent/treaties.pdf; UNEP Division of Environmental Law and
Conventions [UNEP-DELC] and UNEP-WCMC, 2008, Joint Core Reporting Elements
of Biodiversity-related Conventions and Agreements (Report from the UNEP
Knowledge Management Project), accessed January 2011 from http://www.unepwcmc.org/conventions/docs/Report%20on%20joint%20core%20report%20elements_3
_Mar_08.pdf.
680

UNEP-WCMC, 2000, Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting (Report of
a workshop convened by UNEP), accessed January 2011 from http://www.unepwcmc.org/conventions/harmonization/workshop/REPORT.pdf.
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UNEP-WCMC, 2004, Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting to
Biodiversity-Related Treaties (Report of a workshop convened by UNEP), accessed
January 2011 from http://www.unepwcmc.org/conventions/harmonization/workshop04/Workshop_report.pdf.
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the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas), and the Protocol Concerning the Conservation
of Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of Protected Areas in the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aden (henceforth the Protocol Concerning Biological Diversity in the
Red Sea). The Protocol Concerning Protected Areas asserts that littoral ecosystems,
including coastal wetlands, are crucial to the management of the Mediterranean Sea and
the broader goals of the CBD,682 while the Protocol Concerning Biodiversity in the Red
Sea asserts that management of coastal and littoral ecosystems in the Red Sea is
necessary, due to the occurrence of globally important migratory species in this region.683
Finally, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature calls on Parties to
conserve natural resources, including fauna and flora,684 while Article III of the CMS
calls on Parties to “endeavour”685 to conserve endangered and threatened migratory
species and their habitats.
In all these cases, the NCS as lead agency of the MSEA/EEAA is directly
involved in the administration of these MEAs. Reports to the CMS are drafted by the
NCS, in particular by Moustafa Fouda and Sherif Baha El Din in their current capacity as
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NCS staff.686 Consequently, the concern building exercises of these treaties are grounded
in the regulatory agencies relevant to MSB Project management.

Capacity Building
As described above in the SAM Project, the Ramsar Secretariat has established a
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), pursuant to Conferences of the Parties,
that collects information on wetlands management, and has formalized the incorporation
of technical knowledge from ENGOs, including Birdlife International and Wetland
International. Like Mexico, the Egyptian government has a National Focal Point for the
STRP. However, the Egyptian focal point is again located in the national government,
namely the NCS and the MSEA/EEAA, rather than in an academic institution, grounding
the knowledge produced in the STRP more directly in governmental agencies.
As the Egyptian project focuses more strongly on migratory species than the
projects in Jamaica or Mexico, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and its
subsidiary African-Eurasian Waterbirds Agreement (AEWA) are considered particularly
relevant to the project.687 Like the CBD, the CMS focuses on improving the role of
science and information as a tool to promote effective treaty implementation. Article
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International [Birdlife], 2006. Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring
Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway (UNDP
Project Document) passim.
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VIII of the CMS established a Scientific Council, which, based on ongoing research, can
make recommendations to COPs to include species in Appendix I and II. In 1997 for
example, COP-5 adopted the Lesser Kestrel (Falco naumanni), one of the migratory birds
using the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway, on Appendix I pursuant to a recommendation by
the Scientific Council.
Much of this information gathering and management recommendations overlaps
with the functions of AEWA. As with the CMS, AEWA identifies particular species
whose conservation is of global concern, which includes falcons and birds of prey
covered in the GEF Project. To carry out its mandate, AEWA has a Technical
Committee that performs parallel functions for AEWA Parties as does the CMS’
Scientific Council. Some of the Action Plans adopted by CMS were adopted
concurrently by AEWA in its own meetings.
Further, the CMS and AEWA, in the interest of attaining expert information on
migratory species management, encouraged the official participation of ENGOs in the
functions of the treaties. The IBAs identified by Birdlife, and wetlands highlighted by
Wetlands International were referenced as important in AEWA and CMS documents,
including the 2007 CMS Action Plan.688 As such, the CMS and AEWA Secretariats
facilitate the promotion of scientifically validated, current information on the status of
endangered species relevant to treaty implementation.
Finally, the efforts of the CMS and AEWA Secretariats to gather information on
migratory species for implementing Parties are supplemented by UNEP-WCMC. The
688
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WCMC conducts synthesis reports based on national submissions from Parties to the
CMS, and developed the Information Management System for the CMS, a database of
parties covered by the Convention.

Contractual Environment
The contractual environment is highlighted by the following institutions which
specify which species are to be conserved, as well as giving recommendations regarding
how to sustainably manage biodiversity. By doing so, the institutions clarify what
appropriate compliance entails. Moreover, the species and ecosystems specified by the
listed MEAs all pertain to the goals of migratory soaring bird management as discussed
in the goals of the MSB Project.
The Ramsar Convention highlights key areas within the Red Sea/Rift Valley
flyway as meriting conservation. The Ramsar site in Egypt that falls within the flyway is
Lake Bardawil in the Sinai Peninsula (declared 1988), which is also identified as a
Birdlife Important Bird Area (IBA).689 Like SEMARNAT and CONANP in Mexico,
Egyptian environmental governmental agencies are the relevant Administrative
Authorities of the Convention.
In addition to the Ramsar site in the Sinai, several other MEAs specify which bird
species need conservation, as well as recommending what kind of protection is
warranted. The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature calls on ratifying
689
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states to ban the hunting and killing without prior approval of several endangered species,
including storks, pelicans, cranes and vultures, all of which are covered by the MSB
Project.690 In addition, the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas calls on Parties to
protect, conserve and manage endangered species and their habitats.691 Bird species
listed by name in this Protocol include the Dalmatian Pelican (Pelecanus crispus), one of
the species identified in the MSB Project.692
The CMS, an MEA to which Egypt is a signatory, similarly illustrates the
importance of conserving identified species, which are listed in Appendices I and II to the
Convention.693 These goals have been elaborated upon at the triennial COPs, as parties
have proposed that additional, critically important species be included in the Appendices,
and recommended that states take action to conserve them and their habitats. Some of the
species adopted at COPs include species adopted at COP-5 in 1997, such as the Steppe
Eagle (Aquila heliaca), the Dalmatian Pelican (Pelecanus crispus), and the White Stork
(Ciconia ciconia), all of which were listed in Graham Tucker’s 2005 study on migratory
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soaring birds for the MSB Project.694 By the early 2000s, in conformity with several
resolutions passed at the COPs, the Appendices singled out several of the MSB species
that traversed the Palaearctic-African flyway and the Red Sea/Rift Valley region of Egypt
and East Africa as meriting additional attention from parties.695
In 2005, member states of the EU proposed a recommendation to COP-8 of the
CMS calling on Parties within the African-Eurasian flyway zone to cooperate to conserve
migratory birds. This recommendation focused primarily on raptors, owls, and their
habitats, and also called on parties to focus on specific threats, including poisoning and
shooting.696 In 2007, the CMS drafted an Action Plan calling on Parties to protect birds
in the African-Eurasian flyway zone, including recommendations that, “where possible,”
Parties ban exposed poison bait, prevent the disturbance of rest sites, and create protected
areas in identified zones; in Egypt, these zones were the IBA sites identified by Birdlife
in the early 2000s.697 More generally, COPs have illustrated certain anthropogenic
activities as problematic for migratory species, as did COP-7, which passed a Resolution
calling on Parties to assess the impact of wind turbines on migratory birds.698
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Comparing the Embeddedness of Projects in International Institutions
As described above, the cases studied in this dissertation exhibit substantial
variation in the embeddeness of the projects in international institutions. The institutions
vary in particular with respect to concern and capacity engendered; some institutions
identify specific areas as of interest to global biodiversity management, some highlight
particular animal and plant species. Indeed, some institutions single out threats and make
recommendations for what action is necessary for biodiversity conservation. A
comparison of Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 indicate the degree in which each country’s
GEF-funded project is embedded in MEAs and international institutions.

The Implications of International Institutions
As indicated, the case with the highest degree of international institutional
embeddeness is the Migratory Soaring Bird (MSB) Project in Egypt. First, the Protocol
on Protected Areas, the African Convention for the Conservation of Nature, the CMS and
AEWA highlighted particular species of MSBs as meriting conservation, including those
covered by the eventual GEF Project. Second, the African Convention on Nature, the
CMS, its COPs, and the Action Plans adopted by the bodies also illustrated certain threats
as germane to MBS conservation, while the Ramsar Convention described one site, Lake
Bardawil, as a site of particular concern. The UNEP-WCMC reports also highlighted the
synergy between all the MEAs cited by the MSB Project: the CMS, AEWA, Ramsar
Convention and the CBD. Third, several of the institutions pertinent to the MSB Project,
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namely the CMS, AEWA, and the UNEP-WCMC, contain standing scientific bodies
aimed at generating up-to-date technical information on biodiversity and environmental
degradation in areas directly related to the project.
All of these treaties are then grounded in the national environmental agency, the
MSEA/EEAA by virtue of the fact that it is the administering agency of the relevant
MEAs, as well as the implementing agency of the MSB Project. In addition, the
MSEA/EEAA is more directly involved in the capacity-building exercises of the Ramsar
Convention by virtue of the fact that this case is the only example of a governmental
agency functioning as the National Focal Point for the Convention’s STRP. Of the four
cases, this project benefits from the most international concern related to project
management, when considering the number and specificity of the MEAs concerned.
The SAM and CBMMx Projects are somewhat less embedded than is the
Egyptian project. In regards to the SAM Project, both the LBS and SPAW Protocols of
the Cartagena Convention illustrate the importance of marine management, reef
ecosystems, and terrestrial zones including mangrove habitats. CEP-UNEP, functioning
as the standing scientific body of the LBS Protocol, has also arguably improved the
capacity of participating states to respond to environmental degradation through its
dissemination of technical information. Further, the SPAW Protocol called on states to
address conservation of specific fauna and flora species, including mangrove species
involved in the SAM ecosystem. The Ramsar Convention as well demonstrated the
importance of coral reefs, and the Tulúm Declaration reinforced the call for regional
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management of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System. In contrast to Egypt, however,
the Focal Point for the STRP is an academic institution, not a governmental agency.
In regards to the CBMMx Project, the Ramsar Convention, through the STRP,
provided institutions aimed at improving the capacity of states, as well as highlighting the
importance of key sites to global biodiversity. Further, the Tuxtla II summit highlighted
the regional importance of biological corridor management, and the Ramsar Convention
highlighted the international importance of terrestrial zones in the Yucatán Peninsula.
The least embedded project of the four was the Cockpit Country Project in
Jamaica. International references to this region as important for global biodiversity were
oblique, at best. Neither the SPAW Protocol nor the Cartagena Convention explicitly
references the Cockpit Country, although they do indicate the need for states to consider
the integration of downstream terrestrial processes on marine environments. As a result,
an analysis of the thickness of institutions bearing on projects, including dimensions such
as the specificity of recommendations, would suggest that Egypt would be most likely to
fulfill the requirements of the GEF-funded project, and Jamaica the least likely.

Ranking Observed Variation
However, a qualitative analysis of project performance indicates that Egypt was
the most laggardly enforcer of the goals of biodiversity conservation. The declaration of
a protected area at the Important Bird Area (IBA) of Lake Bardawil, though identified as
a Ramsar site, required no change in behavior by the Egyptian government to be
protected. Isolated and remote, the site was described in interviews with Egyptian
361

Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) officials as being protected by virtue of the fact
that people could not easily access the area.
Interviews with ENGO representatives and scientists indicate that the government
was less than committed to improved environmental management in MSB sites. The
formal passage of legislation was not matched by enforcement on the ground, as
protected areas did not contain adequate management due to the lack of political will in
natural resource agencies. Potential regulatory bodies and actors were excluded from
contributing to environmental management in the flyway; the central Egyptian
government maintained strict control over project funds and management, preventing
access not only by ENGOs, but also by the enervated Nature Conservation Sector (NCS).
As described in Chapter 5, despite calls by the CMS and AEWA for participation by
ENGOs in domestic efforts at biodiversity governance, the closed political society of
Egypt precluded any civil society participation.
The CBMMx fared slightly better, as the government of Mexico did commit
additional resources to corridor management zones highlighted in the project. The
federal government committed funds for project development in ejidos and rural
communities demarcated by the CBMMx. Further, evidence that institutions mattered in
this case is supported by the fact that the failure of the Mexican government to carry out
some of its obligations under the project was met by credible sanctions from the GEF.
However, it should be noted that the transnational advocacy network of experts has been
highly critical of the areas that were selected to be covered by the project, and has argued
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that ecosystem management in the Mexican section of the biological corridor is
problematic.
The SAM Project demonstrated remarkable activity by the Mexican government.
Management plans of already established protected areas were reformed to improve the
quality of biodiversity governance. The state adopted new regulations governing the
extraction of fish species, in order to mitigate the tendency of fishing communities to
overharvest. Finally, the environmental ministry, and then the federal government passed
reforms protecting the coastal mangroves from being cleared for hotel construction.
Jamaican environmental management pertinent to the Cockpit Country also
improved noticeably. Most critically, after 2007, the government passed legislation
declaring the Cockpit Country a protected area, despite the fact that this represented an
economic opportunity loss for the JBI, a quasi-state agency. The management of forestry
extraction also improved, as forest management was linked to broader biodiversity
conservation.

Assessing the Institutional Explanation
Certainly, the institutional explanation could explain the commitment of the
Mexican government, in particular SEMARNAT and CONANP to improved reef
management in the Mesoamerican basin under the SAM Project. Regional and
international organizations raised the profile of reef management in the Mesoamerican
basin, and contributed to capacity building among member states. The obligations of
some MEAs, such as the Ramsar Convention, the LBS Protocol, and the SPAW Protocol
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specified which species needed to be conserved in order to comply with the treaty.
Moreover, these organizations were directly invoked by the MEAs, and intimately
involved in SAM Project management. As such, it is not surprising from an
institutionalist perspective that Mexico committed political and economic resources to
managing and conserving the SAM, including steps such as legislation protected
spawning sites for fish, and the passage of substantial reforms to protected areas
management.
However, the institutionalist approach is undermined by the difference in project
implementation and biodiversity governance between Jamaica and Egypt. The Egyptian
MSB project, while linked to several institutions improving the concern, capacity and
contractual environment associated with improved biodiversity management, performed
far worse than the Jamaican Cockpit Country project.
As described above, the institutions associated with the Cockpit Country project
only tangentially referenced the area, and did not emphasize particular species of flora,
nor fauna. In addition, while NEPA was involved in concern and capacity building
through the Ramsar Convention and the Cartagena Convention, the Forestry Department,
one of the most proactive regulatory agencies in the Cockpit Country, was only
tangentially connected to either MEA. Moreover, as indicated above, the Ramsar
Convention and the Cartagena Convention are only minimally connected to the goals of
biodiversity conservation in the Cockpit.
Nevertheless, this did not prevent the adoption of meaningful reform from
Jamaican natural resource management agencies. While the adoption of a ban on bauxite
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mining resulted less from persuasion of policymakers in bauxite agencies, and more from
political mobilization of the mass public, the fact is that the transnational network
functioned as a catalyst for the generation of political pressure that led to the bauxite
reform. The institutionalist approach therefore, would underpredict the likelihood that
the Jamaican government would adopt meaningful regulation in the Cockpit Country,
while overpredicting the commitment of the Egyptian government.
More fundamentally, however, focusing on international institutions as a predictor
of behavior obscures the fact that in the context of biodiversity management, what
comprised “appropriate behavior” was negotiated not at the international level and then
translated to domestic regulatory agencies, but transnationally among networks. While
international institutions such as the CBD, GEF, the CMS, AEWA and the Ramsar
Convention may have contributed to state willingness to launch biodiversity projects, the
state and transnational networks engaged in occasionally acrimonious contestations over
the geophysical dimensions of appropriate management.
This can be observed in the debates in Mexico between the civil society and
governments over the inclusion of corridor zones in the CBMMx, or in Jamaica between
the civil society and bauxite regulatory agencies over the size of the Cockpit Country. As
expressed in the concern of transnational networks, government commitment to declaring
protected areas and issuing management plans would have meant very little for improved
biodiversity governance, if these areas were not carefully selected, and/or if the plans
were not adequately designed to meet the needs of local biodiversity.699 Thus, the
699
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analytic utility of the institutionalist approach in this research is further undermined by
the fact that focusing on institutional design obscures how the interpretation of
international obligations can be continually contested at the domestic level, and that this
interpretation has significant outcomes for the goals of environmental governance.

Conclusion
This research focuses on the role of transnational networks, part of an emerging
phenomenon referred to as the global civil society.700 As indicated in this chapter,
examining the role of transnational networks and the global civil society confers benefits
on the study of global environmental governance beyond that proffered by a state-centric,

in environmental regimes and institutions. While using “effectiveness” to describe
regimes that lead to positive changes in state behavior is parsimonious and (insofar as
advocates of environmental management want states to adopt new regulations) logical,
it is difficult to justify using this term to refer to institutions that do not lead to positive
changes in environmental outcomes. For discussions on contemplating regime
effectiveness, see: David Victor, 2006, Toward Effective International Cooperation on
Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions (Global Environmental Politics 6
(3): 90 – 103); Roland Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation,
Compliance and Effectiveness. International Relations and Global Climate Change
(Cambridge: MIT Press); Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz, 2000, Measuring the
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (Journal of Conflict Resolution
44 (5): 630 – 652).
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institutionalist approach. First, transnational networks may contribute to the
effectiveness of regimes and institutions in ways not predictable by an analysis focused
on international negotiations and the top-down implementation of regime obligations.
Jamaica, as described above, was the case with the thinnest level of institutional
embeddeness. Nevertheless, a transnational epistemic community, motivated by a shared
understanding of appropriate action, and informed by a scientific consensus, was able to
persuade natural resource managers in the state to adopt meaningful environmental
regulation through a combination of direct influence on policymakers, and through the
popular mobilization of domestic constituencies. As a result, agencies in the Jamaican
government were more willing to carry out reform than those in Egypt, the case with the
thickest. Variations in characteristics of transnational networks can also explain
variations in environmental governance efforts in the same political system; while the
Mexican federal government was carrying out both the SAM and the CBMMx Projects,
the SAM epistemic community contributed to what was described in Chapters 3 and 4 as
more effective governance in the reef region.
Second, and related, this research supports ongoing approaches that are critical of
arguments that limit the search for solutions to governance through the creation or reform
of international institutions.701 Institutions certainly matter, and the provision of
technical and financial capacity through the GEF, UNEP, and Secretariats of various
701
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MEAs were important in supporting the Project for Sustainable Conservation, the SAM
Project, the CBMMx Project, and the MSB Project. Regardless of political will and
commitment, monitoring the isolated and rugged terrain of the Cockpit Country, the
marine ecosystems off the coast of the Yucatán, and the desert migrating spots in the Red
Sea/Rift Valley flyway can be prohibitively expensive to the Forestry Department in
Jamaica, CONANP in Mexico, and the Egyptian NCS respectively. However, using
institutions as the analytic focus of global governance marginalizes the importance of the
global civil society in interpreting and implementing treaty obligations, ignores statesociety relations, and reifies the state as the arbiter of “correct” behavior.
This leads to potential distortions in implementing the environmental goals of
international institutions. Top-down requirements by the GEF, UNEP and the World
Bank for ENGO inclusion in project management were abrogated by the governments of
Mexico and Egypt, in the CBMMx and MSB Projects respectively, in the interests of
state leaders and vested political constituencies.702 Without actual commitment by state
leaders to include the civil society in project implementation, there is little the GEF can
do to avoid the de facto marginalization of ENGOs in project implementation.703
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This has an impact on global environmental management as the provision of
international institutional support to governments through mechanisms that do not pay
sufficient attention to state-society relationships and non-state actors may lead to perverse
outcomes in the goals of environmental governance. Without the localization of norms
by transnational networks, governments will find it more difficult to sustain
environmental projects, which is problematic insofar as GEF funds are finite.704 Further,
as demonstrated in Egypt and in the CBMMx Project in Mexico, governments and natural
resource agencies that have not internalized environmental norms are nonetheless still
seen as legitimate arbiters of the allocation of financial and technical assistance (FTA) in
the form of GEF funds, and are able to set the terms of project management. The result is
that the governance of sensitive ecosystems may be hijacked by vested political and
economic interests, to the detriment of environmental sustainability. This is an inefficient
and counterproductive use of GEF funds.
Thus, in the interest of environmental sustainability, actors in the global civil
society, such as transnational networks of environmental advocates, should be
meaningfully incorporated into the theory and practice of global governance. As argued
above, transnational networks of committed individuals can foster the needed political
commitment in participating states to carry out international environmental agreements.
Steel, ed., Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration, New York:
Marcel Dekker).
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This emphasizes the importance of norms and norm entrepreneurs in shaping state
behavior; as transnational networks generate shared understandings about appropriate
action among state leaders, they can lead to more comprehensive action than might have
been expected when examining institutions alone. At the same time, the previous
chapters make it clear that the meaningful participation, and hence influence, of these
transnational networks is in turn constrained by internal characteristics of the networks,
and external political factors. Internally, a shared consensus improves the likelihood that
the claims of transnational networks will be taken seriously. Externally, the ability of
networks to socialize with policymakers will probably be sharply limited in autocratic
polities. By responding effectively to internal and external challenges, transnational
networks of environmental advocates can contribute meaningfully to global
environmental governance.
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Table 6.1: Summary Impact of Institutions on Cockpit Country Management
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Table 6.2: Summary Impact of Institutions on SAM Management
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Table 6.3: Summary Impact of Institutions on CBMMx Management
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Table 6.4: Summary Impact of Institutions on MSB Management
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Figure 6.1: Map of Neovolcanic Zone in Mexico

The area below Line B comprises the neovolcanic zone of Mexico. It includes areas in the states
Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and the Yucatán Peninsula
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Non-State Actors, Transnational Networks, and Governance
The primary question addressed here is: under what conditions do norms and
networks matter to global governance as carried out by less developed countries
(LDCs)?705 To answer this question, this dissertation covers research carried out on four
globally important biodiversity management projects funded by the Global Environment
Facility, and implemented in Jamaica, Mexico and Egypt as pertinent to their obligations
under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. In each country, a TAN advocated for
what it considered appropriate biodiversity management under the rubric of the project,
often requiring substantive changes in the implementing government’s environmental
management approach. However, in only two of the four projects studied did the TAN
succeed in persuading state leaders to adopt new norms and thus influence behavior
concomitant to the goals of the UN treaty. When are transnational networks more
effective in LDCs? What cognitive or material factors contribute to their ability to offer

705

LDCs are particularly important to global biodiversity governance, as most of the
world’s biodiversity is found in the developing world. See inter alia, Marc Williams,
2005, The Third World and Global Environmental Negotiations: Interests, Institutions
and Ideas (Global Environmental Politics, 5: 48 – 69); Adil Najam, 2004, Dynamics of
the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in Desertification Negotiations (Global
Environmental Politics, 4: 128 – 154); Susan Sell, 1996, North-South Environmental
Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodiversity (Global Governance, 2: 97 –
118) pp. 110. See in particular, Marian Miller, 1995, The Third World in Global
Environmental Politics, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner) for a discussion of the Third World
as a negotiating bloc in global biodiversity governance.
376

interpretations of reality that are accepted by policymakers? How are networks
constrained by domestic politics of the state that is the subject of transnational advocacy
campaigns?

Hypotheses: TANs and Domestic Politics in LDCs
The first hypothesis predicting how TANs influence policymakers in LDCs is
derived from scholarship on environmental governance in the Global South. Academics
such as Marian Miller and Lawrence Susskind argue that the relationship between LDC
government and the environment is conditioned by the global history of development and
industrialization, the worsening environmental North-South split in the years after
UNCED, and LDC concerns about the inequitable distribution of global wealth and
ownership of capital.706 LDCs are highly indebted, yet rely heavily on the production of
primary goods, which means that LDC efforts to ‘catch-up’ with the process of
industrialization launched in the developed world depend on the immediate
overexploitation of natural resources. In order to ensure that LDC governments will take
environmentally friendly action, networks have to link environmental management to the
interests of economic development. H1: transnational advocacy networks must frame
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environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order to influence
LDC governments.
This hypothesis was tested concurrently with other theories predicting how
knowledge generated by civil society networks becomes adopted by policymakers. The
epistemic communities literature links influence to the ability of networks of experts to
develop a scientific consensus on the causal dimensions of an emerging problem area,707
leading to the hypothesis: H2: scientific consensus increases the influence of
transnational advocacy networks. Studies on the politics and sociology of turning
information into policy suggest that for policymakers to adopt knowledge claims, they
have to be socialized into the process of knowledge generation through processes such as
multisectoral workshops.708 That is, H3: socialization increases the influence of
transnational advocacy networks.
Having established these hypotheses, the research tested their explanatory power
by process-tracing the implementation of the four projects. In each case, transnational
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networks of environmental advocates participated in multiple campaigns to persuade
policymakers and managers in various sectors, allowing variation on each of the
independent variables: issue-framing, knowledge consensus, and socialization.

The Results
An Overview of the Conclusions
The conclusions strongly support the second and third hypotheses: both consensus
and socialization were necessary for networks to generate influence, but neither was
sufficient. However, there was no support for the first hypothesis: H1: transnational
advocacy networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic
development in order to influence LDC governments. Economic issue-framing does not
correlate either positively or negatively with changes in environmental management
approaches taken by policymakers and managers. As a result, it has no independent
explanatory power in predicting the ability of networks to generate influence over
environmental management.
In fact, arguments relying on an economic valorization of environmental
management are potentially counterproductive, in that they reify an environmental
epistemology that is likely to be harmful to the interests of sustainable, long-term
management. A description of the cases follows, indicating when networks used
economic frames, generated consensus, and socialized with natural resource managers.
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Comparing the Cases: The Jamaican Cockpit Country
In Jamaica, a transnational network emerged in the 1990s, concerned about
biodiversity loss among globally important bird populations residing in the Cockpit
Country, a mountainous rainforest region in the northwestern section of the island. The
transnational network generated an intersubjective consensus on the causal dimensions of
biodiversity loss. The network then participated in the design and implementation of the
Project for Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Bird Habitats, a regional
GEF-funded project simultaneously carried out in the Dominican Republic and the
Bahamas.
The primary threats identified were bauxite mining and decentralized agricultural
activity. The network campaigned to persuade the following actors to adopt
environmentally friendly reforms: 1) agricultural policymakers in the Forestry
Department; 2) mining policymakers in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jamaica
Bauxite Institute (JBI), and 3) protected areas policymakers in the Ministry of
Environment and the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA).
However, despite the presence of a recognized knowledge consensus on the
dimensions of the environmental threats to the Cockpit Country, the network managed to
persuade only the Forestry Department to change their environmental practices. In that
case, the Forestry Department was also the only agency with which the epistemic
community was able to generate socialization processes. Moreover, the demonstrated
success in banning bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country had little to do with persuasive
powers of the epistemic community, but was rather dependent on the political
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mobilization of a TAN concerned about the cultural and social impact of bauxite mining
in the ecoregion. While the TAN mobilized around claims and knowledge publicized by
the epistemic community, the power and influence deployed was political in nature, not
cognitive.
In addition, this case suggested that economic framing had little impact on
epistemic community influence. While the network made a conscious effort to use
economic arguments to persuade policymakers in bauxite management agencies to limit
mining activities in the Cockpit Country, these arguments were ineffectual.

Mexico and the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef
The following chapter discusses a similar case of transnational advocacy around
protected areas management and biodiversity. In the 1990s, an epistemic community
emerged to advocate for biodiversity management in Mexico through the implementation
of the Proyecto para el Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM Project). In the SAM
Project, the network generated an intersubjective consensus about the primary threats to
biodiversity in the Mesoamerican reef system, namely fishing, tourism, and coastal
development.
In this case, the network participated in campaigns to persuade various
policymakers and managers to adopt environmental reforms. These consisted of 1)
protected areas policymakers in la Secretaría de Manejo Ambiental y Recursos Naturales
(SEMARNAT) and la Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP); 2)
fishing policymakers in la Comisión Nacional de Pesquería (CONAPESCA) and la
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Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, y Pesquería (SAGARPA); 3)
civil society quintanarroense fishing cooperatives; 4) tourism policymakers in the
quintanarroense state government; and 5) transnational hotelier associations (see Table
3.3).
Again, this epistemic community had limited success in influencing
environmental management, albeit qualitatively moreso than their analogue in Jamaica.
The network successfully persuaded all actors, with the exception of recalcitrant
policymakers in the state government and transnational hotelier associations, to adopt
environmental reform. As in Jamaica, the successful campaigns depended on the
presence of both a recognized knowledge consensus and socialization between the
community and target audiences. Where socialization was absent, as in the case with the
quintanarroense state government, the network found itself without influence.
In addition, economic arguments had no discernible impact on network influence.
The network did successfully use economic arguments in the campaign to persuade
CONAPESCA and fishing cooperatives to change management practices and policy but
in the first place, the network also managed to generate both consensus and socialization
with target audiences in these populations. Second, the use of economic arguments in
those cases depended on linking environmental sustainability with the economic
wellbeing of domestic populations, rather than with the interests of transnational capital
and the primary economic productive sectors of the state. As shall be indicated, linking
environmental sustainability to transnational capital interests rather than domestic actors
is a strategy that threatens to undermine the logic of conservationism.
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Mexico and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor
The following chapter, focusing on the Proyecto para el Corredor Biológico
Mesoamericano (CBMMx Project), clarified that demonstrated that, while insufficient,
knowledge consensus was nevertheless necessary. In this case, the TAN participated in
campaigns to persuade 1) policymakers in the federal biodiversity agency la Comisión
Nacional de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO); 2) agricultural management in la Secretaría
de la Ganadería, Agricultura, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA); 3)
protected areas managers in SEMARNAT and CONANP; and 4) state and municipal
governments (see Table 4.3).
Here, the TAN created substantial social links with policymakers in key agencies,
namely CONABIO, SEMARNAT and SAGARPA, through joint participation in
institutions created to administer the project. Moreover, the network consciously adopted
economic arguments to persuade policymakers to adopt environmental reforms, such as
targeted projects for biodiversity conservation. However, since the TAN was unable to
generate a knowledge consensus on the threats faced by biodiversity in corridor zones, or
on the relevant elements of what constituted important biodiversity, policymakers in
CONABIO and the federal government overrode the network’s recommendations for
corridor management.

Influential Causal Variables: Consensus and Socialization
Thus, the previous three chapters indicate that, for TANs to increase the
likelihood of influencing environmental policymaking in LDCs, the members of the
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network should generate an intersubjective consensus on the causal dimensions of the
problem at hand, and that they should be socialized with policymakers and target
audiences. As indicated here, the socialization processes needed include participating in
knowledge-building workshops, exchanging staff members, and participating in joint
research projects. This is not an exhaustive list, and other kinds of processes are certainly
possible. However, without either consensus or socialization, transnational networks will
find it extremely difficult to persuade policymakers to adopt significant environmental
reforms.
Consensus, TANs and Epistemic Communities
Consensus functions as expected in the epistemic communities literature, in that it
undermines competing arguments, legitimates the claims of activists, and provides
boundaries on considerations of accepted policy. As a result, networks of scientific
epistemic communities are theorized to occupy a privileged role in the process of
environmental advocacy.
However, TANs that are not organized exclusively around scientific reasoning
can also play a significant catalytic role in environmental advocacy as occurred in both
Jamaica and Mexico. In Jamaica, organizations within the Cockpit Country TAN, such
as the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ) and associations of Accompong
Maroons, provided funds and information to the development of the Nature
Conservancy’s (TNC’s) Parks in Peril Project. As described in Chapter 2, the Parks in
Peril Project assisted the epistemic community in generating scientific information on the
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Cockpit Country, and in building inter-network links between allies in different
institutions.
Moreover, this influence was not limited to the provision of resources for
knowledge building. After the epistemic community’s campaigns in the Project for
Sustainable Conservation began, the TAN mobilized public political opposition through
the Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s Group (CCSG) against the issuance of mining leases
in the Cockpit Country.
Similarly, the epistemic community in the Mexican SAM Project developed its
shared reef monitoring methodology through participating in workshops held by TAN
organizations in the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) and the Atlantic-Gulf Reef
Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) networks. While ICRI and the AGRRA networks were
also science-based institutions, they were not directly involved in the policy debates over
appropriate coastal management in Quintana Roo, and were thus not part of the epistemic
community network. Nevertheless, the TAN in this case provided important
informational resources to the epistemic community, including data that contributed to
the emergence of a scientific consensus and shared policy platform. Thus, the roles of
TANs and epistemic communities are mutually supportive. Epistemic communities
provide authority and legitimacy to environmental arguments, while TANs provide
material and political support to epistemic community knowledge building. The
transnational dimension of these different is also important, insofar as links to advocates
in other countries give TANs a broader resource base, cognitive, informational, and
material than would otherwise be the case.
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Since consensus matters, a question relevant to the study of transnational
environmental advocacy is: when are epistemic communities likely to emerge within
broader networks? Can scientific consensus be, if not deliberately engineered, at least
fostered? The failure of the Egyptian TAN to generate an intersubjective consensus also
suggests that the generation of a knowledge consensus may be curtailed by the technical
difficulty of collecting information. This is highlighted in the failure of the MSB TAN to
generate a knowledge consensus, as this problem was caused in part by the inability of
the network to gain access to needed administrative and material support. For example, in
attempting to identify the cause of bird mortalities at Sharm and other recorded instances
of mass deaths, members of NCE and EgyBirdGroup reiterated a common concern, that
convincing analysis was impossible without extensive technical support. The 2005 Porter
study on bird bottlenecks noted the difficulties of data gathering:
…to undertake a comprehensive count at any site would require a
commitment to watch for an entire season for at least eight hours per day.
Two observers present for all of the time would be essential and up to four
when there are large numbers passing. They would need to be capable of
total concentration for searching for high flying birds against a brilliant
blue sky, for counting large and wheeling flocks and, of course, tricky
identification.709

For this to occur, there would have to be sufficient resources, support, and
autonomy allocated to researchers to gather the kind of quantitative and qualitative
information that would be conducive to generating an intersubjective consensus.
Theoretically, governments can provide these kinds of resources to prominent scientific
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research institutes as is the case in the United States, with the National Science
Foundation (NSF). More modestly, the federal government of Mexico, along with the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), created and funded the Centro de
Investigaciones de Quintana Roo (CIQRO) which later became el Colegio de la Frontera
Sur (ECOSUR), one of the primary research organizations of the epistemic community
active in the Mesoamerican reef system. However, this kind of institutional support to
the civil society is simply not present in Egypt.
In Egypt, like in the rest of the world, scientists would be willing to do
research if they had funds. Scientists, for instance in Egyptian
universities, have no university funds that will support large-scale research
projects. And large-scale research projects need to be supported, either by
EEAA, or supported by bilateral aid programs, like joint AmericanEgyptian universities.710

Consensus Is Not Enough: the Importance of Socialization
At the same time, socialization between networks and managers is needed. In
describing how global environmental assessments become influential, Clark, Mitchell
and Cash argue that: “the process by which information is generated and delivered affects
the potential of that information process to influence outcomes.”711 Actors who are
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William C. Clark, Ronald B. Mitchell, and David Cash, 2006, Evaluating the
Influence of Global Environmental Assessments, in Mitchell, Cash and Clark, eds.,
Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence (Cambridge: MIT
Press), p. 14. See also Karen Litfin, 2000, Environment, Wealth and Authority: Global
Climate Change and Emerging Modes of Legitimation (International Studies Review,
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internalization is a fundamentally social process
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socialized in the generation of information and knowledge associated with an emerging
problem are therefore more likely to adopt the normative implications associated with
that knowledge and consider the conclusions relevant to their own interests. Despite the
scientific credibility of the network, Jamaican policymakers in the bauxite mining sector
were resistant to arguments for comprehensive protection of sensitive ecosystems in the
Cockpit Country, and consensus in the SAM Project was insufficient to overcome
environmental recalcitrance by policymakers in the quintanarroense government, or
transnational hotelier associations.
Finally, in none of the cases did economic framing correlate with the ability of
networks to exercise influence over policy. TANs and epistemic communities shaped
behavior when economic framing was not used, and in one instance when framing was.
Consequently, it is not an independent predictor of network influence.
The only case in which socialization and consensus did not lead to influence
occurred in the case of the SAM Project, where the epistemic community failed to
persuade hoteliers to change practices and adopt a more sustainable model. This does not
necessarily undermine the argument presented here. In the first place, social science
arguments are probabilistic, not determinative. In the second place, as will be argued
below, the goals of sustainable resource management cannot be incorporated into the
logic of transnational capitalism.
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The Role of Democracy in Fostering Socialization
In examining the previous three cases, it is apparent that the civil society had
more success socializing with a greater number of natural resource managers in Mexico
than in Jamaica, even while Mexico has a more recent history with autocracy, only
transitioning away from a bureaucratic-authoritarian model in 2000. One possible
explanation is that increased centralization improves the likelihood that powerful political
elites will socialize with civil society researchers in the production of policy-relevant
knowledge. By doing so, they may be more likely to perceive of such knowledge as
legitimate, and share perspectives with civil society actors.

Egypt and the Red Sea/Rift Valley Flyway
The final chapter was selected primarily to test whether increasing levels of
political centralization were inimical or not to the process of socialization between
managers and civil society network members. In Chapter 5, a transnational network
attempted to influence biodiversity management in Egypt by campaigning to change the
management structure of 1) the Ministry of State of Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and
the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA); 2) the Nature Conservation Sector
(NCS); 3) the governorates of the North Sinai, the South Sinai, and the Red Sea; and 4)
the Tourism Development Authority (TDA).
However the failure of the network to generate any meaningful influence in this
case suggests that while moderate levels of political centralization may enhance the
influence of networks of experts, extreme centralization and autocracy prevents expert389

government socialization. Of the campaigns addressed, the network failed to generate
socialization with any of the natural resource management agencies, except the NCS,
which was marginalized and ineffective. Closed decision making, governmental
antipathy to the civil society, and political cronyism hampered the free flow of
knowledge from experts to decision makers by isolating civil society experts, and
marginalizing the environmental agencies most likely to be receptive to ecological
arguments.
While greater democracy may not be necessary, autocracy is directly harmful.
This suggests that the effect of political centralization on the exercise of influence by
civil society experts is shaped like a Kuznets Curve. Under increasing levels of
centralization, policymakers are likely to be more engaged in knowledge production, and
hence more likely to socialize with civil society knowledge networks. At a certain point,
however, autocracy and centralization calcifies the state and precludes the possibility that
civil society researchers will have necessary access to policymakers. However, given the
fact that this research provides only four data points, this hypothesis will have to be tested
with further research.

Theoretical and Practical Implications
Implications for Theory: Disaggregating Influence
This research clarifies the importance of taking a multilevel approach to
understanding how epistemic communities and knowledge networks influence global
environmental governance. While authors such as Betsill and Corell restrict the study of
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network influence to focus on the impact of advocacy on international environmental
negotiations,712 it is clear that biodiversity management is shaped by the actions and
practices not only of policymakers, but also of transnational corporations, networks, nonstate governance structures such as the International Organization of Standards ISO
14000 series and local, community-based organizations (CBOs).713 Studying the effect
of epistemic communities on environmental management requires paying attention not
just to the impact of networks on national policymakers, but also on subnational actors
and other transnational interests, including transnational capital.
Expanding the parameters of global environmental management to consider
multiple sources and levels of political action further gives a clearer picture of how and
when knowledge deployed by networks exerts influence on governance. As indicated in
the dissertation, framing matters, although not in the way originally theorized. Epistemic
712
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communities were successful in Jamaica and Mexico when they reframed biodiversity
loss as integrated with broader problems of ecosystem integrity and threats to sustained
resource use for domestic populations. Conversely, epistemic communities and TANs
were unable to translate knowledge into action when they framed biodiversity loss as
relevant to the interests of transnational capitalism.
What this suggests is that the choice of which frames are relevant to
understanding a politically contested issue-area is more than just a rhetorical exercise.
Different frames or discourses privilege different courses of action, and by extension
different constellations of political actors. In the process of policy advocacy and project
implementation, epistemic communities and the project institutions, that is the GEF,
UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank, are attempting to change the policies and practices of
government agents, domestic populations, and transnational capitalists. However, these
target audiences do not necessarily have isomorphic goals. The choice of how problems
are framed thus affects which of these interests is validated in environmental
management; framing a problem involves determining what values and worldviews are
associated with inputs and outcomes. Thus, while an intersubjectively held consensus is
an important element in predicting when networks exercise influence, the persuasive
power of a scientific consensus may be attenuated or conversely strengthened by the
social relationships of knowledge production, and by the power dynamics implied by
accepted problem frames.
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Implications for Policy: Rethinking the Link between Biodiversity and Economics
The constraining effect of frames on the exercise of knowledge is demonstrated in
differences between epistemic community success in persuading policymakers and local
actors in Jamaica and Mexico, and failure in persuading transnational capital interests in
the same cases. Simply put, environmental frames privileged anti-environmental logic,
and minimized the chance of success of epistemic communities to persuade target
audiences.
As indicated throughout, transnational capitalism is intimately connected with
environmental degradation in the cases studied here. Jamaican biodiversity in the
Cockpit Country was threatened by transnational aluminum production; Mexican coastal
and terrestrial biodiversity in the Mesoamerican region was threatened by transnational
tourism; Egyptian biodiversity in the Red Sea region was threatened by transnational
tourism and energy, and in all cases, these stated interests benefited from a privileged
relationship with the state.
Economic arguments were adopted, but failed to convince transnational capitalist
managers in any of these cases to adopt environmental reforms. Conversely, ecological
sustainability arguments which did not depend on privileging the interests of
transnational capitalism were adopted in Jamaica by the Forestry Department, and in
Mexico by SEMARNAT, CONANP and fishing cooperatives.
What this means is that arguments by the GEF and other international
environmental institutions to use “biodiversity mainstreaming” as a counterweight to
transnational capitalism subordinate environmental management to the economic
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interests of elites. This is contrary to the goals of sustainable development. Economic
frames that privilege the worldview of transnational capitalism advance elite preferences
for natural resource use to the detriment of local populations, and further mean that
concern for substantive environmental reform is likely to be transient. At the end of the
day, transnational elites do not have a comparative cultural, emotional or historic
attachment to sustained natural resource management to that held by local actors,
preferring instead to maximize short-term economic exploitation. Interviews with
Alfredo Arellano, chair of the National Reef Committee in the SAM Project, and
Ildefonso Palermo, member of the Quintana Roo Comité Consultivo Estatal in the
CBMMx Project point to this calculation by transnational capital holders:
Traditionally, in the case of tourism in coastal development in Mexico, the
expectation of a return on investment among the major hotel developers, is
a return in six, seven, eight years. In sustainable development, the plan for
a return on investment of resources and benefits, we’re talking about the
long-term, possibly 15 years. To the way of thinking of the investor, it’s a
notable difference. …Unfortunately, with globalization, the hotel chains –
Spanish, Italian and German – are looking for the exploitation of short
term resources… And this brings more than environmental impacts, this
also has social impacts.714
…You’re going to have very destructive actions in the name of
development. Very negative… Because they talk about nature as if it
were segmented or fragmented, where you have nature on one side and
man on another… So you utilize nature to the maximum because, after
all, under this idea, the short term is going to predominate, and of course,
profit. Immediate profit. A return on investment as soon as possible.
This is pure business.715
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Consequently, sustainable biodiversity management is better served by a policy
framework that empowers local actors as the primary stakeholders. This is qualitatively
different from the stated goals of biodiversity mainstreaming as described by the GEF,
which calls for linking sustainable biodiversity management policies to elite economic
interests “where the primary focus has previously been on production, economic activity,
and development, rather than on biodiversity conservation losses or gains.”716
First, the successful adoption of frames that privilege and empower local interests
raises the possibility that transnational knowledge networks will gain political allies in
the campaign for improved environmental management. As indicated in Jamaica, local
communities in the Cockpit Country mobilized in support of the biodiversity
conservation goals of the Project for Sustainable Conservation, lobbying ardently for a
moratorium on bauxite mining through the CCSG. Similarly, locally based fishing
cooperatives in Mexico were highly supportive of the SAM Project and the sustainable
use of marine resources promoted by the TAN. In those cases, local actors, aware of the
impact of transnational capitalism on their long-term resource use objectives, provided
political support to epistemic communities.
Second, taking a management approach that focuses on empowering local actors
minimizes the possibility of local obstructionism in natural resource conservation. If
local actors feel alienated from the goals of environmental management, as occurred in
the CBMMx Project, they could effectively withdraw from and undermine conservation
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efforts. In short, local support grounds transnational norms in a specific political context,
described as “norm localization” by Acharya.717

Specific Recommendations for Policy and Practice
Given these constraints on the efficacy of scientific knowledge, namely the need
to attain socialization, consensus, and to empower local actors, the following section
gives specific recommendations to the GEF and to networks to improve the influence of
transnational knowledge-based communities over global environmental governance. As
described below, these recommendations focus on enhancing the impact of knowledge
networks on the domestic implementation of MEAs and environmental norms. As such,
while drawn from these specific cases, they are relevant to environmental issue-areas
characterized by similar relationships between international obligations and domestic
practices.

Restrict the Focus of Transnational Research
First, it is essential that advocacy networks, in order to give their claims authority,
base their arguments on sound scientific claims. Second, the importance of knowledge
consensus in legitimating claims is demonstrated here and in the literature, where
epistemic communities have more persuasive power than other kinds of networks. Thus,
networks should take steps to encourage the development of an intersubjective consensus.
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In order to facilitate the emergence of a knowledge consensus, it is essential that
transnational knowledge networks restrict the research agenda such that scientists have a
commonly shared baseline for understanding emerging problems. The efficacy of a
restricted research agenda in generating a workable consensus is demonstrated in the
emergence of a knowledge consensus in a transnational epistemic community constituted
around the depletion of stratospheric ozone. After the negotiation of the framework
Vienna Convention on the ozone layer, Mostafa Tolba, who was adamant about deriving
a binding agreement, used UNEP’s offices to commission studies on ozone depletion
from transnational scientific working groups.
Scientists within these groups focused their research on seven ozone depleting
substances, and adopted a program focused on a chlorine-loading model of the
stratosphere, all of which comprised a truncated view of the environmental problem.718
This program fostered a core set of agreed-upon principles and arguments called the
Würzburg Consensus, which then strengthened the arguments made by pusher states for a
strong regulatory protocol.719
In the cases studied here, the networks that developed a standardized or restricted
research agenda similarly developed a scientific consensus on relevant causal processes,
thus becoming epistemic communities. In Jamaica, the Nature Conservancy (TNC) and
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the Windsor Research Center (WRC) developed a shared methodology, which was then
later shared with other ENGOs, such as the Southern Trelawny Environment Association
(STEA) and the Forestry Department. In Mexico, the reef monitoring methodology used
by the network was developed over a period of several years, by the ICRI workshops in
the mid-1990s, and the Atlantic Gulf Reef Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) initiative from
1998 onward, before the SAM Project was formally created. The methodology was later
formally adopted as a component of the project under the Programa de Monitoreo
Sinóptico (PMS) in 2002.
In contrast, the transnational advocacy network in the Mexican CBMMx project
did not start trying to generate a shared methodology until after the launch of the project,
after federal policymakers had already asserted their preferences over project
management. The lack of a shared research program prevented the network from
generating a shared conceptualization of, and hence knowledge consensus on,
biodiversity loss in the CBMMx.
As of the time of writing, the network still had not developed a commonly held
methodology on understanding biodiversity loss in Mexican Mesoamerica. Although the
project has since formally ended, the CBMMx TAN should foster and generate an
intersubjective consensus through a shared understanding of biodiversity. If the TAN
demonstrated a scientific consensus on the importance of additional areas to biodiversity
conservation in Mesoamerica, the network would have an additional cognitive tool to
lobby for additional funds from the GEF, as well as to undermine competing arguments
for limited biodiversity protection.
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Institutional Empowerment of Transnational Knowledge
The research also shows that institutions such as the GEF can and should play a
formative role in fostering a knowledge consensus. First, as occurred with Mostafa
Tolba’s influence over the ozone scientific network’s focus on limited ozone depleting
substances, institutions can, under the mandate of gathering useful policy relevant
information, constrain the research agenda taken by transnational networks. By doing so,
institutions may encourage the adoption of a standardized approach to understanding
environmental problems among scientists.
Second, the GEF should ensure that local and transnational networks of experts
have sufficient resources to ensure that scientific knowledge is credible. As described
above, the Egyptian TAN was unable to generate an intersubjective consensus, in large
part due to the absence of validated information on the anthropogenic causes of bird
mortalities. An effective, direct transfer of resources to Nature Conservation Egypt
(NCE) would have aided the network in conducting research, overcoming the gaps
characterizing the current state of knowledge. Moreover, engaging directly with
domestic NGOs would obviate the need of experts to depend on antipathetic state
agencies. Again, by facilitating consensus, international environmental organizations
would improve the chance that networks of experts would influence environmental
management and contribute to effective reform.
Third, the institutions of environmental governance, including the GEF, should
refrain from uncritically advancing arguments for environmentalism based on the
interests of economic capital. As a result of the focus on capitalist growth as a metric for
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appropriate policy the key stakeholders named by the GEF and the World Bank
documents all included the same transnational interests that were motivated to cause the
environmental problems studied in the first place. As environmental problems in LDCs
involve local natural resource use, this is not appropriate; rather the primary stakeholders
should always be identified as the local users of resources, particularly if they are
subsistence or traditional users. In order to include these kinds of actors as proper
stakeholders, rather than engage in tokenism, environmental projects should create
standing administrative institutions that formalize their participation in project design and
management. The CCEs or the National Reef Committee created in Mexico for the
CBMMx and the SAM Projects respectively serve as potential templates, as long as the
participatory issues described in the chapter on the CBMMx are addressed.

Improving the Level of Socialization
As knowledge consensus is insufficient, international organizations should also
promote substantive socialization between governmental agencies and civil society
networks of experts in generating policy relevant knowledge. This should be carried out
by credibly threatening to withhold project funds unless state agencies effectively
integrate local experts into planning and management strategies. While the GEF did
include mechanisms for civil society-government interaction in its biodiversity
management projects, insufficient attention was paid to the quality of civil society
participation, particularly in Egypt.
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In that case, the GEF funded a project in which the network of civil society
advocates universally asserted that there was no substantive communication between
experts and natural resource managers in the government. In fact, during the
development of the MSB Project, project partners in Birdlife International recognized
that there was no domestic civil society ENGO that could act as an implementing agency.
While the Nature Conservation Egypt (NCE) was established shortly after the design of
the MSB Project, as described in Chapter 5, they were given only a formal role in project
participation, with no authority over agenda setting and project design.
However, as seen in the case of the CBMMx, the GEF can exercise leverage to
persuade governments to take a more active role in including civil society participation.
As described in Chapter 4, the threat issued by the World Bank to withdraw GEF funds
persuaded la Comisión Nacional de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO) to finally create the
Consejos Consultivos Estatales (CCEs), institutionalizing them as forums of participation
for civil society experts. At best, projects that lack effective expert participation are
likely to lead to inefficiently spent resources. At worst, given the centralization of power
in Egypt in a government characterized by embedded cronyism, this is likely to
perpetuate harmful patterns of resource use by empowering environmentally antipathetic
actors. The GEF should therefore refuse to transfer additional funds to Egypt for the
MSB Project unless these concerns are meaningfully addressed, and should take a similar
stance in countries characterized by analogous relationships between the state and
environmentally exploitative actors. While the Mubarak regime is no longer in power,
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this does not necessarily mean that the cloistered political system will liberalize to
empower environmental activism without prodding from external economic actors.

Technocracy versus Democracy?
As a final note, critical theorists observe that the privilege accorded to scientific
inquiry may lead to technocratic policymaking. This is problematic when science
delegitimates local participation, and hence local democracy, especially when the
networks carrying transnational claims and norms to the developing world are rooted in
Northern countries. Moreover, as the above policy suggestions indicate, transnational
networks may be empowered or facilitated by international financial institutions like the
GEF and the World Bank, which have been amply criticized as embodying Northern,
capitalist interests. As indicated throughout the dissertation, the transnational networks
active in environmental advocacy in Jamaica, Mexico and Egypt are based, at least in
part, in ENGOs, academic institutions and scientific communities from the United States,
the UK and continental Europe.
The preponderance of apparent Northern actors in these transnational networks is
not obviated by observing that the language used by the networks is based on scientific,
ostensibly universal epistemologies. Authors such as Kütting and Lipschultz
problematize the authority accorded to scientific inquiry as a rationalist epistemology that
de-legitimates worldviews based on, for example, cultural or emotional
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epistemologies.720 Additionally problematic, science is validated in ways that tend not to
acknowledge the fact that scientific inquiry itself is driven by normative biases.
However, this research indicates that concerns about the potential anti-democratic
nature of transnational expert advocacy may not be warranted. In practice, domestic
policymaking and natural resource management in developing countries may frequently
be non-democratic, even where policymakers can claim a public mandate. Khagram721
and Moog Rodrigues722 both illustrate cases of popularly elected governments in India
and post-transitional Brazil respectively, where domestic natural resource management
policy created tremendous costs for marginalized rural populations.
A similar logic adheres in the cases described here. While Egypt cannot plausibly
make the claim to be a representative government, Jamaica and Mexico, especially after
2000, are administered by governments that can credibly base their legitimacy on their
electoral support by the mass public. Nevertheless, the erstwhile stances taken by these
government officials over natural resource management have clearly negative
consequences for local populations. Bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country, if it took
place, would have resulted in the loss of economic livelihood among Maroons and
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agricultural populations who resided in areas of bauxite deposits. Indeed, as the research
indicates, bauxite companies were allegedly seeking to relocate residents, before public
outcry and a responsive administration halted bauxite expansionist plans. Similarly, the
ongoing concern among coastal fishing populations in Quintana Roo was that hoteliers
continuing the pattern of large-scale resort construction would damage marine
ecosystems to the extent that fishing would become impossible.
Consequently, the anti-democratic assertions of critical theorists can be alleviated
by noting that transnational knowledge networks in practice may oppose transnational
and domestic forces that marginalize local populations. Indeed, as suggested here,
transnational knowledge networks are likely to meet their environmental policy goals
when they adopt frameworks and strategies that empower local populations and improve
their autonomy over natural resource management. By doing so, transnational sciencebased activism can contribute not only to global environmental governance, but also to
comparatively democratic policymaking in LDCs.
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